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Scholarship about the Constitution’s meaning generally fo-
cuses on four core features of the document: the rights that it 
creates, the obligations that it imposes, the institutions that it 
empowers, and the relationships that it structures. These con-
cepts are clearly important. But understanding how these con-
cepts translate into doctrine requires considering an aspect of 
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the Constitution that scholars have not systemically analyzed. 
This overlooked dimension is the Constitution’s identification, 
definition, and integration of the physical spaces in which it 
applies. Spatial precision is essential because knowing how the 
Constitution addresses a particular problem often requires 
knowing where the problem arises. The text remains the same, 
but its significance varies as one travels between, for example, 
Maryland, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guantánamo 
Bay, and Afghanistan. Yet despite the importance and perva-
siveness of spatial references in the Constitution, commenta-
tors have not analyzed these references collectively. 
This Article fills that gap in the literature by considering 
each of the fourteen spaces that the Constitution identifies, as 
well as several that it overlooks, to reveal patterns in the text’s 
approach to delineating the physical domain in which it ap-
plies. The analysis shows that many discrete problems on 
which scholars have focused—such as the rights of U.S. mili-
tary detainees abroad and the extraterritorial reach of state 
law—are manifestations of a broader phenomenon that exists 
because of indeterminacy in the Constitution’s typology of 
spaces. Considering these spaces together highlights this inde-
terminacy, provides new perspectives on commonly discussed 
problems, and exposes additional puzzles that have escaped 
scrutiny. The Article thus provides a foundation for future 
scholarship addressing a wide range of constitutional questions 
linked to the boundaries and status of discrete spaces. 
The importance of spatial distinctions emerges from three 
of the Constitution’s signature features: its bifurcation of sover-
eignty, its recognition of fifty semi-autonomous subnational 
units, and its enumeration of individual rights. The fragmenta-
tion of regulatory authority raises vexing allocation problems: 
the Constitution must allocate power vertically between the 
federal and state governments, and horizontally among the 
states.1 Compounding these problems is the fact that the allo-
cation of power is sometimes exclusive and sometimes concur-
rent. A conclusion that one entity (such as Congress or a state) 
possesses a given power does not foreclose further inquiry into 
whether the same power resides in another entity, and if so 
 
 1. See Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493, 504–
05 (2008) (explaining how vertical federalism and horizontal federalism prob-
lems overlap). 
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how those overlapping powers operate in tandem.2 The Consti-
tution’s enumeration of rights and the historical importance of 
territorial limits on institutional authority add further com-
plexity when thinking about the text’s spatial distinctions. 
Each constitutionally defined space has at least one corre-
sponding governing entity and governed community that may 
have more or less power, or more or fewer rights, when acting 
within or beyond a particular place. In essence, most people are 
citizens in some places and aliens in others, and governments 
are sovereign in some places and foreign in others. The permis-
sibility of particular interactions between people and govern-
ments can therefore vary depending on the relationship be-
tween them, the territorial scope of the government’s authority, 
and the territorial reach of individual rights.3 Fragmented reg-
ulatory authority and enumerated rights thus combine to 
create a central question of constitutional law: Which unit(s) of 
government, if any, may exercise binding power with respect to 
particular matters? 
The Constitution takes three distinct approaches to an-
swering the “which unit” question by focusing, variously, on 
who is acting, what they are doing, and where they are doing 
it.4 For example, if the relevant actor is a foreign ambassador, 
federal courts possess adjudicative authority that might other-
wise lie in state courts.5 If the actor is instead a private citizen 
engaging in interstate commerce, Congress possesses legisla-
tive authority that it might otherwise lack.6 And if the actor’s 
noncommercial conduct occurs in a national forest, federal 
power may exist to a greater degree than if the conduct oc-
curred on land belonging to a state.7 
Most scholarship about the Constitution’s allocation of 
regulatory authority focuses on the who and what aspects by 
considering whether the federal or state governments should 
 
 2. See generally Mark D. Rosen, From Exclusivity to Concurrence, 94 
MINN. L. REV. 1051 (2010) (analyzing evolving understandings of when powers 
are or should be exclusive or concurrent). 
 3. See infra notes 33–34 (discussing how law shapes and is shaped by 
notions of territory). 
 4. A fourth question—when conduct occurred—is relevant when consti-
tutional amendments or nonretroactive changes in controlling precedent draw 
a temporal line between otherwise indistinguishable acts. 
 5. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 6. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 7. See infra Part I.G. 
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have authority to regulate various kinds of actors or activities.8 
But the where question merits closer scrutiny because of the 
Constitution’s haphazard approach to defining physical spaces 
and assigning significance to those spaces. 
The key to understanding the where question in constitu-
tional law is to recognize that spaces are important because 
they have boundaries, and those boundaries are important be-
cause they create an inside and outside and define people as in-
siders or outsiders. These inside/outside distinctions animate a 
broad range of constitutional doctrines. Judges must constantly 
consider what must and cannot happen in certain spaces, who 
decides what may happen in these spaces, and whether the 
force of particular powers and rights varies with the physical 
context of their assertion or the affiliation of actors and the 
people they affect. Opinions thus emphasize whether conduct 
happened in a particular space, whether a regulator is of a par-
ticular space, or whether an actor is from a particular space. Of 
course, the empirical prominence of spatial boundaries in con-
stitutional analysis does not mean that analysis based on spa-
tial distinctions is normatively sound. The extent to which lines 
on a map should determine government prerogatives and indi-
vidual entitlements is debatable.9 But for better or worse, “the 
People” who “ordain[ed] and establish[ed]” the Constitution or-
ganized themselves within overlapping spaces marked by phys-
ical borders that play at least some role in structuring relation-
ships between and among political units and their 
constituencies.10 This Article explores that role by considering 
multiple permutations of the “where” question in constitutional 
law. 
Thinking about how to apply the where component of con-
stitutional law (as opposed to the who and what components) 
 
 8. For examples of articles discussing aspects of the “where” question, 
see infra notes 33–34. One can ask similar who/what/when questions from a 
different perspective. Instead of focusing on how the Constitution applies to 
private conduct (who is acting, what are they doing, where are they doing it, 
and when did it happen), one can focus on how the Constitution constrains 
government officials (who is the official that is violating the Constitution, how 
did the violation occur, and when did it occur). For an example of this latter 
approach, see Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 
STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1211 (2010) (“[J]udicial review should begin by asking 
who has violated the Constitution?” and then consider “when was the Constitu-
tion violated?,” because “the answer to when follows inexorably from the an-
swer to who”). 
 9. See infra notes 33–34. 
 10. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
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requires answering two questions. First, we need to know how 
a particular location in physical space maps onto constitutional 
space. In other words, what is the formal constitutional status 
of the places where the conduct occurs, or an actor or object is 
located? For example, the place might be within a state, a terri-
tory, the high seas, or a foreign country. Second, once we know 
what kind of place we are dealing with, we need to know what 
consequences (if any) flow from that categorization. We there-
fore must consider which entities possess power to regulate the 
space, whether the space’s unique identity limits that power, 
whether the power applies uniformly to all people and entities 
within the space, and whether any mechanisms exist for resolv-
ing competing assertions of concurrent authority.11 The initial 
source of answers to both the formal categorization and func-
tional analytical questions is the Constitution, which supplies 
the basic rules for allocating power among the entities that it 
creates (the national government), that created it (the people), 
and that preceded it (the states). Yet the Constitution does not 
explicitly answer many salient questions about the contours 
and characteristics of constitutional space.12 This indetermina-
cy helps explain why disputes about the scope and allocation of 
institutional authority have proven so vexing for over 230 
years.13 
 
 11. I have framed the questions in terms of government power over places 
rather than individual rights within places to highlight the importance of fed-
eralism. However, one could also reframe the issue as implicating the extent to 
which a person’s presence in a particular space confers a right that might not 
exist if the person were located elsewhere. Cf. Erbsen, supra note 1, at 562–66 
(noting a distinction between limits on a government’s capacity to regulate 
and rights constraining that capacity). 
 12. This Article’s emphasis on the Constitution’s text—both on what the 
Constitution includes in numerous scattered clauses and what it omits—
illuminates connections between seemingly distinct doctrinal questions related 
to regulation of physical spaces. The insights from such “structural analysis” 
can support further inquiry and normative conclusions using a wide range of 
interpretative methods. Erbsen, supra note 1, at 530. In a prior article, I dis-
cussed the value of “mapping the terrain” by reading the Constitution “system-
ically” through a particular prism as a precursor to “further scholarship incor-
porating originalist, textualist, or normative methods in the context of specific 
fact patterns and doctrines,” id., although I noted reasons to be cautious when 
relying on the Constitution’s structure as a source of meaning, see id. at 530 
nn.122–23. 
 13. Thinking about gaps in the Constitution fits within a line of scholar-
ship analyzing the consequences of placing extensive weight on a short docu-
ment produced over only a few months by a small group that could not antic-
ipate and provide for all contingencies. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, 
THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS (2005); SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR 
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The Constitution creates the foundation for drawing a map 
of the domain that it governs by creating components (such as 
states, districts, and territories) that each generation of leaders 
could add or rearrange as the nation evolved.14 Unfortunately, 
the Framers did not fully define these components. Labels on a 
map therefore do not communicate complete information about 
the legal significance of the places that they represent. Rather 
than thinking through the “where” component of federalism ho-
listically, the Framers addressed the issue in a piecemeal fa-
shion throughout the Constitution. The document lacks a “Ge-
ography Clause” that systematically defines each kind of 
legally relevant place subject to regulation by actors in the fed-
eral system, the relationship of each place to other places, and 
the legal significance of boundaries between these places. In-
stead, the Constitution introduced and elaborated upon differ-
ent kinds of places as the need arose based on the context of the 
moment. 
The drafters’ ad hoc approach to the nation’s constitutive 
DNA created four problems that plague modern attempts to 
construct a coherent account of how the different pieces of the 
constitutional order fit together. First, the Constitution identi-
fies some places by name without fully defining their physical 
scope, leading to confusion about whether a particular point in 
space is within or beyond the place’s borders. Second, some 
places have boundaries that are easily determined, but those 
boundaries have an ambiguous significance that leads to confu-
sion about why the existence of a particular place matters and 
about how it should be regulated. Third, many constitutionally 
defined places physically overlap, yet the Constitution often 
does not explain how to handle the conflicts that inevitably 
arise when the same space exists within multiple regulatory 
regimes. Fourth, the Constitution does not mention some places 
at all, despite the fact that they clearly exist in physical space 
 
UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG 
(AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006); Symposium, Constitu-
tional Stupidities, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 139 (1995). 
 14. The Framers themselves could not draw a permanent map because 
fixing boundaries for and within the new nation would have been impractical: 
the Framers could not have known which states would be part of the initial 
union (up to four of the thirteen states could have refused to join), see U.S. 
CONST. art. VII, could not have anticipated the borders of federal units such as 
districts, and would have faced cartographical obsolescence due to expansion 
of the Union through the addition of new states and territories. The Framers 
could therefore go no further than defining the basic components for future 
mapmakers to assemble over time. 
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and pose difficult legal problems that would benefit from a con-
stitutional solution. The Constitution thus creates a typology of 
spaces that only partially addresses the questions intrinsic to 
the “where” component of federalism while leaving many pivot-
al questions unanswered. 
This Article explores the Constitution’s typology of spaces 
in two steps. Part I analyzes each of the fourteen spaces that 
the Constitution specifically enumerates. The goal is not to de-
finitively explain what each relevant clause means, but rather 
to expose ambiguity about the scope and significance of each 
space and to illustrate how similar ambiguities reappear in 
multiple contexts. Reading the Constitution through this spa-
tial prism highlights connections between clauses that are rare-
ly analyzed together, and that scholars often overlook entirely. 
Part II then considers spaces that the Constitution does not ex-
pressly address, such as tribal lands and what I call “Adjacent 
Spaces” that are above, below, beside, or between the spaces 
that the Constitution enumerates. Each of these spaces 
presents questions about the role of federal and state authority 
that have confounded courts in part because of the Constitu-
tion’s silence. 
Parts I and II illustrate four basic points on which future 
scholarship can build. First, although the Constitution creates 
a typology of spaces that relies on formal categories, the catego-
ries often have little utility in resolving specific questions. The 
text’s description of the physical contours of spaces and the le-
gal significance of their borders is too imprecise to permit a ju-
risprudence of labels that converts lines on a map into “bright 
line” rules of decision. Determining where in physical space a 
problem arises is therefore a necessary but insufficient prereq-
uisite to determining which government entities can address 
the problem and how they may respond. Second, constitutional-
ly defined places routinely overlap, such that a point in physi-
cal space can map onto several points in constitutional space. 
Drawing conclusions about how the Constitution regulates par-
ticular spaces in particular contexts therefore requires develop-
ing rules for allocating concurrent authority and resolving 
competing claims. Third, even when spaces do not physically 
overlap, events in one space routinely have consequences in 
others, residents of a space routinely act in others, and agents 
of an entity that controls a particular space often operate in 
other spaces. These spillovers raise questions about when enti-
ties (such as states, the United States, and tribes) can regulate 
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beyond borders that would normally cabin their jurisdiction. 
The parameters of a constitutionally defined place are thus not 
necessarily coextensive with the reach of an entity governing 
that place. Finally, the same questions tend to recur in mul-
tiple spatial contexts. For example, who decides the boundary 
of a space and by what standards, when can federal courts 
create common law governing a space, and when does the text’s 
explicit enumeration of a space’s attributes imply by negative 
implication the absence of other attributes? Exposing how these 
questions arise in multiple contexts reveals subtle dimensions 
of problems that can go unnoticed when viewed in isolation. 
The pervasive and overlooked “where” question in constitution-
al law therefore merits systemic scrutiny. 
I.  THE LAND OF THE LAW: THE CONSTITUTION’S AD 
HOC TYPOLOGY OF PHYSICAL SPACES   
This Part discusses the constitutional clauses that address 
the physical spaces in which the Constitution applies. The four-
teen spatial categories that the Constitution creates are: “the 
Land,” the “United States,” “States,” “Territory,” “territory,” 
“Places,” “places,” “Property,” “possessions,” a “District,” the 
“Seat,” “districts,” the “high Seas,” and “admiralty and mari-
time Jurisdiction.”15 These constitutional spaces are not the on-
ly spaces in the federal system. For example, federal statutes 
define judicial “circuits,”16 administrative “regions,”17 foreign 
trade “zones,”18 enterprise “communities,”19 historic “sites,”20 
 
 15. The Constitution also refers to other tangible spaces with either fixed 
or transient locations, such as “houses,” U.S. CONST. amends. III, IV, and 
“ports,” “ships,” and “vessels,” id. art. I, §§ 9, 10. These spaces are important in 
the contexts in which they appear and generate related jurisprudence. See, 
e.g., United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 296 (1987) (distinguishing a “house” 
from the “curtilage” surrounding it). “Houses” are particularly interesting be-
cause their physical borders create a metaphorical domestic sphere that dis-
torts the operation of otherwise applicable legal norms. See DAVID DELANEY, 
TERRITORY 7–8 (2005) (discussing rules governing privacy and self-defense as 
examples of how legal regimes attach significance to territorial boundaries 
surrounding homes). See generally JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW 
THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY (2009) 
(analyzing the evolution of legal rules governing conduct in homes). Neverthe-
less, these tangible spaces are not analogous to the spaces that I discuss. My 
focus is on the political dimensions of space within a federal system—i.e., how 
the Constitution allocates government authority over various physical ex-
panses—rather than on the status of various structures within that space. 
 16. 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2006). 
 17. 6 U.S.C. § 317 (2006) (creating homeland security “region[s]”). 
 18. 19 U.S.C. § 81b (2006). 
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and the “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States,”21 which extends both extraterritorially and 
extraterrestrially.22 State statutes similarly define various mu-
nicipal23 and “sublocal”24 divisions. Likewise, courts have de-
fined spaces to aid in applying constitutional provisions that 
lack a clear physical scope, including “public forums” under the 
First Amendment25 and “open fields” under the Fourth 
Amendment.26 Even the shape of spaces normally under discre-
tionary state control—such as voting districts,27 school dis-
tricts,28 and cities29—can have constitutional significance if 
their boundaries meander based on suspicious criteria. Al-
though these statutory and common law spaces are interesting, 
their existence and contours are ephemeral compared to the 
spaces that comprise the Constitution’s relatively immutable 
 
 19. 26 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) (2006). 
 20. 49 U.S.C. § 303 (2006). 
 21. 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). 
 22. See, e.g., id. § 6 (encompassing vehicles in “Outer Space”); id. § 9(B) 
(encompassing privately owned land in foreign countries “used” in connection 
with diplomatic missions). 
 23. Examples include towns, villages, parishes, cities, boroughs, and coun-
ties, which might be further fragmented or sorted into various administrative 
units, such as school and irrigation districts. See generally 1 EUGENE 
MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ch. 2 (3d ed. 2010). 
 24. Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Govern-
ance, 82 MINN. L. REV. 503, 508 (1997) (discussing Tax Increment Finance 
Districts, Business Improvement Districts, Special Zoning Districts, and En-
terprise Zones). 
 25. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 
(1983). 
 26. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 173 (1984) (“The ‘open fields’ doc-
trine . . . permits police officers to enter and search a field without a warrant.”). 
 27. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913 (1995) (“Shape [of a voting 
district] is relevant not because bizarreness is a necessary element of the con-
stitutional wrong or a threshold requirement of proof, but because it may be 
persuasive circumstantial evidence that race for its own sake, and not other 
districting principles, was the legislature’s dominant and controlling rationale 
in drawing its district lines.”); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578 (1964) (not-
ing the states’ interest in drawing voting districts that are “compact” and “con-
tiguous”). 
 28. See Haney v. Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 410 F.2d 920, 924–25 (8th Cir. 1969) 
(noting that school district boundaries are “lines of convenience” that cannot 
“deny federal rights,” and that the Constitution prohibits racial “gerrymander-
ing” and reliance on “geographic structuring” tainted by prior segregation re-
gimes). 
 29. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960) (holding that the 
Constitution barred the Alabama legislature from redrawing a city’s borders in-
to “a strangely irregular twenty-eight-sided figure” that exiled “all save four or 
five of its 400 Negro voters while not removing a single white voter”). 
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infrastructure. This Article therefore focuses solely on constitu-
tionally defined spaces. 
The goal of this section is to highlight the utility of concur-
rently considering all the spaces that the Constitution men-
tions. The discussion of each space is therefore not intended to 
be comprehensive—nor could it be, given that there are four-
teen spaces to cover in a single Article. Instead, this section 
highlights salient features and ambiguities of each space and 
notes some of the interesting and overlapping issues that each 
relevant clause raises. This analysis suggests the existence of 
patterns that can add new dimensions to evolving scholarship 
about the many areas of constitutional doctrine linked to the 
clauses discussed below.  
Generating insights about constitutional law by adopting a 
spatial perspective is consistent with and reinforces observa-
tions in the emerging field of law and geography. Academic 
geographers have developed a rich methodology and vocabulary 
for analyzing the public and private ordering of physical 
space.30 Scholarship considers, for example, the cultural, politi-
cal, economic, and legal regimes that animate, divide, and tran-
scend distinct kinds of spaces and the communities and ecosys-
tems within them.31 Insights from this field help explain the 
 
 30. “Geography studies the way in which place, space, and scale interact 
over time.” Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation Part 
II: Narratives of Massachusetts v. EPA, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 573, 583–84 (2008). 
These terms have a nuanced and contested meaning within the field. See id. at 
584–86. A simpler lexicon suffices for my purpose of highlighting overlooked 
spatial themes in the Constitution’s text. I use “space” in the colloquial sense 
of “a physical expanse” and recognize that law defines certain spaces in a 
manner that organizes them into “places.” However, the terms are intended 
merely to be helpful and do not have any formal significance in my analysis. I 
do not directly engage the concept of scale—essentially, the level of abstraction 
with which one considers nested spaces and places. The Constitution itself 
provides scale in the clauses that create spatial distinctions (e.g., enclaves 
nested within states nested within the United States). This ordering raises a 
question for future scholarship about whether ostensibly discrete types of con-
stitutionally defined spaces warrant distinct legal treatment, or are merely 
smaller or larger variations of an archetype operating at multiple scales. Cf. 
Dennis R. Judd, The Case of the Missing Scales: A Commentary on Cox, 17 
POL. GEOGRAPHY 29, 30 (1998) (contending that analysis of scale must account 
for missing levels of government that could exist, and whose absence distorts 
the operation of the levels that remain). 
 31. See, e.g., NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES 
OF POWER (1994); NEIL BRENNER, NEW STATE SPACES: URBAN GOVERNANCE 
AND THE RESCALING OF STATEHOOD (2004); GEOGRAPHY’S INNER WORLDS: 
PERVASIVE THEMES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN GEOGRAPHY (Ronald F. Ab-
ler et al. eds., 1992); PETER JACKSON, MAPS OF MEANING: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
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persistence, utility, and dysfunction of spatial categories and 
suggest creative responses to recurring questions of public poli-
cy.32 Scholars have extended these insights to constitutional 
law by considering how uncritical assumptions about the signif-
icance of territorial borders and national affiliation influence 
legal fictions such as jurisdiction and citizenship.33 This analy-
 
CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY (1989); EDWARD W. SOJA, POSTMODERN GEOGRAPHIES: 
THE REASSERTION OF SPACE IN CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY (1989). 
 32. See, e.g., DAVID DELANEY, RACE, PLACE, AND THE LAW 1836–1948 
(1998) (analyzing race relations in the context of political and social ordering 
of physical space); LAW AND GEOGRAPHY (Jane Holder & Carolyn Harrison 
eds., 2002) (collecting essays on spatial dimensions of recurring questions af-
fecting disparate fields such as antitrust law, environmental law, and family 
law); Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped Out of Local Democracy, 62 STAN. L. 
REV. 931, 933–34 (2010) (analyzing “spatial inequality” that arises when city 
boundary lines are drawn to create adjacent “unincorporated urban areas” 
that lack access to essential services); Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and 
Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. 
REV. 1293, 1318–22 (1996) (considering how the flow of information across na-
tional borders challenges the nexus between a government’s territorial sover-
eignty and its definition and protection of intellectual property); Daniel A. 
Farber, Stretching the Margins: The Geographic Nexus in Environmental Law, 
48 STAN. L. REV. 1247, 1249–57 (1996) (examining how the connection be-
tween a potential plaintiff and a place where environmental harm occurs 
should affect the plaintiff ’s standing to sue about the harm); Richard Thomp-
son Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1844–45 (1994) (discussing the relationship between seg-
regation, “racially identified space,” and “political geography—the position and 
function of jurisdictional and quasi-jurisdictional boundaries”); Gerald L. 
Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1201–06 (1996) (exploring 
how otherwise applicable legal norms can go unenforced in spaces that resist 
the extension of government authority or individual entitlements either by de-
sign or systemic quirk); Myron Orfield & Thomas F. Luce, Jr., Governing 
American Metropolitan Areas: Spatial Policy and Regional Governance, in 
MEGAREGIONS: PLANNING FOR GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS 250 (Catherine L. 
Ross ed., 2009) (discussing challenges of governing regions encompassing nu-
merous spaces defined at different scales, such as distinct local governments 
within adjacent, yet competing, states); Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of 
Climate Change Litigation: Implications for Transnational Regulatory Govern-
ance, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1789, 1802 (2005) (considering the “web of place-based 
relationships” underlying climate change litigation); Robert R.M. Verchick, 
Critical Space Theory: Keeping Local Geography in American and European 
Environmental Law, 73 TUL. L. REV. 739, 742–50 (1999) (analyzing how criti-
cal theory can inform solutions to problems of transborder environmental 
management). See generally DELANEY, supra note 15, at 4–5 (noting that “in-
numerable complex territorial configurations and assemblages . . . shape hu-
man social life, relationships, and interactions,” including “micro-territories of 
everyday life” and “macro-territories of global politics”).  
 33. See LAUREN BENTON, A SEARCH FOR SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND 
GEOGRAPHY IN EUROPEAN EMPIRES 1400–1900 (2010) (exploring the European 
antecedents of territorial concepts of sovereignty that influence modern U.S. 
law); Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 
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sis of how law and space intersect provides a useful lens for 
evaluating specific doctrines, such as rules governing immigra-
tion, the extraterritorial application of U.S. law, and the prop-
erty rights of indigenous tribes.34 The approach in this Article 
adds a new dimension to the literature by examining broader 
questions about how the Constitution defines and fragments 
the physical domain where it operates, how the many types of 
constitutional spaces overlap, how each space raises similar 
questions about the allocation of regulatory power and scope of 
entitlements, and how considering these spaces collectively can 
potentially inform our understanding of each. 
A. THE “LAND” 
A threshold question when thinking about how the Consti-
tution regulates particular matters is “where does the Consti-
tution apply?” We know that the Constitution creates “supreme 
Law,”35 but it is not supreme everywhere on Earth. For exam-
ple, it is not the supreme law of the various islands comprising 
 
311, 424 (2002) (contending that “jurisdictional rules reflect and construct so-
cial conceptions of space”); Hannah L. Buxbaum, Territory, Territoriality, and 
the Resolution of Jurisdictional Conflict, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 631, 636 (2009) 
(exploring how “claims of territoriality and extraterritoriality resonate differ-
ently” in distinct legal systems that view jurisdiction through “different 
lenses”); Richard T. Ford, Law’s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. 
L. REV. 843, 851 (1999) (“The logic of government is the logic of jurisdiction—
question it and all that is solid melts into air.”); Peter S. Onuf, Federalism, 
Republicanism, and the Origins of American Sectionalism, in ALL OVER THE 
MAP: RETHINKING AMERICAN REGIONS 11 (Edward L. Ayers et al. eds., 1996) 
(discussing the role of sectional rivalries in the design and operation of the 
U.S. federal system); Timothy Zick, Constitutional Displacement, 86 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 515, 518 (2009) (analyzing “how the combination of laws, customs, and 
physical borders creates and shapes . . . ‘Geographies of Displacement,’ which 
in turn affect the exercise of fundamental personal liberties”). 
 34. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: 
IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996) (examining how the 
Constitution applies to citizens and aliens within and outside states and terri-
tories); KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? THE 
EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW (2009) (analyzing the 
“extraterritoriality” and “intraterritoriality” of constitutional provisions that 
have different effects within and beyond U.S. territory and between different 
types of U.S. territory); Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Justice Wormholes: 
Dilemmas from Property and Criminal Law, 53 VILL. L. REV. 117 (2008) (dis-
cussing federal power to detain enemy combatants within the United States 
and to expropriate land belonging to Native Americans); Kermit Roosevelt III, 
Guantánamo and the Conflict of Laws: Rasul and Beyond, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 
2017, 2060 (2005) (critiquing the “mechanical” equation of “sovereignty” with 
“geography” in “territorialist” theories of the Constitution’s scope). 
 35. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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the United Kingdom. If it were, the Constitution would have 
been the culmination of a coup rather than a war of indepen-
dence.36 Given that the Constitution is not supreme every-
where, it must be supreme only somewhere, and as readers we 
would benefit from knowing where that somewhere is. For ex-
ample, does it govern only within the borders of the states com-
prising the “United States,” or also in possessions beyond those 
borders (such as a naval base in Cuba), or anywhere that an 
agent or instrumentality of the United States happens to be? 
And if the Constitution (or a portion of it) does apply, does it 
apply differently in different types of places? 
The Constitution appears to explicitly tell us where it ap-
plies, albeit unhelpfully and misleadingly. According to Article 
VI, the Constitution is “supreme” only with respect to “the 
Land.”37 The use of the definite article “the” and the capital “L” 
seems to imply that “the Land” is a specific place and that the 
Constitution is not merely a treatise on real estate—the “su-
preme law of land.”38 This reading suggests that if an event oc-
curs at a physical point located within “the Land” then the 
Constitution applies, and if the event occurs outside “the Land” 
then the Constitution is irrelevant. All we would need to know 
to determine whether the Constitution applies is how far “the 
Land” extends (including whether “Land” is a term of art that 
also encompasses water39 and airspace40). But it turns out that 
this binary inside/outside interpretation of “the Land” oversim-
plifies the complex problem of territoriality in constitutional 
law and that the real meaning of “the Land” is elusive and unil-
luminating. 
 
 36. The Constitution acknowledges its limited geographic scope by recog-
nizing the existence of “foreign” entities that are presumably beyond its con-
trol. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 3, 5; id. § 9, cl. 8; id. § 10, cl. 3; id. art. III, § 2. 
 37. Id. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 38. The capitalization of the “L” on its own would not be dispositive be-
cause the Constitution uses “Land” to refer to private parcels, id. art. III, § 2, 
and generic physical expanses, id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (referring to captures on 
“Land”). But cf. id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (referring to military “land” forces). For a 
discussion of the important and sometimes inscrutable role of grammar and 
punctuation in constitutional interpretation, see Vasan Kesavan & Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 291, 
334–41 (2002) (explaining the importance of a semicolon in Article IV). 
 39. The text is inconsistent about how it uses “Land” in the context of wa-
ter. The Constitution presumably must be the supreme law of Lake Tahoe 
even though that portion of “the Land” is covered by water, yet the Constitu-
tion elsewhere expressly distinguishes between “Land and Water.” U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 40. See infra Part II.B. 
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The phrase “the Land” has received virtually no attention 
from courts and commentators. But what little information 
there is suggests that the Framers’ decision to link the Consti-
tution to “the Land” did not resolve questions about the Consti-
tution’s geographic scope and has complicated several recurring 
questions in constitutional law. Two approaches to interpreting 
“the Land” seem plausible, but neither is helpful in resolving 
specific doctrinal problems. One option is that “the Land” is an 
abstract idea rather than a physical place, and the other is that 
“the Land” has a physical dimension but that its scope varies 
depending on the legal context. Either way, the Supremacy 
Clause would provide only minimal guidance about where the 
Constitution is supreme. 
The first problem with interpreting “the Land” in Article 
VI is that the words may be subsumed into the broader phrase 
“Law of the Land” and thus reflect an abstract idea about the 
nature of law rather than defining a physical place. The Consti-
tution’s drafters adapted the phrase “law of the land” from the 
Magna Carta,41 where it was used to identify a set of rules and 
entitlements that constrained the King and thus functioned as 
“higher” law trumping royal prerogative.42 The Framers appar-
ently transformed the idea of higher law into “supreme” law. 
They accented the point by clarifying that the Constitution 
(and derivative laws and treaties) play a similar role in the 
United States that the “law of the land” played in England.43 
Read from this perspective, the Supremacy Clause includes re-
dundant language—it would have been sufficient to say either 
that the Constitution was “supreme law” or the “law of the 
land” without using both constructions. But, redundant or not, 
the phrase “the Land” would be a historic artifact that has 
nothing to say about the geographic scope of the Constitution’s 
operation. If this interpretation of “the Land” is correct, then 
 
 41. See Magna Carta, ch. 29 (1225), reprinted in RALPH TURNER, MAGNA 
CARTA THROUGH THE AGES 231 (2003). 
 42. Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due 
Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amend-
ment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585, 599, 622–40 (2008) (discussing the founding genera-
tion’s awareness of the “law of the land” concept in the Magna Carta and schol-
arly commentary); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 552 (2004) 
(Souter, J., concurring) (“[W]e are heirs to a tradition given voice 800 years ago 
by Magna Carta, which, on the barons’ insistence, confined executive power by 
‘the law of the land.’”); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134–35. 
 43. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 204–05 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961) (observing that the supremacy of federal law is a necessary 
consequence of binding distinct governments into a union). 
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the Framers did not even try to expressly define the Constitu-
tion’s geographic reach and left open the question of where the 
Constitution was supreme. 
This omission of a general spatial referent should not be 
surprising because the question of where the Constitution ap-
plies is a red herring when asked outside of a specific doctrinal 
context. Certain constitutional provisions apply everywhere. 
For instance, if the President visits the Queen of England in 
Buckingham Palace, he is still the President. He retains his Ar-
ticle II powers (the military must follow his lawful orders even 
if he issues them while in England), and he cannot use his 
presence beyond the United States as an excuse to act contrary 
to Article II’s limits (for example, by appointing a Supreme 
Court Justice without Senate consent while the Senate is in 
session).44 Likewise, some constitutional provisions apply only 
to specific places, such as the clause authorizing District of Co-
lumbia residents to vote in presidential elections.45 The ques-
tion of where the Constitution “applies” therefore is challenging 
only when asked in a context where the text might yield differ-
ent conclusions depending on spatial factors. For instance, 
states, tribes, and Congress might have power to regulate in 
some places but not in others, and the vitality of particular 
rights might vary based on where people assert them. The Con-
stitution thus lacks a uniform spatial reach. Rather, specific 
components have distinct zones of applicability, and so one 
should not expect to find a general clause that defines the Con-
stitution’s reach in all circumstances. 
Another set of problems arises if we assume that “the 
Land” does in fact refer to specific physical spaces. First, there 
 
 44. Article II might have a spatial limit if the President’s location made 
him “unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. XXV, § 4. For example, if the President decided to travel on the space 
shuttle or to the moon under circumstances where he could not reliably commu-
nicate with Earth, one could imagine the Vice President and principal cabinet 
officers removing the President from power for the duration of his voyage. See id. 
 45. See id. amend. XXIII. The right to vote presumably also authorizes 
casting absentee ballots outside the District, but the right remains geographi-
cally limited in the sense that absentee voters must retain some affiliation 
with the District. See D.C. CODE § 1-1001.02(2)(C) (2001) (requiring prospec-
tive voters to “maintain a residence in the District for at least 30 days preced-
ing the next election”); id. § 1-1001.02(16)(A) (“The term ‘residence’, for pur-
poses of voting, means the principal or primary home or place of abode of a 
person.”); cf. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965) (“[States have] un-
questioned power to impose reasonable residence restrictions of the availabili-
ty of the ballot.”). 
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is no authoritative account of the Land’s contours. The text is 
silent about how far “the Land” extends, the Supreme Court 
has never tried to interpret “the Land,”46 and commentators 
analyzing the phrase “Law of the Land” generally focus on the 
content of the “Law”47 rather than the scope of the “Land.”48 
Second, there is no proxy for “the Land” elsewhere in the Con-
stitution’s typology of places. In particular, “the Land” is not 
synonymous with the borders of the “United States” or its pos-
sessions because the Constitution authorizes action with re-
spect to places that are not physically within the broad ambit of 
the United States. For example, Congress may regulate certain 
acts “committed on the high Seas”49 and the conduct of military 
service members on foreign battlefields.50 The Constitution 
thus extends beyond any plausible definition of U.S. bounda-
ries.51 
Third, the fact that the Constitution may apply in some 
lands for only limited purposes (e.g., on the high seas for the 
purpose of combating piracy and other felonies) suggests that 
the Supremacy Clause does not really mean what it appears to 
say. The Constitution is not in fact the “supreme” law of the 
lands where it applies because it applies on the high seas and 
foreign battlefields and yet is not the supreme law of the Atlan-
 
 46. Justice Harlan, writing in dissent, suggested that the Land “manifest-
ly embraced all the peoples and all the territory, whether within or without 
the states, over which the United States could exercise jurisdiction or authori-
ty.” Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 383 (1901) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The 
emphasis on “jurisdiction” of a governing entity suggests that constitutional 
supremacy is partly a function of who is acting and what they are doing in ad-
dition to where the action occurs. 
 47. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, “Law of the Land” Reconsidered, 74 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1, 1 (1979); Gedicks, supra note 42, at 594–95; Carlos Manuel Vázquez, 
Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial En-
forcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 618 (2008). 
 48. For rare examples of scholarship mentioning “the Land’s” geographic 
component, see J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a 
Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463, 509 (2007) (stating that the Constitu-
tion is the supreme law of a specific land and not “any other place”); Zick, su-
pra note 33, at 530 (observing that “Land” may reference a physical place, but 
not attempting to define that place). 
 49. U.S. CONST. art I., § 8, cl. 10. 
 50. Id. art. I., § 8, cl. 14; 10 U.S.C. § 805 (2006) (stating that the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice “applies in all places”). 
 51. The high seas and U.S. territory may overlap to a limited extent, but 
the bulk of the high seas extends far beyond the United States. See 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(2) (2006) (preserving “the character of the waters above the outer Con-
tinental Shelf as high seas”). 
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tic Ocean and Afghanistan.52 A more accurate reading would be 
that the Constitution is the supreme law of the places where it 
applies, to the extent that it applies, for the duration of its ap-
plication.53 
This more nuanced reading of the Supremacy Clause sug-
gests that the scope of “the Land” and the content of the “Law” 
are interdependent. If the Constitution’s application to a par-
ticular territory is context-sensitive, then “the Land” is not a 
fixed place. It has a stable core, but at the margins it is a con-
stantly evolving set of locations that ebbs and flows with the 
movement of people and institutions subject to constitutional 
 
 52. “The Land” can even overlap with the boundaries of a foreign country 
if that country consents. For example, in the nineteenth century the United 
States often negotiated agreements with foreign nations that allowed it to op-
erate consular courts with broad criminal and civil jurisdiction over U.S. citi-
zens. See, e.g., Act of June 22, 1860, ch. 179, 12 Stat. 72 (authorizing consular 
courts in Japan, China, and Siam); Act of Aug. 1, 1956, ch. 807, 70 Stat. 773 
(repealing statutory authorization for consular courts upon confirmation by 
the President that the last such court, in Morocco, would relinquish jurisdic-
tion). The United States even went so far as to create “the United States Court 
for China.” Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3934, 34 Stat. 814, 814. This unusual 
court had judges appointed by the President (with Senate consent), applied 
“the common law and the law as established by the decisions of the courts of 
the United States,” and issued decisions appealable to the Ninth Circuit and 
Supreme Court; yet, it sat in Shanghai and exercised territorial jurisdiction 
throughout China. Id. §§ 1, 3–4, 6, 34 Stat. at 814–16. The court responded to 
the dearth of directly applicable sources of U.S. law either by citing general 
“American law” or by deeming the District of Columbia Municipal Code to bind 
U.S. citizens in China. See Milton J. Helmick, United States Court for China, 
14 FAR E. SURV. 252, 253 (1945) (article by former judge of the court noting 
that “every American lawyer in China had a D.C. Code on his desk”). These 
malleable choice of law principles enabled the court and related officials to ex-
ercise broad authority. For example, the court adjudicated a criminal nuisance 
action brought under U.S. common law by the U.S. “district attorney” for Chi-
na against U.S. nationals who operated “houses of ill-fame” in Shanghai; the 
U.S. marshal even arrested and physically detained the defendants, including 
some who initially claimed not to be U.S. citizens. Note, Extraterritoriality and 
the United States Court for China, 1 AM. J. INT’L L. 469, 478 (1907) (observing 
that the “shameless” defendants solicited patrons with “invitations decorated 
with American flags”). The court’s territorial jurisdiction and the police powers 
of U.S. officials in a sense made China part of “the Land,” yet the Constitution 
was supreme only in the limited context that the treaty and enabling legisla-
tion permitted. For a history of the court, see Note, The United States Court 
for China, 49 HARV. L. REV. 793 (1936). 
 53. Cf. Patrick Allen Flynn, The Constitution Abroad: The Operation of 
the Constitution Beyond the Continental Limits of the United States, 32 TEX. L. 
REV. 58, 58 (1953) (“The problem [of how the Constitution applies abroad] is 
perhaps better stated in this manner: to what extent does the fundamental 
law apply to territories subject to varying degrees of political control and to 
peoples of diverse allegiance and heritage when acted upon by various instru-
ments of the United States government?”). 
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oversight.54 Asking where “the Land” is and what the “Law” is 
with respect to any particular legal question therefore forces us 
to think about which kinds of powers can be exercised in which 
kinds of places regarding which kinds of people for which kinds 
of purposes and with which kinds of limits. The oft-repeated 
slogan that “the Constitution follows the flag”55 is thus mislead-
ing because it presupposes an undefined set of rules governing 
where the flag is, where it may go, and what baggage it carries 
on each journey. 
The geographic indeterminacy of the Constitution’s scope 
helps to explain the intensity and duration of disputes about 
how the Constitution applies to particular places and people. If 
we recognize that the content of the “Law” and the scope of “the 
Land” are interdependent, then every geographic permutation 
of a legal problem may have a unique solution. Thus, unsurpri-
singly, courts and scholars have for centuries debated questions 
about the rights of aliens in the United States, of U.S. citizens 
abroad, of Indians living on and off tribal lands, and of people 
in incorporated and unincorporated territories acquired by 
treaty or force.56 Even in the recent past, questions have per-
sisted on basic issues about the rights of alien detainees held by 
the United States in places with varying degrees of connection 
to the core of “the Land,” such as a military base on territory 
leased from Cuba yet beyond Cuba’s effective sovereignty,57 a 
relatively temporary base in Afghanistan,58 and “black site” de-
tention facilities that exist in a grey area where the United 
States exercises influence, but not necessarily control.59 More 
 
 54. This view is consistent with Justice Harlan’s interpretation of “the 
Land,” although he did not explore the idea of “supremacy” in a spatial con-
text. See supra note 46. 
 55. For a history of this idea, see RAUSTIALA, supra note 34. 
 56. For a thorough discussion of how the scope of government power is of-
ten a function of the place where it is exercised and people whom it affects, see 
NEUMAN, supra note 34; RAUSTIALA, supra note 34; Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers 
Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Cen-
tury Origins of Plenary Power Over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
 57. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 770–72 (2008) (holding that the 
Suspension Clause applied to a U.S. Navy base on land leased from Cuba over 
which the United States exercised “complete and total control”). 
 58. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding 
that the Suspension Clause did not apply to Bagram Air Force Base in part 
because “there is no indication of any intent to occupy the base with perma-
nence, nor is there hostility on the part of the ‘host’ country”). 
 59. Cf. United States v. Ghailani, No. S10 98 Crim. 1023 (LAK), 2010 WL 
1839030, at *5 n.33 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2010) (holding that the alleged abuse of 
a defendant by the CIA at a foreign site would not justify dismissal of the in-
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generally, courts continue to struggle with questions about 
when Congress may regulate extraterritorially and how strong-
ly the judiciary should presume that Congress has not chosen 
to do so.60 
Uncertainty about the scope and status of “the Land” illu-
strates a basic point that will emerge repeatedly throughout 
this Article. The Constitution seems to identify a physical space 
with contours that are legally significant, but the boundaries 
and implications of the space are too ill-defined to foreclose de-
bate on recurring questions about the scope of government 
power in a system of divided domestic and international sover-
eignty. We cannot know how far “the Land” extends without 
knowing something about what the “Law” is, and we cannot 
know what the “Law” is without knowing something about the 
type of “Land” at issue. Law is in part a function of place, yet 
places are creations of law. 
B. THE “UNITED STATES” 
Most lawyers in the United States presumably know what 
the United States is, but few probably realize that they do not 
know where it is. The Constitution does not tell us explicitly, 
instead offering incomplete information about the physical 
space encompassed by the label “United States.”61 Even if the 
 
dictment and therefore not reaching the question of whether such abuse would 
violate the Fifth Amendment). 
 60. See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 
U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“It is a longstanding principle of American law ‘that leg-
islation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’ This [canon] . . . serves 
to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other na-
tions which could result in international discord.” (citations omitted)); 
CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 94–166, EXTRATERRITORIAL 
APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 4–7 (2010) (discussing potential 
due process constraints on the extraterritorial extension of U.S. criminal law); 
Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: 
Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 121, 136–58 (2007) (discussing potential structural constraints on 
Congress’s power to punish extraterritorial crimes); Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual 
Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule for Extraterritorial Application 
of U.S. Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 110, 117–20 (2010) (discussing “unilateralism,” 
“territorialism,” “interests balancing,” and “dual-illegality” approaches to in-
terpreting “geoambiguous” federal statutes); Austen Parrish, The Effects Test: 
Extraterritoriality’s Fifth Business, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1455, 1493 (2008) (advo-
cating “a return to territoriality” in considering the geographic scope of Con-
gress’s power); supra notes 33–34; infra Part I.B. 
 61. The Framers could not have defined the physical parameters of the 
“United States” because its scope would not be known until after ratification 
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Constitution clearly defined the United States’ geographic 
scope, questions would still arise about the practical signifi-
cance of its boundaries. The physical and legal contours of the 
institution at the Constitution’s heart are thus indeterminate, 
which raises several puzzling questions.62 
The Constitution uses the term “United States” in three 
distinct ways: as shorthand for the aggregation of states joined 
into a Union, as the name of a legal entity, and as a place. 
First, the “United States” is a literal term that describes the set 
of states that joined together to form a larger government unit. 
This usage is evident in the Eleventh Amendment, which refers 
to “one of the United States,”63 likely appears in the Preamble 
as well,64 and was foreshadowed in both the Declaration of In-
 
and then would likely evolve. See supra note 14. The treaty that ended the Rev-
olutionary War purported to define the boundaries of the United States as it 
then existed. See Treaty of Paris art. 2, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80, 
81–82, T.S. No. 104. These boundaries encompassed land that was not part of 
any state, and yet was part of the new sovereign entity whose existence the trea-
ty confirmed. See C.C. Langdell, The Status of Our New Territories, 12 HARV. 
L. REV. 365, 370 (1899). According to James Madison, the lands that the treaty 
delineated were within “the actual dimensions of the Union” (although he did 
not specifically discuss non-state territories or attach any significance to their 
existence). THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, supra note 43, at 101 (James Madison). 
 62. Scholars generally have not attempted to systemically define the term 
“United States” in all the forms where it appears in the Constitution. For a 
rare example of such an attempt, see Langdell, supra note 61, at 365 (“What 
extent of territory do the United States of America comprise? In order to an-
swer this question intelligently, it is necessary to ascertain the meaning of the 
term ‘United States.’”); cf. Sanford Levinson, Why the Canon Should Be Ex-
panded to Include the Insular Cases and the Saga of American Expansionism, 
17 CONST. COMMENT. 241, 248 (2000) (“[O]ne might think that the question as 
to what constitutes ‘the United States’ that is, after all, presumptively struc-
tured by the Constitution would have a clear constitutional answer, but that, 
just as obviously, is untrue.”). 
 63. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Constitution is inconsistent when de-
scribing the aggregation of states, which sometimes are referenced as ele-
ments of the “Union” rather than one of the “United States.” See id. art. I, § 2, 
cl. 3 (“the several States which may be included within this Union”); id. art. 
IV, § 4 (“every State in this Union”). 
 64. The Constitution purports to have been authorized by the “People of 
the United States.” Id. pmbl. The “United States” in this context presumably 
means the aggregation of the original thirteen states because the relevant 
people were those who were legally associated with the states holding ratify-
ing conventions rather than members of an extended polity that transcended 
state borders. See id. art. VII; cf. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 565 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) [hereinafter FARRAND] 
(reprinting an early draft of the “We the People” Clause that listed each state 
in lieu of mentioning the “United States”); Langdell, supra note 61, at 366 
(noting, without citing the Preamble’s drafting history, that an early rationale 
for using the term “United States” was to avoid “enumerating the thirteen 
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dependence65 and Articles of Confederation.66 Second, the 
“United States” is also the term for the larger unit that the 
states created, which has a unique legal identity; the whole is 
distinct from the aggregation of its founding parts.67 The Unit-
ed States therefore is capable of having citizens, possessing in-
stitutions, and creating instruments (that are “of”68 or “un-
der”69 the “United States”), can take actions (“by”70 or “from”71 
the “United States”), and can be the object of action (“against 
the United States,”72 or as a “Party”73 to litigation). Finally, 
and most importantly for present purposes, the “United States” 
is a place: events can occur “in,”74 “within,”75 or “throughout”76 
 
States by name”); id. at 372 n.2 (observing that the Preamble could not list the 
states in the Union because the nation’s composition had not yet been con-
firmed by ratification). 
 65. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) (referring to 
“the thirteen united States of America” in the title). The Declaration’s subse-
quent reference to “[r]epresentatives of the [U]nited States of America” is 
more ambiguous: it could again refer to thirteen states that were united, or to 
a broader entity. Id. para. 32; see also Carlton F.W. Larson, The Declaration of 
Independence: A 225th Anniversary Re-Interpretation, 76 WASH. L. REV. 701, 
721–62 (2001) (contending that the Declaration created a national entity); Don-
ald S. Lutz, The Declaration of Independence as Part of an American National 
Compact, 19 PUBLIUS 41, 50 (1989) (noting that the Declaration foreshadowed 
constitutional federalism by acknowledging the “simultaneous presence of two 
orders of government”). 
 66. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV, § 2 (“any of the 
United States”); id. art. IX (“each of the United States”). The Articles also used 
the term “United States of America” as the name for the “confederacy” that it 
created. Id. art. I. 
 67. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16 (distinguishing the “United States” 
from the “States respectively”); id. amend. X (same); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (dis-
tinguishing the “Navy of the United States” from the “Militia of the several 
States”); id. art. VI, cl. 3 (distinguishing officers “of the United States” and “of 
the several States”). 
 68. Id. art. I, § 1 (“Congress of the United States”), § 2 (“Citizen of the 
United States”), § 6 (“Treasury of the United States”), § 8, cl. 6 (“Coin of the 
United States”), § 8, cl. 18 (“Government of the United States”); id. art. III, § 1 
(“Power of the United States”); id. art. VI, cl. 2 (“Authority of the United 
States”). The Constitution also idiosyncratically references the “Laws of the 
Union.” Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. 
 69. Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“Office under the United States”). 
 70. Id. amend. XIX (limiting actions “by the United States” with respect to 
the right to vote). 
 71. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 (“Emolument from the United States”). 
 72. Id. § 2, cl. 1 (“Offences against the United States”). 
 73. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 74. Id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“persons born or naturalized in the United States”). 
 75. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (person “who shall not have been . . . fourteen 
Years a Resident within the United States” is ineligible to be President); id. 
amend. XIII, § 1 (slavery shall not exist “within the United States”). 
  
2011] CONSTITUTIONAL SPACES 1189 
 
it. The definition of that place is a term of domestic legal art. 
No matter how far the “United States” may extend for purposes 
of constitutional provisions linked to its borders, it could have 
distinct contours for purposes of international law.77 
The fact that the United States is a place has four sets of 
significant implications that the Constitution’s text for the 
most part ignores. First, there is a question about whether all 
aspects of the Constitution apply with equal force and effect to 
all areas within the United States. In other words, does the 
United States exist at a single level of abstraction or does it 
contain subsidiary components subject to distinct legal re-
gimes? This is essentially the same question discussed in the 
prior section about how the “Law” applies in “the Land.”78 The 
absence of an explicit answer helps explain why courts and 
commentators cannot agree about how the Constitution might 
apply to different categories of places even if such places are 
assumed for the sake of argument to in some sense be “in” the 
United States and not part of “States” (which have a special 
status relative to other kinds of domestic places).79 Variants of 
this problem arose in the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies in the Insular Cases (which considered how the Constitu-
tion applied in unincorporated and incorporated territories),80 
 
 76. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform 
throughout the United States”), § 8, cl. 4 (authorizing a “uniform Rule of Nat-
uralization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the 
United States”); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (“Congress may determine . . . the Day on 
which [electors] shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same through-
out the United States.”). 
 77. For example, one can imagine an argument that, say, Guam is not “in” 
the United States for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment’s provision gov-
erning birthright citizenship, see infra notes 93, 228, but that it is in the Unit-
ed States for purposes of the U.N. Charter’s prohibition against “the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity . . . of any state,” U.N. Charter art. 
2, para. 4. Cf. Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (8 How.) 603, 615 (1850) (noting that 
the status of land in Mexico occupied by the United States Army was different 
under U.S. law, which treated the land as foreign territory, and international 
law, which treated it as U.S. territory). 
 78. See supra Part I.A. 
 79. See infra Part I.C (discussing “States”).  
 80. See generally FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, 
AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 1–30 (Christina Duffy Burnett 
& Burke Marshall eds., 2001) (collecting essays discussing and critiquing the 
Insular Cases). For an account of the Insular Cases contending that “whether 
a place was within or outside the ‘United States’ did not reliably determine 
whether a constitutional provision applied there,” see Christina Duffy Bur-
nett, Untied States: American Expansion and Territorial Deannexation, 72 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 797, 816 (2005). 
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and continue to arise in the twenty-first century in cases ad-
dressing how the Constitution applies to U.S.-controlled mili-
tary facilities located beyond the United States’ “de jure sover-
eignty” but within its “de facto sovereignty.”81 Second, there is 
a question about which constitutionally defined powers and 
rights operate with less force when relevant actors or events 
are clearly outside the United States. Courts have struggled 
with this question because the Constitution’s text often pro-
vides little or no guidance: it defines a place, but provides only 
limited information on why the definition of that place mat-
ters.82 Third, there is a general issue that arises whenever the 
definition of a place creates an inside and outside, and thus po-
tentially defines people as insiders or outsiders and attaches 
consequences to those distinctions. The law and geography lit-
erature discussed above offers perspective on this issue of how, 
why, and to what extent boundary lines should be significant in 
defining individual rights and obligations.83  
Finally, thinking of the United States as a place highlights 
the fact that a few specific provisions of the Constitution attach 
importance to defining the contours of that place. For example, 
rules governing three subjects (“Naturalization,” “Bankrupt-
cies,” and “Duties, Imposts and Excises”) must be “uniform” 
“throughout” the United States,84 Congress cannot deny citi-
zenship to people who are born both “in” the United States and 
subject to its “jurisdiction,”85 and no person can become Presi-
 
 81. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 754–56 (2008). 
 82. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5–14 (1957) (plurality opinion) 
(holding that wives of American service members had constitutional right to a 
jury trial in criminal actions on U.S. military bases in Europe); In re Terrorist 
Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 157, 167 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement does not govern searches 
conducted abroad by U.S. agents; such searches of U.S. citizens need only sat-
isfy the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of reasonableness.”). See generally 
RAUSTIALA, supra note 34, at 28–29; Zick, supra note 33, at 525 (“The geo-
graphic borders of the United States are critical legal and constitutional 
markers—in terms of diplomacy, trade, national defense, and claims to indi-
vidual privileges and liberties.”). 
 83. See supra text accompanying notes 30–34. An odd twist on this prob-
lem of insiders and outsiders is the “entry fiction” in immigration law, which 
posits that an alien who is physically within the United States but has not 
formally entered the country can be treated as if she were still outside nation-
al borders. Brian G. Slocum, The War on Terrorism and the Extraterritorial 
Application of the Constitution in Immigration Law, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 
1023–25 (2007) (criticizing the “entry fiction”). 
 84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 4. 
 85. Id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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dent unless he or she was a “Resident” “within” the United 
States” for at least fourteen years.86 A coherent account of what 
physical spaces are within and beyond the United States would 
be helpful to understanding how the Constitution applies in 
these contexts, yet this account is difficult to construct. 
The place “United States” is difficult to define for two rea-
sons: the different meanings of United States may not be coex-
tensive, and there are several plausible permutations of what 
the United States may encompass. First, the scope of the Unit-
ed States as an entity need not be coextensive with its scope as 
a place because an entity can own or exercise control over plac-
es that are not physically within itself. The Constitution seems 
to recognize this fact in at least two provisions. The Thirteenth 
Amendment refers to conduct “within the United States, or any 
place subject to their jurisdiction,”87 and the Eighteenth 
Amendment (now repealed) referred to imports and exports “in-
to” and “from” the “United States and all territory subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof.”88 A place can thus be affiliated with 
the United States in a constitutionally meaningful way without 
being “in” it,89 and so the term “United States” may have dis-
 
 86. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 87. Id. amend. XIII, § 1. The use of “their” rather than “its” creates an in-
terpretative problem by suggesting that the Amendment’s drafters used the 
term “United States” to refer to the aggregation of states rather than to the 
entity “the United States.” However, it is difficult to see how the aggregation 
of states could exercise “jurisdiction” over any land other than through the 
mechanism of the entity “the United States,” and thus the use of “their” seems 
sloppy rather than revealing. A similar quirk exists in Article II, which forbids 
the President from receiving certain “Emolument[s] from the United States, or 
any of them.” Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 7. 
 88. Id. amend. XVIII, § 1, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1. The 
word “territory” is not capitalized, which suggests that the term is more gener-
ic than the formal concept of “Territory” in Article IV, § 3. See infra Part I.G. 
 89. Christopher Langdell’s thorough article about the meaning of “United 
States” seems to miss the subtle distinction between territory within a sover-
eign and territory under a sovereign’s control. According to Langdell, if the 
term “United States” in the Thirteenth Amendment was intended to describe 
an entity encompassing “territory,” then the phrase “or any place subject to 
their jurisdiction” was redundant. Langdell, supra note 61, at 377. However, if 
we assume that the Amendment’s drafters intended to eradicate slavery in 
every place where the United States possessed authority to enforce its prefer-
ences, then it follows that some of those places could be outside its borders as 
those borders were defined by domestic constitutional law (as distinct from 
international law, which might have a different definition of “United States,” 
see supra note 77). For example, the Amendment could be interpreted to re-
quire that the U.S. Army free slaves in foreign territory that it formally occu-
pied, or that slaves would become free if brought into other kinds of peripheral 
places that arguably might not be within the constitutional definition of the 
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tinct context-sensitive definitions depending on whether it re-
fers to an entity or a place.90 Moreover, asking whether a given 
place is a physical component of the United States rather than 
merely subject to its control (i.e., is it “in” the United States or 
“of” the United States) may often be pointless because there is 
no reason to think that the distinction matters beyond a few 
exceptional issues noted below.91 Thus, for example, there 
might be no reason to develop legal fictions about whether the 
land under a particular federal installation is on U.S. soil,92 or 
whether a ship flying a U.S. flag is an “island” of the United 
States.93 What matters is how a particular place relates to the 
 
United States, such as embassies (which was not a far-fetched concern given 
that Thomas Jefferson had brought slaves to the United States embassy in 
Paris). See ANNETTE GORDON-REED, THOMAS JEFFERSON & SALLY HEMINGS: 
AN AMERICAN CONTROVERSY 1 (1997); cf. Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (8 How.) 
603, 614–15 (1850) (stating that military “conquest” could bring lands under 
U.S. “dominion” without adding them to “the boundaries of this Union”); 
Cleveland, supra note 56, at 197 (observing that the Thirteenth Amendment 
might apply to “forts, consuls, or vessels abroad”); infra Part I.F. 
 90. Federal statutes, like the Constitution, can define places that are sub-
ject to U.S. control even though they are not in the United States. For exam-
ple, the “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,” 18 
U.S.C. § 7 (2006), includes “[a]ny place outside the jurisdiction of any nation 
with respect to an offense by or against a national of the United States,” id. 
§ 7(7). See also id. § 7(9)(B) (extending U.S. jurisdiction to “residences in for-
eign States . . . irrespective of ownership . . . used by United States personnel 
assigned to [diplomatic] missions or entities”). 
 91. See infra text accompanying notes 100–03. 
 92. The Supreme Court confirmed in Boumediene v. Bush that determin-
ing the Constitution’s geographic scope requires “functional” rather than “for-
mal” analysis. 553 U.S. 723, 763–65 (2008). However, Boumediene’s analysis 
was functional only in a narrow sense. The Court held that the Suspension 
Clause’s applicability to the Guantánamo Bay naval base depended on the rel-
ative “control” and “sovereignty” that the United States and Cuba exercised over 
the base, and not the formal fact that Cuba owned the land and leased it to the 
United States. Id. at 753–54, 770–72. Yet “sovereignty” is an inherently formal 
concept, and foreign “control” over a base is a formality if in practice there are 
portions of the base where U.S. officials have unfettered discretion. This for-
mality led the D.C. Circuit to hold that the Suspension Clause did not apply to 
Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan due to differences in the nature of the 
“leasehold interest[s]” that the United States possessed at Guantánamo and 
Bagram, even though U.S. officials allegedly supervised the challenged activi-
ties on both bases. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 93. United States v. Smiley, 27 F. Cas. 1132, 1134 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1864) 
(No. 16,317) (Field, Circuit Justice) (analogizing a nation’s loss of sovereignty 
over a sunken ship to loss of sovereignty “over an island which should sink in-
to the sea”); see also id. (“The constructive territory of the United States em-
braces vessels sailing under their flag . . . .”); Jon D. Peppetti, Building the 
Global Maritime Security Network: A Multinational Legal Structure to Combat 
Transnational Threats, 55 NAVAL L. REV. 73, 103 (2008) (“Flag state control of 
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United States, which may not exclusively be a function of the 
place’s location. 
Second, because the Constitution defines many types of 
places, there are numerous permutations of these places that 
may collectively comprise the “United States.” For example, the 
“United States” might merely be the sum of all land in the 
“States,” or may also include land in the “Territories,” the “Dis-
trict” constituting the seat of government, and/or federal “pos-
sessions.”94 The Constitution is silent about which permutation 
is accurate. The Supreme Court addressed the void by opining 
that the “term” “United States” “is the name given to our great 
republic, which is composed of States and territories.”95 This 
 
its ships is premised on the theory that a ship is a national of a state or an ex-
tension of its territory; essentially, a floating island.”). The fiction that a ship 
is an island becomes untenable (assuming that it is initially coherent) when 
one realizes that islands generally do not move, and thus do not raise the con-
flict of competing legal regimes that arises when a foreign ship sails into a na-
tion’s territorial waters. Cf. Gustavus H. Robinson, Legal Adjustments of Per-
sonal Injury in the Maritime Industry, 44 HARV. L. REV. 223, 231 (1930) (“If [a 
foreign-flagged vessel] floats in territorial waters, the law of the waters tradi-
tionally speaks more loudly than that of the ship.”). Modern law still attaches 
importance to a vessel’s flag, but emphasis on the “island” fiction appears to 
have waned, although not disappeared. Compare Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 
262 U.S. 100, 123 (1923) (noting that flag-state jurisdiction over vessels “par-
takes more of the characteristics of personal than of territorial sovereignty”), 
and United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 92(1), Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 433 (requiring that “[s]hips shall sail under the flag 
of one State only and . . . shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the 
high seas,” but not invoking the territory metaphor), with NLRB v. Dredge 
Operators, Inc., 19 F.3d 206, 212 (5th Cir. 1994) (“[A] United States flag vessel 
is considered American territory . . . .”). 
If U.S.-flagged vessels were technically “in” the United States, as then-
Judge Alito has suggested, an implication would be that people born on them 
would become U.S. citizens. This perk could inspire enterprising mariners to 
create floating birthing centers that would ply foreign ports selling the pros-
pect of a U.S. passport. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Cruz v. Chesapeake 
Shipping, Inc., 932 F.2d 218, 237–38 (3d Cir. 1991) (Alito, J., dissenting) (con-
tending that “the United States” “consists of all the States, Territories, and 
possessions” and that its territory encompasses “[v]essels flying the American 
flag”). Current jurisprudence forecloses this possibility. See Lam Mow v. 
Nagle, 24 F.2d 316, 317–18 (9th Cir. 1928) (rejecting a citizenship claim by a 
person born on a U.S.-flagged merchant vessel because such vessels are only 
metaphorically, rather than actually, “in” the United States). 
 94. See infra Parts I.D, I.G, I.H. The “District” is in the United States be-
cause it “was made up of portions of two of the original states of the Union, and 
was not taken out of the Union by the cession.” O’Donoghue v. United States, 
289 U.S. 516, 540 (1933); see also Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 261 (1901) 
(noting that after cession the District “remained a part of the United States”). 
 95. Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317, 319 (1820) (emphasis 
added). 
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statement appears correct insofar as it defines the United 
States as more than merely the sum of the states because the 
District of Columbia seems clearly in the United States even 
though it is not part of any state.96 But the Court did not 
purport to treat all territories equally, nor did it purport to ex-
clude other types of places from the ambit of the United States 
even if these arguably could not be classified as “territories” 
(such as embassies, military bases on foreign soil, U.S.-flagged 
ships, and the exclusive economic zone that extends 200 miles 
from the U.S. coast97).98 The Court’s dicta thus adds little to our 
knowledge about what places are in the United States and 
what places are outside it.99 
In addition to the interesting theoretical questions noted 
above, the indeterminacy of the United States raises several 
practical puzzles about the application of particular constitu-
tional provisions. For example, suppose that a U.S. military of-
ficer has a child who also becomes a military officer and spends 
most of her life living on various military bases located on what 
 
 96. See infra Part I.D. More generally, the Framers were aware that the 
new nation would be the steward of western lands ceded from the states, and 
may have understood the “United States” to encompass this territory and ter-
ritories that would be acquired in the future. See Abbott Lawrence Lowell, The 
Status of Our New Possessions—A Third View, 13 HARV. L. REV. 155, 159–61 
(1899) (suggesting that the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 may have required 
treating the covered territories as part of the United States). 
 97. See Proclamation 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605, 10,605 (Mar. 10, 1983) 
(claiming the exclusive economic zone pursuant to international law). The zone 
is “larger than the combined land area of all fifty states.” U.S. COMM’N ON 
OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 30–31 (2004). 
 98. The Court’s statement also does not indicate whether the physical 
place “the United States” has the same definition in each clause in which it is 
mentioned. Reading the same words to have the same meaning everywhere 
they appear in the Constitution is a useful method of interpretation, but is not 
always appropriate if meaning depends on context. See Akhil Reed Amar, 
Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 799 (1999) (“[T]he same words some-
times sensibly mean different things in different contexts. . . . Even when the 
intratextual tool can generate interpretive leads and clues, we still need other 
tools of interpretation to finally assess the plausibility of any reading sug-
gested by intratextualism.”). 
 99. Statutes from the post-Founding era replicated the Constitution’s im-
precision by using the term “United States” to identify a place whose borders 
had significance without defining the scope of that place. See, e.g., Act of July 
6, 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577, 577 (governing “alien enemies” “within the United 
States”); Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 55, 55 (establishing a system for 
registering vessels “built within the United States”); Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 
5, 1 Stat. 29, 45 (repealed 1790) (regulating collection of duties on tonnage and 
stating that goods “shall not be relanded in any port or place within the limits 
of the United States”). 
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would otherwise be foreign land. Upon turning thirty-five, the 
child wants to become a presidential candidate. Would the can-
didate’s time living on military bases on foreign soil constitute 
residence “within” the United States, or would she instead be 
ineligible for the presidency?100 And if we think that such a 
person should be eligible, does that mean that birthright citi-
zenship also extends to any person born “in” such bases?101 
More generally, should a person born in Guam, which is a U.S. 
territory, automatically be a U.S. citizen, even if Congress 
 
 100. A permutation of the problem would arise if the candidate previously 
served as an ambassador residing in various embassies on foreign soil after a 
childhood spent mostly outside the United States. The residence qualification 
for the Presidency has not received scholarly attention. In contrast, the tex-
tually adjacent “natural born Citizen” qualification has generated substantial 
debate in light of questions about where and under what circumstances vari-
ous Presidents and candidates were born. See William T. Han, Beyond Presi-
dential Eligibility: The Natural Born Citizen Clause as a Source of Birthright 
Citizenship, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 457, 464–66 (2010); Gabriel J. Chin, Commen-
tary, Why Senator John McCain Cannot Be President: Eleven Months and a 
Hundred Yards Short of Citizenship, 107 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 1, 
5–10 (2008), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol107/chin 
.pdf; Peter J. Spiro, Commentary, McCain’s Citizenship and Constitutional 
Method, 107 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 42, 42–48 (2008), http://www 
.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol107/spiro.pdf; cf. Langdell, supra 
note 61, at 375 (asserting without explanation that the Residence Clause re-
fers to the “United States” as the aggregation of its member states, and is thus 
equivalent to a requirement that a prospective President reside “in one or 
more of the United States”). 
 101. Few commentators have considered whether birth on a U.S. military 
base located within a foreign country would constitute birth “in” the United 
States for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. The consensus is that such 
births would not confer automatic citizenship. See 7 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., 
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 92.03(2)(d) (rev. ed. 2010) (“The far 
flung foreign interests and operations of the United States in the modern 
world may also raise questions concerning the status of children born in Amer-
ican installations in foreign countries. It seems quite clear that such installa-
tions cannot be regarded as part of the United States for the purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”); Sarah Helene Duggin & Mary Beth Collins, 
‘Natural Born’ in the USA: The Striking Unfairness and Dangerous Ambiguity 
of the Constitution’s Presidential Qualifications Clause and Why We Need to 
Fix It, 85 B.U. L. REV. 53, 103 (2005) (“[C]ontrary to popular belief, birth in 
United States embassies, consulates, or United States military facilities, does 
not result in United States citizenship in the absence of another basis for citi-
zenship.”). Even if the Constitution does not confer automatic citizenship to 
children born on U.S. military bases abroad, citizenship can exist by statute, 
raising a question about whether such children are “natural born” citizens for 
purposes of eligibility to serve as President. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5; see 
also Christina S. Lohman, Presidential Eligibility: The Meaning of the Natu-
ral-Born Citizen Clause, 36 GONZ. L. REV. 349, 367 (2000) (arguing for presi-
dential eligibility in this context because children of active-duty service mem-
bers are “within the allegiance” of the United States); supra note 100. 
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would prefer otherwise.102 And must the same “uniform” bank-
ruptcy rules apply in Puerto Rico as in Texas, even though 
Congress’s legislative discretion with respect to territories is 
generally broader than with respect to states?103 The fact that 
these questions lack definitive textual answers again illu-
strates the lack of systemic focus during the Founding and the 
subsequent amendment process on the “where” component of 
 
 102. Courts have held that birth in unincorporated territories does not au-
tomatically confer citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Nolos v. 
Holder, 611 F.3d 279, 283–84 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that birth in the Philip-
pines while it was a U.S. territory did not confer citizenship); Valmonte v. INS, 
136 F.3d 914, 920 (2nd Cir. 1998) (same); Rabang v. INS, 35 F.3d 1449, 1453 
(9th Cir. 1994) (same); cf. Langdell, supra note 61, at 376 (contending that 
birthright citizenship applies only to births within states because the Four-
teenth Amendment: (1) was not intended to limit Congress’s power to define 
the significance of events in territories; and (2) did not contemplate the exis-
tence of birthright citizens who were not also state citizens). Children born in 
territories that Congress has expressly incorporated into the United States 
presumably do have birthright citizenship, but the issue is “unsettled.” Duggin 
& Collins, supra note 101, at 92. In practice, questions about the constitution-
al status of people born in incorporated territories are likely moot. First, a 
birth in the only current incorporated territory (Palmyra Atoll) is unlikely be-
cause the island is isolated and has only a small transient population of scien-
tists and visitors. See Palmyra Atoll National Wildlife Refuge, U.S. FISH & 
WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/palmyraatoll/management.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 22, 2011). Second, Congress retroactively granted citizenship to 
people born in Alaska and Hawaii—the two most recent incorporated territo-
ries—during the period between incorporation and statehood. See 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1404–1405 (2006). The status under the Fourteenth Amendment of child-
ren born in incorporated territories could therefore arise only in bizarre cir-
cumstances. For example, one can imagine: (1) a Mexican citizen giving birth 
to a daughter in the Arizona territory prior to statehood in 1912; (2) the 
daughter then returns to Mexico without otherwise acquiring U.S. citizenship; 
(3) the daughter then resides in the United States for at least five years (in-
cluding at least two after the age of fourteen); (4) the daughter then gives 
birth to a child in Mexico. The child born in Mexico would arguably be a U.S. 
citizen based on its mother’s birth in the incorporated Arizona territory and 
subsequent temporary U.S. residence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2006) (setting 
conditions for citizenship of children born outside the United States to a par-
ent who is a U.S. citizen and former U.S. resident). 
 103. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (Congress may “make all needful 
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory belonging to the United 
States”). Congress has mooted the question of whether it must apply the 
Bankruptcy Code to territories by doing so voluntarily. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. 
§ 101(55) (2006) (“The term ‘United States’, when used in a geographical 
sense, includes all locations where the judicial jurisdiction of the United 
States extends, including territories and possessions of the United States.”). In 
other contexts, the Court has held that territories are not “in” the United 
States for purposes of the Uniformity Clauses. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 
U.S. 244, 287 (1901) (Congress could lawfully impose a nonuniform duty upon 
imports from Puerto Rico). 
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the Constitution’s allocation of power. As a result, a critical 
place—the United States—has borders with indeterminate con-
tours and indeterminate meaning. 
C. “STATES” 
A third category of constitutionally defined places are 
“States,” which like the “United States” are both ethereal enti-
ties104 and physical locations in space.105 The “State” designa-
tion has always been highly coveted in U.S. politics. Attaining 
statehood signified that a territory and its people were full and 
equal members of the nation.106 In contrast, exclusion from 
statehood created a second-class status, rendering people fed-
eral “subjects” rather than national “citizens.”107 Territories 
therefore aspired to eventual statehood even before the Consti-
tution was ratified.108 Yet notwithstanding the importance of 
statehood, the legal significance of state borders is strikingly 
ambiguous.109 
 
 104. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (states have a “People,” a “Legisla-
ture,” and an “Executive Authority”); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (states have a “Mili-
tia”); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (states have “Citizens”); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (states 
can be a “Party” in court); id. art. VI, cl. 2 (states have “Laws”). 
 105. See, e.g., id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (states can have “Inhabitant[s]”); id. art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 17 (states possess “Places” that they can sell to the United States); id. 
art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (states can “admit” persons into their territory); id. art. I, § 9, 
cl. 6 (vessels can travel “from” or “to” states); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (states can 
“Grant” “Lands”); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (trials can be held “in” and crimes com-
mitted “within” a state); id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2 (fugitives can be “found in” 
states); id. amend. XII (electors “meet in” states). 
 106. Of all the places in the Constitution with a corresponding governing 
entity, only states have a reservoir of preexisting (“reserved”) powers that do 
not require specific enumeration. Id. amend. X. States admitted into the union 
after 1789 did not necessarily have a prior sovereign status that could be “re-
served,” but nevertheless have been deemed to exist on an “equal footing” with 
the original states. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567–68 (1911); see also Erb-
sen, supra note 1, at 507–08 (discussing the equal footing doctrine). The Con-
stitution contains only one exception to state equality: the original (“now exist-
ing”) states could permit the importation of slaves until 1808, while 
subsequent states could not. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. 
 107. PETER S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION 69 (1987). Statehood is still 
an aspiration for some residents of Puerto Rico. See Mireya Navarro, Looking 
Beyond Vote in Puerto Rico After ‘None of the Above’ Is Top Choice, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 15, 1998, at A16, available at 1998 WLNR 2977400 (discussing a referen-
dum in which 46.5 percent of voters in Puerto Rico favored statehood). 
 108. See ONUF, supra note 107, at 44–87 (discussing the path to statehood 
of the Northwest Territories). 
 109. The Constitution does not expressly accord special status to local com-
ponents of states, and thus spatial questions are usually binary: the fact that 
an event occurred within or outside a state is generally more important than 
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States are unique places in the constitutional order be-
cause the first thirteen states preexisted the Union. The origi-
nal states are therefore the only places in the federal system 
that the Constitution recognizes rather than creates.110 There 
was no need for the Framers to define these states’ physical 
boundaries because borders were already fixed. Indeed, the 
Convention rejected a proposal that “a map of the U.S. be 
spread out, that all the existing [state] boundaries be erased, 
and that a new partition of the whole be made into 13 equal 
parts.”111 The borders of future states likewise could not be 
specified because they were unknowable and would emerge 
over time through the mechanism for admitting new states.112 
Moreover, unlike with “the Land” and the “United States,” 
there are no constitutionally defined spaces that are outside a 
state and yet subject to its general authority113 (in contrast to 
authority that Congress delegates114 or borrows,115 authority 
 
where in the state it occurred. See Ford, supra note 32, at 1862–65 (discussing 
how local action equates with state action); cf. Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Ju-
risdiction, 60 EMORY L.J. 1, 29–30 (2010) (noting that personal jurisdiction 
doctrine provides constitutional protection only to defendants compelled to 
travel across state rather than local boundaries, and suggesting possible con-
stitutional limits on intrastate venue rules). 
 110. The “high Seas” preexisted the Constitution in the sense that the 
oceans were present, but they lacked a formal status until the Constitution 
provided it. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. “Indian Tribes” and “foreign Na-
tions” also existed, but the Constitution treats these primarily as entities rath-
er than places. Id. § 8, cl. 3; see also infra Part II.A. 
 111. See 1 FARRAND, supra note 64, at 177 (noting this suggestion by dele-
gate Brearly); id. at 184, 199, 275, 321 (discussing repartitioning the states); 3 
id. at 613 (reprinting notes of a draft of the New Jersey Plan that proposed 
“consolidat[ing]” all state and federal “Lands” into a single “Body or Mass” 
that would be divided into thirteen or more “integral Parts” called “Districts”). 
 112. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
 113. The Constitution references only two types of spaces under state con-
trol, both of which seem to fall within state borders: “ports” and “Places” for 
holding elections. Id. art. I, §§ 4, 9. The Constitution also refers to state “Ju-
risdiction,” but there is no indication that this reference contemplated any 
unique physical space outside the existing constitutional typology of places. Id. 
art. IV, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring extradition of fugitives “to the State having Juris-
diction of the Crime”); id. art. IV, § 3 (“no new State shall be formed or erected 
within the Jurisdiction of any other State”); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (a state may 
not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws”). Article IV refers to “Claims” that states may have on prospective feder-
al territory, but does not accord any distinct formal status to land subject to 
such claims. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
 114. See infra Part II.B (noting that Congress has granted states regulato-
ry authority over some rivers adjacent to their territory). 
 115. See 18 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2006) (acts committed in federal enclaves are 
federal crimes if they violate the criminal law of the state in which the enclave 
  
2011] CONSTITUTIONAL SPACES 1199 
 
that follows state citizens acting extraterritorially,116 or con-
text-sensitive authority that arises over certain extraterritorial 
transactions affecting the state117). The states thus had or 
would have relatively determinate physical boundaries that in 
case of doubt (which was often)118 would be subject to clarifica-
tion by compact119 or adjudication.120 Most scholarship about 
 
is located); 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A) (2006) (deeming federal law to incorpo-
rate portions of state civil and criminal law in the region between a state’s 
outer coastal boundary and the outer national boundary). 
 116. See Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 76–77 (1941) (holding that state 
law may regulate the extraterritorial conduct of state citizens). The extent to 
which state law follows its citizens is unclear. For example, the issue might 
arise if states acquired authority to ban abortions and then attempted to bar 
their citizens from circumventing state law by obtaining abortions in other 
states. See Mark D. Rosen, “Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism? Positive, Normative, 
and Institutional Considerations of States’ Extraterritorial Powers, 51 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 713, 745–47 (2007). 
 117. See infra note 136. 
 118. Border disputes were common in the Founding era due to ambiguities 
in colonial charters, ineffective methods of marking territory, and incomplete 
knowledge of geography. See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 516 (1893) 
(noting that state commissioners had initially “marked” the border by making 
“five chops . . . in the form of a diamond” on a line of trees, and that the border 
eventually became “indistinct”); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 
Pet.) 657, 724 (1838) (“[A]t the adoption of the constitution, there were exist-
ing controversies between eleven states respecting their boundaries, which 
arose under their respective charters . . . .”);Note, Congressional Supervision of 
Interstate Compacts, 75 YALE L.J. 1416, 1422 n.47 (1966) (“[O]ften the lines 
drawn on the basis of antique charts and maps bore no relation to the actual 
lie of the land.”). Disputes could also arise from the natural evolution of river 
boundaries. Rivers seem like useful fixed reference points for drawing borders, 
yet they have an inconvenient tendency to change their course over time. In 
extreme situations, land that used to be on one side of a river can wind up on 
the other side. The Supreme Court has addressed this problem by developing 
the doctrines of accretion (gradual changes in a river’s course do not alter the 
river’s status as a border) and avulsion (the prior bed of a river remains the 
border after the river moves to a new bed). See, e.g., New Jersey v. New York, 
523 U.S. 767, 784 (1998) (noting that state territory can expand through the 
addition of landfill at the edge of a water boundary); Ohio v. Kentucky, 444 U.S. 
335, 340 (1980) (“Situations where land of one State comes to be on the ‘wrong’ 
side of its boundary river are not uncommon.”); Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 
359, 360–61 (1892) (discussing accretion and avulsion). Whatever the cause, 
border disputes could be a significant source of interstate friction. See Erbsen, 
supra note 1, at 514–15. For an interesting example of a political conflict be-
tween states that almost escalated to military conflict, see DON FABER, THE 
TOLEDO WAR (2008) (discussing the “Toledo War,” which arose when Ohio and 
the Michigan Territory claimed the same land, resulting in standoffs between 
armed militias until the federal government helped broker a settlement). 
 119. The Compacts Clause permits states, with congressional approval, to 
negotiate agreements that resolve border disputes. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 
3; Jill Elaine Hasday, Interstate Compacts in a Democratic Society: The Prob-
lem of Permanency, 49 FLA. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1997) (“[C]ompacts resolve state 
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“States” in a constitutional sense therefore focuses on their sta-
tus as legal entities rather than places, considering the extent 
to which they are sovereign, the limits on their authority, and 
their amenability to federal regulation. But states are also in-
teresting as places because: (1) the permanency of their borders 
may be less clear than commonly imagined, and (2) the overlap 
between state and federal territory and the coequal status of 
states helps to explain the persistence of intractable federalism 
problems. 
First, state borders may be less permanent than commen-
tators generally assume. The Constitution makes state borders 
difficult to change.121 But the framework protecting the integri-
ty of state borders has an unexplored loophole: treaties might 
be able to jettison portions of a state without the state’s con-
sent. For example, having purchased Alaska from Russia, per-
haps the United States can sell some of it back. This deannexa-
tion scenario does not seem likely today, but any comfort we 
have in the permanence of state borders may be a product of 
fortune rather than constitutional design. The United States 
has had sufficient military, economic, and political strength to 
avoid being forced into a position where the loss of state land 
would be an expedient means of protecting national interests. 
Yet history could have turned out differently: the United States 
might have lost the War of 1812 and been asked to surrender 
New Hampshire, or lost the Mexican-American War and been 
asked to surrender Texas, or lost the Spanish-American War 
and been asked to surrender Florida. Even if the United States 
were not forced into sacrificing land, one can imagine the Pres-
ident and Senate concluding that trading land for cash or some 
other concession (such as a promise of peace) might be worth 
 
boundary disputes. Indeed, this was the purpose of all but one of the thirty-six 
compacts enacted before 1921.”). 
 120. See, e.g., New Jersey, 523 U.S. at 770–71 (State Controversies Clause 
permitted the Supreme Court to exercise original jurisdiction in a dispute be-
tween New York and New Jersey regarding sovereignty over Ellis Island); 
Moore v. McGuire, 205 U.S. 214, 219 (1907) (Land Grant Clause permitted 
federal jurisdiction in a private civil action that required the court to deter-
mine the location of the Arkansas/Mississippi border). But cf. Jonathan Horne, 
On Trying and Failing to Resolve Interstate Disputes, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 
(forthcoming 2011) (arguing that the Court should reconsider the scope of its 
remedial authority in suits between states, including suits regarding boundary 
lines). 
 121. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (“[N]o new State shall be formed 
or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed 
by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent 
of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.”). 
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the cost. Whether these kinds of transfers would be constitu-
tional presents an interesting and unexplored question that 
tests traditional assumptions about state sovereignty.122 
Deannexing an entire state would arguably be unconstitu-
tional, but deannexing portions of a state might be allowed 
(even if ill-advised). The Constitution protects state borders 
from interference by: (1) requiring a state’s consent to the join-
ing of all or some of its land into a new state, to the cession of 
its land for the seat of government, and to the sale of its land 
for use as federal “Places” (such as forts);123 (2) compelling the 
United States to protect states from “Invasion” and “domestic 
Violence”;124 and (3) limiting the effect of federal eminent do-
main power over state property.125 None of these protections 
explicitly address whether the United States may expel an un-
consenting state. But there are four reasons to doubt such pow-
er: (1) the Constitution does not provide a formal mechanism 
for expulsion; (2) Congress’s enumerated power to “dispose of” 
“Territories” might foreclose an unenumerated power to dispose 
 
 122. Legal or not, deannexation might have been unavoidable if a foreign 
country physically occupied U.S. territory. Such an occupation actually hap-
pened, albeit temporarily. British forces seized portions of Maine (which at the 
time was part of Massachusetts) for five months during the War of 1812. The 
Supreme Court held that British control “suspended” all U.S. “sovereignty” in 
the occupied zone such that “laws of the United States could no longer be 
rightfully enforced.” United States v. Rice, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 246, 254 (1819) 
(holding that the United States could not retroactively collect customs duties 
on goods imported during the occupation). The legality of any deannexation 
might also be a “political question” on which the courts would not opine. See 
Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890) (“Who is the sovereign, de 
jure or de facto, of a territory is not a judicial, but a political question, the de-
termination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any gov-
ernment conclusively binds the judges . . . .”). 
 123. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17; id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. For a discussion 
of the ambiguity in Article IV’s consent requirement due to a stubbornly in-
scrutable semicolon, see Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 38, at 295–96. States 
may also voluntarily adjust their borders by interstate compact. See Hasday, 
supra note 119, at 3. 
 124. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 125. “The United States can . . . exercise its eminent domain power to take 
title to state property.” Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. 
Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 291 n.26 (1983). When the United States takes state land 
without the state’s consent, it holds the land as an “ordinary proprietor” and 
does not possess the “exclusive” jurisdiction that state consent would provide. 
Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 264 (1963). The seized land thus remains 
subject to a greater degree of state control than lands that states cede to the 
federal government under the Enclave Clause. See infra Part I.I. 
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of “States”;126 (3) expelling a state from the Union would im-
pinge its “equal Suffrage in the Senate” and therefore might 
require its consent;127 and (4) the states’ duty to remain in the 
Union over their objection—some states lost a war over their 
attempt to secede—suggests a correlative obligation for the Un-
ion not to expel states without their consent (and possibly not 
to expel them even with their consent).128 
Some of these objections fade if the issue is whether a trea-
ty can transfer part of a state, thus shrinking the state without 
eliminating it. Such a treaty would raise a conflict between the 
broad federal power over foreign affairs and the general pre-
sumption that a state’s territory is immutable without its con-
 
 126. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. Although the plain meaning of “dispose” 
suggests that Congress can completely sever U.S. ties with Territories, other 
interpretations are possible. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 314 (1901) 
(White, J., concurring) (“I cannot resist the belief that the theory that the dis-
posing clause relates as well to a relinquishment or cession of sovereignty as 
to a mere transfer of rights of property, is altogether erroneous.”). 
 127. U.S. CONST. art. V. The consent requirement appears in the context of 
the process for amending the Constitution, but the text does not explicitly lim-
it the requirement to that context. The word “equal” in the Equal Suffrage 
Clause is undefined. It could set a baseline of equality that precludes any de-
parture, and thus would preclude deannexation. Alternatively, it could mean 
that each state must have the same representation in the Senate as all other 
states, which would not be an obstacle to deannexation because the unrepre-
sented entity would no longer be a state. 
 128. On the other hand, the rule against contested secession may merely 
reflect deference to national will, such that the Union’s desire either to expel or 
keep a state would trump a contrary state preference. For a discussion of 
whether the Constitution permits secession, see ABRAHAM LINCOLN, First In-
augural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND 
WRITINGS 1859–1865, at 218 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989) (“[N]o State, 
upon its own mere motion, can lawfully get out of the Union . . . .”); DAVID P. 
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS, 1845–1861, at 230–37 (2005) (ana-
lyzing Civil War era arguments for and against secession); DANIEL FARBER, 
LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 70–91 (2003) (same); WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 295–310 (Buffalo 2d 
ed. 1829) (defending states’ right to secede); Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of 
the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
457, 499, 506–08 (1994) (suggesting that secession might be permissible if ap-
proved by the national populace, rather than unilaterally by a single seceding 
state’s polity). Ironically, the Articles of Confederation purported to form a 
“perpetual” union that nevertheless quickly dissolved, while the Constitution 
contains no such explicit aspiration and yet may forge bonds that are legally 
permanent. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. XIII, para. 1; cf. Texas 
v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868) (dicta that the “more perfect Union” 
clause in the Preamble makes the United States “indissoluble”), overruled on 
other grounds by Morgan v. United States, 113 U.S. 476 (1885); id. (“The Con-
stitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of 
indestructible States.”). 
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sent. A large literature analyzes when the Treaty power can 
circumvent other aspects of the Constitution limiting federal 
authority over subjects that would ordinarily be under state 
control.129 But this literature has not addressed whether trea-
ties may transfer portions of unconsenting states.130 The Su-
preme Court likewise has never directly engaged the ques-
tion.131 The answer is not obvious. Many states encompass land 
 
 129. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432–33 (1920) (upholding fed-
eral power to regulate by treaty a subject that the Court assumed Congress 
could not regulate by statute); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 191 (2d ed. 1996) (“[W]hatever is within [the 
treaty power’s] scope is not reserved to the states: the Tenth Amendment is 
not material. Many matters, then, may appear to be ‘reserved to the States’ as 
regards domestic legislation if Congress does not have power to regulate them; 
but they are not reserved to the states so as to exclude their regulation by in-
ternational agreement.”); Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American 
Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 460 (1998) (“[T]here is a strong case—based 
on history, doctrine, and policy—for subjecting the treaty power to the same 
federalism limitations that apply to Congress’s legislative powers.”); Nicholas 
Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1868, 1875 
(2005) (“This Article endeavors to demonstrate that Missouri v. Holland is 
wrong.”); David Sloss, International Agreements and the Political Safeguards 
of Federalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1963, 1975–88 (2003) (contending that the 
treaty ratification process protects state interests and may obviate content-
based constraints on federal power); cf. Fort Leavenworth Ry. Co. v. Lowe, 114 
U.S. 525, 541 (1885) (noting that the United States, deeming it necessary, 
sought Maine’s participation in treaty negotiations about their mutual north-
ern boundary with Great Britain, but not holding that this was required). A 
related question is whether the President and Senate can use the treaty power 
to alienate federal land that is not part of the states, or if instead Congress must 
enact legislation authorizing loss of federal title. See Edwards v. Carter, 580 
F.2d 1055, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (rejecting a challenge by members of the House 
of Representatives to a treaty transferring the Panama Canal to Panama). 
 130. But cf. Burnett, supra note 80, at 804–05 (contending that incorpo-
rated territories are a permanent part of the Union, but not specifically focus-
ing on the treaty power). 
 131. The Court has assumed in dicta without analysis that “the tie that 
bound the States . . . to the Constitution could not be dissolved” without their 
“consent.” Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 261 (1901). Three concurring Jus-
tices took a more nuanced position. They acknowledged that “from the exigen-
cy of a calamitous war or the necessity of a settlement of boundaries, it may be 
that citizens of the United States may be expatriated by the action of the trea-
ty-making power.” Id. at 317 (White, J., concurring). However, a “mere act of 
sale” would not be permissible. Id. Two Justices subsequently suggested that 
incorporation of territories (and presumably states as well) permanently ex-
tends constitutional protection, but the full Court has not considered the ques-
tion. See Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 529–30 (1905) (Harlan, 
J., concurring) (“Congress cannot suspend the operation of the Constitution in 
any territory after it has come under the sovereign authority of the United 
States, nor, by any affirmative enactment, or by mere non-action, can Congress 
prevent the Constitution from being the supreme law for any peoples subject 
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that the United States acquired through treaties.132 The Su-
preme Court views “cession” of land via such treaties as in-
grained in “the law of nations, recognized by all civilized 
states.”133 This broad view of national prerogative suggests that 
any limit on the ability of the United States to shrink itself by 
treaty would be inconsistent with the general principles that 
led to U.S. expansion. The Court could of course hold that the 
Constitution modifies international law by making cession a 
one-way ratchet once land is incorporated into states: the Unit-
ed States can expand but cannot contract. But the Constitu-
tion’s text does not expressly compel this result. Thus, for ex-
ample, if Russia demanded the Aleutian Islands in exchange 
for concessions on national security matters, it is not clear that 
Alaska’s objection could derail the deal. The transfer might be 
unwise as a matter of policy, Alaska might deserve compensa-
tion for its loss,134 and U.S. citizens in the affected territory 
 
to the jurisdiction of the United States.”); id. at 536 (Brown, J., concurring) 
(contending that the extension of the Constitution to territories is “irrevocable”). 
The scant commentary from the Founding era does not indicate a consen-
sus on whether treaties could alienate states. There is some evidence that Al-
exander Hamilton was amenable to deannexation, but that Thomas Jefferson 
and George Washington were opposed. See Downes, 182 U.S. at 315–17. Fears 
of deannexation were briefly discussed during ratification debates and met 
with inconsistent responses. Compare 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 501 (Jona-
than Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES] (statement of 
James Madison in Virginia) (“The power of making treaties does not involve a 
right of dismembering the Union.”), with id. at 507–08 (statement of George 
Mason in Virginia) (“If, in the course of an unsuccessful war, we should be 
compelled to give up part of our territories, or undergo subjugation if the gen-
eral government could not make a treaty to give up such a part for the preser-
vation of the residue, the government itself, and consequently the rights of the 
people, must fall. Such a power must, therefore, rest somewhere. . . . I con-
ceive, therefore, that there is nothing in that Constitution to hinder a dis-
memberment of the empire.”). 
 132. See, e.g., Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the 
Republic of Mexico art. V, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922 (California and 
southwestern states); Treaty with Great Britain, U.S.-Gr. Brit., June 15, 1846, 
9 Stat. 869 (Oregon); Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, U.S.-Spain, 
Feb. 22, 1819, 8 Stat. 252 (Florida); Treaty Between the United States of 
America and the French Republic, U.S.-Fr., Apr. 30, 1803, 8 Stat. 200 (Louisi-
ana Territory); Definitive Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 
81 (territory south of Canada). 
 133. Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890). 
 134. Cf. Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 
534 (1941) (“The fact that land is owned by a state is no barrier to its condem-
nation by the United States. There is no complaint that any property owner 
will not receive just compensation for the land taken.” (citation omitted)). 
  
2011] CONSTITUTIONAL SPACES 1205 
 
would probably have exit rights by virtue of their citizenship.135 
Yet the treaty might nevertheless be constitutional unless 
there is a compelling reason to believe that state borders are 
inviolable. The extent to which the treaty power allows dean-
nexing states or portions of states thus presents future scholars 
with a fascinating and overlooked question of constitutional 
balancing between the power of two entities (the United States 
and a state) over a single space. 
Second, even if states’ physical boundaries are secure from 
federal alteration, the legal significance of these boundaries is 
ambiguous because the Constitution defines overlapping spaces 
subject to overlapping authority. To see why, imagine a simpli-
fied variant of the federal system that consists entirely of the 
United States and two states (X and Y ). Point Z is within State 
X, as illustrated below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 135. Russian citizens enjoyed exit rights when Alaska was transferred to 
the United States. See Treaty Concerning the Cession of the Russian Posses-
sions in North America by His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias to the 
United States of America art. III, U.S.-Russ., Mar. 30, 1867, 15 Stat. 539 (al-
lowing Russian citizens to leave Alaska within the first three years after its 
transfer to the United States). The transfer of state land to a foreign country 
might seem to violate the Constitution by depriving residents of a “Republican 
Form of Government.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. The federal “guarantee” of 
such government applies “to every State in this Union.” Id. The word “State” 
encompasses its “people.” Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 721 (1868) 
(applying this construction to the Guarantee Clause), overruled on other 
grounds by Morgan v. United States, 113 U.S. 476 (1885). State residents might 
therefore have an entitlement to avoid being transferred to a foreign power. 
However, the text is ambiguous about the clause’s temporal scope, creating a 
question for future scholars: is the guarantee limited to the duration of state-
hood, or does it create an obligation that could require preserving statehood? If 
the Guarantee Clause limits federal authority to deannex state land, then pre-
sumably such deannexation would be constitutional if the acquiring country 
offered a republican form of government. Indeed, the United States potentially 
could fulfill its “guarantee” by including a clause in the treaty requiring the 
acquiring government to preserve republican rule. Other countries have im-
posed similar requirements in treaties with the United States. See Treaty of 
Amity, Settlement, and Limits art. V, U.S.-Spain, Feb. 22, 1819, 8 Stat. 252 
(enumerating exit rights with respect to Florida); Treaty Between the United 
States of America and the French Republic, supra note 132, art. III, 8 Stat. at 
202 (“The inhabitants of [Louisiana] shall . . . [have] enjoyment of all the 
rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States.”). 
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The boundary line between X and Y in theory should have 
meaning, as should the fact that Z is within X and outside Y. 
But if we want to know which government entity regulates 
events in Z, the boundaries alone provide insufficient informa-
tion. It is possible that: (1) X exclusively regulates events at Z 
because they occur within X; (2) the United States exclusively 
regulates events at Z because they occur within the United 
States; (3) the United States and X concurrently regulate 
events at Z because it is within both places; and (4) Y regulates 
events at Z concurrently with X (and with federal oversight) to 
the extent that those events are of legitimate concern to Y.136 
State borders are therefore merely relevant rather than dispos-
itive when trying to determine whether the location of an event 
has regulatory significance. The most that we can conclude 
from knowing that Z is in X is that X probably is the sole regu-
lator because federal power is limited and the extraterritorial 
application of other states’ laws is relatively unusual.137 But a 
 
 136. Examples of why Y might care about conduct at Z include: (1) a facto-
ry at Z spews pollution into Y; (2) a car accident at Z injures a passenger from 
Y; (3) a distributor at Z ships dangerous products into Y; or (4) a resident of Y 
earns income from an employer at Z. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held 
in these and similar circumstances that states can regulate extraterritorial 
conduct by taxing it, applying statutory and common law regulations, and ex-
ercising adjudicative jurisdiction. See generally Erbsen, supra note 1; Kather-
ine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the Extra-
territoriality Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1057 (2009); Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynam-
ics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterri-
torial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865 (1987); Mark D. Rosen, State 
Extraterritorial Powers Reconsidered, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133 (2010). 
 137. See Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 
168 (2001) (“[S]tates still do most of the actual governing in this country, and 
the important objects of daily life are still chiefly matters of state and local, 
not federal, cognizance.”). State law applies extraterritorially more often than 
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more precise answer requires information about who is acting 
at Z, what they are doing, and where the effects of that conduct 
arise. For example, is the actor a citizen of X, Y, or elsewhere, 
does the conduct implicate one of Congress’s enumerated pow-
ers that has generated legislation or dormant preemption, and 
does the conduct have a nexus with Y that might justify apply-
ing Y ’s law or permitting Y ’s courts to exercise adjudicative ju-
risdiction? 
Thinking about these “who” and “what” questions in the 
context of the “where” question illustrates a dilemma of federal-
ism. In a system of unitary sovereignty, the answer to the 
“where” question can moot the “who” and “what” questions be-
cause a single government has authority over all events within 
its components. That government may choose to delegate its 
power to subsidiary units, but it remains the ultimate source of 
authority within its physical realm.138 Yet in a system of frag-
mented sovereignty, the where question cannot be dispositive 
because conduct occurs in and causes effects in spaces that ex-
ist simultaneously within multiple constitutionally defined en-
tities. The “who” and “what” questions therefore become impor-
tant and create a multivariable regulatory calculus that is 
notoriously complex and resists formulaic resolution.139 
 
is commonly assumed, but still far less often than it applies locally. See Rosen, 
supra note 2, at 1108. 
 138. Delegation within a system of formal unitary sovereignty can create 
complicated federalism issues when regional subdivisions have ill-defined 
guarantees of autonomy. See Charles E. Ehrlich, Democratic Alternatives to 
Ethnic Conflict: Consociationalism and Neoseparatism, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 
447, 470–71 (2000) (“The Constitution of 1978 divided Spain into seventeen 
autonomous communities . . . . However, the Constitution also spoke of the unity 
of the Spanish State, in the process denying any right to self-determination in 
the traditional sense of sovereignty. The arrangement was meant to allow 
each region or ‘nationality’ autonomy and local self-government . . . . As a 
trade-off, the principle of ‘self-determination’ was applied to the Spanish state 
in its entirety.” (footnotes omitted)); Ford, supra note 33, at 852 n.20 (“It is of-
ten difficult to determine whether a sovereign jurisdiction chronologically or 
normatively precedes its jurisdictional subdivisions, or whether it is simply 
the sum of its subdivisions.”). 
 139. Expanding analysis of federalism beyond the traditional focus on state 
and federal actors adds additional complexity. See Heather K. Gerken, Fore-
word: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 6, 22 (2010) (contend-
ing that “a broad-gauged, democratic account of how . . . nested governmental 
structures ought to interact” should address “the special purpose institutions 
(juries, school committees, zoning boards, local prosecutors’ offices, state ad-
ministrative agencies) that constitute states and cities”); supra notes 31–32; 
infra note 318. 
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The relationship between the who, what, and where ques-
tions suggests that constitutional law governing federalism can 
in part be understood as a byproduct of legal geography. The 
Constitution fragments “the Land” into multiple components, 
including two overlapping places (“States” and “the United 
States”) governed by entities that have a hierarchical relation-
ship under the Supremacy Clause. Doctrine is therefore neces-
sary to allocate power over this shared space.140 Likewise, con-
duct in one place can affect other similarly defined places that 
share an equivalent legal status of “statehood.” Doctrine is 
therefore necessary to determine when states may resist or 
must submit to the extraterritorial reach of other states’ laws 
or institutions. Accordingly, “vertical” federalism doctrine that 
manages hierarchical federal/state relationships and “horizon-
tal” federalism doctrine that manages coequal state/state rela-
tionships are reactions to the incomplete role that state borders 
play in preserving and confining state authority.141 
D. THE “DISTRICT” AND THE “SEAT” 
The Constitution creates a “District” about which it says 
very little. This District: (1) “become[s] the Seat of the Govern-
ment”; (2) derives from the “Cession of particular States” upon 
“Acceptance of Congress”; (3) can be no larger than “ten Miles 
square”; (4) is subject to the “exclusive” power of Congress in 
“all Cases whatsoever”; and (5) may appoint presidential and 
vice-presidential electors.142 The District’s physical scope is 
ambiguous. The Constitution limits the District’s maximum 
size,143 but does not establish its minimum size,144 location,145 
 
 140. For a rare example of the Supreme Court framing federalism prob-
lems in spatial terms, see Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 516 (1858) 
(“[T]he powers of the General Government, and of the State, although both ex-
ist and are exercised within the same territorial limits, are yet separate and 
distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other, 
within their respective spheres.” (emphasis added)). The Constitution’s only 
explicit reference to the federal and state governments’ shared authority over 
places is the now-repealed Eighteenth Amendment, which granted the United 
States and states “concurrent power” over prohibition. U.S. CONST. amend. 
XVIII, § 2, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. 
 141. For a discussion of how vertical and horizontal federalism doctrines 
overlap, see Erbsen, supra note 1, at 504–05. 
 142. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17; id. amend. XXIII. 
 143. This limit might not be as clear as the “ten Miles square” language 
suggests because the District has contended that it may operate government 
facilities outside its boundaries. See Virginia v. Reno, 955 F. Supp. 571, 578–
80 (E.D. Va. 1997) (holding that the Property Clause permits Congress to ac-
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or permanency (the District has shrunk over time).146 Arguably, 
the District’s very existence is not required. The Constitution 
 
quire land in Virginia on which the District may operate a prison), vacated as 
moot, 122 F.3d 1060 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 144. The Framers wanted buffer space between the states and federal in-
stitutions to ensure that the District would be secure, autonomous, and pro-
tected from parochial state influences. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 
43, at 272 (James Madison) (“Without [exclusive federal jurisdiction over the 
District,] not only the public authority might be insulted and its proceedings 
interrupted with impunity, but a dependence of the members of the general 
government on the State comprehending the seat of the government for protec-
tion in the exercise of their duty might bring on the national councils an impu-
tation of awe or influence equally dishonorable to the government and dissat-
isfactory to the other members of the Confederacy.”); 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, 
supra note 131, at 439 (statement of Edmund Pendleton in Virginia) (arguing 
that exclusive federal jurisdiction over the nation’s capital was necessary to 
give Congress “power over the local police of the place, so as to be secured from 
any interruption in their proceedings”); 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 131, 
at 220 (statement of James Iredell in North Carolina) (“Do we not all remem-
ber that, in the year 1783, a band of soldiers went and insulted Congress? 
. . . It is to be hoped such a disgraceful scene will never happen again; but 
that, for the future, the national government will be able to protect itself.”). 
 145. By not specifying the District’s location, the Framers sidestepped a 
delicate political question that was entangled with conflicts between free and 
slave states and competition between states hoping that proximity to the capi-
tol would foster economic development. See Whit Cobb, Democracy in Search 
of Utopia: The History, Law, and Politics of Relocating the National Capital, 
99 DICK. L. REV. 527, 534–49 (1995). 
 146. The District originally consisted of land ceded from Maryland and 
Virginia, but Congress retroceded the portion from Virginia. See Act of July 9, 
1846, ch. 35, § 1, 9 Stat. 35, 35–36. The “present” district is the “permanent 
seat of government,” 4 U.S.C. § 71 (2006), but there is no apparent constitu-
tional limit on Congress changing its mind, retroceding the entire District, and 
accepting a new District elsewhere. The Constitution says merely that a Dis-
trict may exist; it never explicitly says where it must be or how long it must 
persist. Cf. Phillips v. Payne, 92 U.S. 130, 134 (1875) (holding that the plain-
tiff was “estopped” from challenging the constitutionality of retrocession be-
cause Virginia had long exercised “de facto” control of the retroceded territory, 
but not considering whether retrocession was constitutional at the time it oc-
curred). The Twenty-Third Amendment seems to support the District’s ephem-
eral status by referring generically to “the District constituting the seat of 
Government” rather than specifically to “the District of Columbia.” But see 
OFF. OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL: THE QUESTION OF STATEHOOD FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 23 
(1987) (contending that retrocession may be unconstitutional in part because a 
new or reduced District could have insufficient population to justify three elec-
toral votes, which suggests that the Amendment’s drafters intended to freeze 
the District at its current dimensions). Congress could conceivably retrocede 
the District and then reacquire a portion as a “Place” under the Enclave 
Clause, see infra Part I.I; this would render the Twenty-Third Amendment 
moot by eliminating the District to which it refers. See Neuman, supra note 
32, at 1223 (noting this possibility). Finally, if the District is a subset of feder-
al “Property,” then Congress may have power to “dispose” of it, which further 
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provides only that Congress “may” “[a]ccept[]” an offer of land 
for the District,147 and there is no mechanism for compelling 
states to provide such land.148 Moreover, the seat of govern-
ment—which is both a concept and place149—apparently can be 
anywhere that Congress specifies, and briefly was in Pennsyl-
vania.150 The District is thus yet another constitutional space 
with tenuous physical boundaries. 
 
suggests that the District is not permanent. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; see 
infra note 212. 
 147. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
 148. Congress can seize state land by eminent domain, but would not ac-
quire the kind of full sovereignty over seized land that it possesses over the 
voluntarily ceded District. See supra note 125. 
 149. The “seat” must exist somewhere because the Constitution requires 
Electoral College members to send their ballots “to” that place (addressed to 
the Senate President). U.S. CONST. amend. XII. It is unclear why Article I re-
fers to the “Seat” while the Twelfth Amendment refers to the “seat.” One pos-
sibility is that the “Seat” is an abstract entity (the District “become[s]” the 
Seat), see id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17, while the “seat” is shorthand for the place where 
that entity is (ballots are sent “to” the seat), see id. amend. XII. 
The Seat has two additional spatial dimensions. First, legislators “going to 
and returning from” legislative sessions (which presumably occur in the Seat) 
enjoy broad freedom from “Arrest” in the states that they transit. U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (creating exceptions for “Treason, Felony and Breach of the 
Peace”). Second, “Speech or Debate in either House” may “not be questioned in 
any other Place.” Id. (emphasis added). The fact that these clauses do not ap-
ply to all travel or all speech by members of Congress suggests a special status 
for the Seat that creates an extraterritorial immunity for local conduct. 
 150. The statute authorizing the District as the future “permanent seat of 
the government” specified Philadelphia as the interim location for “all offices 
attached to the seat” between 1790 and 1800. Act of July 16, 1790, ch. 28, §§ 1, 
5, 1 Stat. 130, 130. The seat was also briefly in New York, which was the final 
seat under the Articles of Confederation and carried over to the new govern-
ment. See 34 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 523 
(1937) (reporting the September 12, 1788, resolution calling for the first Con-
gress under the new Constitution to convene at the “present seat” of govern-
ment). Presumably, if the District were occupied by foreign invaders or de-
stroyed (as was a risk during the Cold War), the seat of government could 
relocate without need to await cession of a new District. Cf. Ted Gup, The Ul-
timate Congressional Hideaway, WASH. POST MAG., May 31, 1992, at W11 
(discussing a secret bunker under the Greenbrier resort in West Virginia in-
tended to house the government in case of nuclear attack). Article I never 
mentions the Seat and allows Congress to “sit[ ]” in “any” “Place” to which both 
houses consent. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4. The text does not indicate wheth-
er any such place outside the District formally becomes a new “seat” of gov-
ernment. In practice, however, Congress must have authority to designate a 
new seat when circumstances require, otherwise there would be nowhere for 
the Electoral College to send its ballots (or nobody to open them if sent to the 
old seat). See supra note 149. Less clear is whether the President can select a 
meeting place outside the seat when he or she “on extraordinary Occasions” 
orders Congress to “convene.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. On the one hand, there 
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More generally, the sparse description creates a mystery 
about how the District is different from other kinds of constitu-
tionally defined spaces and about the legal significance of those 
differences. Constitutional powers and rights that refer to 
spaces such as States and Territories therefore may or may not 
apply to the District depending on how one situates the District 
within the broader typology of federal spaces. 
The District is a unique space and entity, and thus any ef-
fort to consider its constitutional significance requires engaging 
with its Districtness. At first glance, the “District” looks like a 
“Territory.”151 It was initially called the “territory of Colum-
bia,”152 the Constitution uses similarly expansive language to 
describe federal power over both the District and the Territo-
ries,153 and the Twenty-First Amendment arguably treats it as 
a “Territory.”154 Yet the District differs from other Territories 
in that it is the “seat” of government, it has a more “perma-
nent” status than Territories,155 the Constitution allows its res-
 
is little reason to permit the President to order Congress to meet in an incon-
venient place (such as Crawford, Texas, or Hyannis Port, Massachusetts) 
when meeting in the ordinary seat would be feasible. On the other hand, in a 
true emergency in which the seat was occupied or destroyed, the President’s 
power to convene Congress presumably includes the power to select a venue 
(at least if the two houses cannot agree on an alternative). For a discussion of 
separation of powers concerns arising from the President’s role in legislative 
procedure, see Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, If the Judicial Confirmation Process Is 
Broken, Can a Statute Fix It?, 85 NEB. L. REV. 960, 1003–07 (2007). 
 151. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
 152. Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, § 21, 2 Stat. 89, 96. 
 153. Compare U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (Congress may “make all need-
ful Rules and Regulations” for Territory), with id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (Congress 
may “exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever” for the District). 
 154. The Twenty-First Amendment applies to “any State, Territory, or pos-
session of the United States.” Id. amend. XXI, § 2. There is no reason to be-
lieve that the drafters intended to exclude the District from the Amendment’s 
coverage. The District is not a state, and so if the Amendment applies to the 
District then the District must be a “Territory” or “possession.” The “Seat of 
Government” seems to have a higher status than “possession” implies, leaving 
“Territory” as the only option. See infra Part I.H (discussing the meaning of 
“possession”). The D.C. Circuit reached a different conclusion without consid-
ering the foregoing analysis. The Court held that the Twenty-First Amend-
ment applies to the District “as if it were a state.” Milton S. Kronheim & Co. v. 
District of Columbia, 91 F.3d 193, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that Congress 
intended the District to function like a state for purposes of regulating alco-
hol). This seems to be the weakest of the possible arguments: the District is 
not a State, so either the Amendment does not apply, or the District is a Terri-
tory or possession. 
 155. O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 538 (1933). 
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idents to vote in presidential elections,156 and it was once part 
of a state, such that wisps of its prior status may linger.157 
These attributes make the District look a bit like a State. But 
the District is not a State. It was not one of the original states 
to ratify the Constitution and it was never added to the “Union” 
by the only mechanism for admitting new states.158 Indeed, if 
the entire District were to become a state, a question would 
arise about whether it could continue to be the District.159 The 
District is therefore neither exactly like a Territory nor exactly 
like a state.160 However, the District’s uniqueness has not 
stopped courts from relying on metaphors. Courts have found 
the District-as-state meme sufficiently tantalizing to justify ap-
plying to the District some, but not all, constitutional provi-
sions that nominally apply only to “States.” The District is thus 
 
 156. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII. 
 157. See O’Donoghue, 289 U.S. at 540; Langdell, supra note 61, at 382. The 
District’s status as a nonstate carved from a state is currently unique, with 
the possible exception of federal enclaves. See infra Part I.I. However, shortly 
after the Founding, the United States acquired some territory that had pre-
viously been part of a state. For example, a six-year gap separated North Car-
olina’s cession of the Southwest Territory and Tennessee’s statehood. See Act 
of June 1, 1796, ch. 47, 1 Stat. 491 (admitting Tennessee into the Union); Act 
of May 26, 1790, ch. 14, 1 Stat. 123 (organizing the Southwest Territory); Act 
of April 2, 1790, ch. 6, 1 Stat. 106 (accepting cession of the Southwest Territo-
ry); see also UNITED STATES PUBLIC LAND COMMISSION, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 
74–75 (1881) (reprinting the May 1800 cession of Connecticut’s claims to the 
Western Reserve in what later became Ohio); Georgia: Cession of Western 
Land Claims, in 5 THE TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES 142–45 
(Clarence Edwin Carter ed., 1937) (ceding Georgia’s claims to western lands 
that eventually became Alabama and Mississippi). One can in theory imagine 
according this territory special status, although in practice the issue does not 
appear to have arisen during the territory’s brief existence. 
 158. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. Maryland and Virginia would have 
had to consent to contemporaneous formation of a new state from their territo-
ry, see id., although consent to subsequent admission of the ceded territory is 
probably unnecessary due to intervening nonstate status of the land between 
cession and statehood.  
 159. For example, if Congress “admitted” the District as a state under Ar-
ticle IV, could Congress retain “exclusive jurisdiction” over the District under 
Article I? The answer seems to be no because the existence of federal plenary 
power is inconsistent with states having “reserved” powers. Id. amend. X. 
However, proposals for D.C. statehood typically do not apply to all of D.C.: the 
District would continue to exist as a “smaller” place while its residential areas 
would become a state. Peter Raven-Hansen, The Constitutionality of D.C. 
Statehood, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 160, 163 (1991).  
 160. The District is also not like a “Place” under the Enclave Clause. See 
Raven-Hansen, supra note 159, at 171. 
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like a state for purposes of the Commerce Clause161 and the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause,162 but not the Equal Protection 
Clause163 and Diversity Clause.164 There is also a heated politi-
cal and legal campaign centered around whether the District is 
sufficiently like the “States” referenced in Article I to receive 
representation in Congress without a constitutional amend-
ment.165 Beyond the constitutional context, an extensive juris-
prudence has evolved to determine when statutory and treaty 
references to “states” and “territories” encompass the Dis-
trict.166 
The indeterminacy surrounding the District’s legal status 
illustrates two points about the Constitution’s typology of spac-
es. First, geographic labels are often an obstacle to reasoned 
analysis of how physical spaces and related entities exist with-
in legal regimes. The District is unique, yet we are forced to 
think about it by reference to other categories of places because 
 
 161. See Milton S. Kronheim & Co. v. Dist. of Columbia, 91 F.3d 193, 198 
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[W]e apply to local legislation of the District the same inter-
state commerce analysis as we would to state laws.”). 
 162. See Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 228 (1934) (“[C]ourts of the 
District are bound, equally with courts of the States, to observe the command 
of the full faith and credit clause . . . .”). 
 163. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–99 (1954). 
 164. See Hepburn & Dundas v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445, 452–53 
(1805). Oddly, D.C. citizens are state citizens for purposes of the diversity stat-
ute because three Justices who believed that Article I allowed Congress to vest 
jurisdiction that would be unavailable under Article III formed a majority with 
two Justices willing to overrule Hepburn. See Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater 
Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 600 (1949) (opinion of Jackson, J., joined by Black 
and Burton, JJ.); id. at 625–26 (Rutledge J., joined by Murphy, J., concurring). 
Seven Justices affirmed Hepburn. See id. at 586–88 (opinion of Jackson, J., 
joined by Black and Burton, JJ.); id. at 653 (Frankfurter, J., joined by Reed, J., 
dissenting); id. at 645 (Vinson C.J., joined by Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 165. In 2007, Congress considered the District of Columbia House Voting 
Rights Act, which would have given the District one seat in the House of Rep-
resentatives. See S. 1257, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1905, 110th Cong. (2007). 
The bill passed the House but failed in the Senate. See 153 CONG. REC. 
S11,631 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 2007); 153 CONG. REC. H3,593 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 
2007). For analysis of the bill, see Ending Taxation Without Representation: 
The Constitutionality of S. 1257: Hearing on S. 1257 Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007); District of Columbia House Voting Rights 
Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 1433 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
110th Cong. (2007); Jonathan Turley, Too Clever by Half: The Unconstitution-
ality of Partial Representation of the District of Columbia in Congress, 76 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 305 (2008); see also Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35, 59 
(D.D.C. 2000) (three-judge court) (rejecting theory that District residents were 
entitled to representation in Congress or entitled to vote in Maryland), aff’d, 
531 U.S. 941, (2000). 
 166. See Dist. of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 420 (1973). 
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the Constitution itself refers to those categories in circum-
stances that arguably should encompass the sparsely defined 
District. These forced analogies produce bizarre opinions about 
when the District sufficiently resembles something else such 
that it functionally is the thing that it formally is not.167 
Second, creating a typology of defined spaces endows those 
spaces with meaning and generates a need for precision that 
the text does not always fulfill. It is possible that every refer-
ence to states in the Constitution was intended to exclude the 
District, but some may have been oversights.168 Likewise, it is 
 
 167. See supra note 164 (discussing Tidewater, in which a majority of the 
Justices disagreed with the reasoning underlying the Court’s holding about 
how the Diversity Clause applies to District residents). A similar phenomenon 
of strained analogies exists in civil rights jurisprudence. See Jane S. Schacter, 
The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equiva-
lents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283, 285 (1994) (discussing the “discourse of 
equivalents” that asks “whether sexual orientation is sufficiently ‘like’ race, 
gender, disability, religion, or national origin, to merit the legal protection of 
civil rights laws”); Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, 
Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 962 (2002) 
(“Precisely as analogies dramatize similar features of different practices, they 
work both to illuminate and occlude. The race/gender analogy no doubt helped 
the Court see features of sex discrimination which, to that point in history, it 
had not seen. But the Court relied upon the race/gender analogy in ways that 
ultimately worked to limit the critical acuity and constitutional legitimacy of 
the emergent law of sex discrimination.”). 
 168. Alexander Hamilton’s unsuccessful proposal to amend the District 
Clause at the New York ratifying convention illustrates the spatial impreci-
sion in Founding era views of the District. Hamilton proposed that upon at-
taining a sufficient population, the “District shall cease to be parcel of the 
State granting the Same, and Provision shall be made by Congress for their 
having a District Representation in that Body.” 5 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE 
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 189 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke 
eds., 1962). This proposal can be read to support either of two contradictory 
conclusions about the District’s status: (1) the District was a distinct entity 
whose residents could not vote absent a Constitutional amendment; or (2) the 
District was a “parcel” of the granting state, and thus its residents could vote 
in their capacity as state citizens even without an amendment (the amend-
ment would be necessary only to give the District a separate congressional 
delegation). The proposal is also ambiguous about what sort of representation 
the District would have. For example, Hamilton did not indicate that the Dis-
trict would be treated like a state and granted two senators; he merely sought 
an unspecified form of “Representation” and did not indicate how much discre-
tion Congress had in structuring that representation. See generally Adams, 90 
F. Supp. 2d at 51 (noting Hamilton’s proposal and discussing other evidence of 
the Framers’ attitude toward and awareness of the District’s status). The record 
does not indicate why Hamilton, who attended the Philadelphia Convention, 
waited until the New York ratifying convention to raise his concerns about the 
District. Cf. Cobb, supra note 145, at 533 n.19 (speculating that Hamilton may 
have hoped that the District would be carved from New York, and thus that 
his proposal would increase his home region’s representation in Congress). 
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possible that the drafters who coined the term “District” had an 
intended meaning that was broader than what they actually 
conveyed.169 Readers are thus left to draw conclusions from 
words that may not fully communicate the ideas that the text is 
supposed to embody.170 The result is a jurisprudence that in-
evitably will be unsatisfying to observers hoping that formal 
labels and territorial boundary lines can produce conceptual 
clarity. Indeed, the more spaces we study as this Part 
progresses, the more we see that reliance on labels and borders 
provides either confusion or false comfort. 
E. “DISTRICTS” 
The Sixth Amendment’s Vicinage Clause provides that 
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State 
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law.”171 The legal significance of district borders is therefore 
relatively straightforward: when a defendant commits a crime 
in a district, he is entitled to a jury from that district whenever 
the clause applies. Unfortunately, the word “district” appears 
in a context that fails to account for the subtleties of federal 
geography. The physical contours of districts are therefore in-
determinate in ways that highlight several latent ambiguities 
in the vicinage requirement. 
First, the literal language of the Sixth Amendment makes 
an important category of criminal prosecutions impossible be-
cause of the text’s inattention to geography. Article III states 
that “all” federal crimes (other than impeachment) require trial 
by jury.172 Venue for such trials is appropriate in either of two 
places: if the crime was “committed” “within” a state, then trial 
must occur in that state; but if the crime was committed out-
 
 169. See sources cited supra note 166 (discussing Founding era commen-
tary about the District). 
 170. This disconnect between language and concepts is a problem that per-
vades all aspects of constitutional interpretation. The problem is especially 
acute when considering novel spaces that the Constitution created from 
scratch. For example, the “high Seas” and “admiralty” were spaces that inter-
national or English law already recognized; those spaces may have a unique 
constitutional definition, but readers at least benefit from a point of reference. 
See infra notes 282–92, 300. In contrast, the “District” is a novel feature of a 
novel federal system—a federal island in a sea of states—and thus lacks a 
preexisting frame of reference. 
 171. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 172. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
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side the states, then trial can occur wherever Congress “di-
rect[s].”173 The Sixth Amendment adds a requirement that in 
“all” federal “criminal prosecutions” the jury must be “of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted.”174 The problem is that unlike Article III, the Sixth 
Amendment fails to recognize that some federal crimes are not 
committed in states. The literal combination of rules requiring 
trial of “all” crimes by jury and “all” juries to be from the state 
where the crime occurred means that crimes committed outside 
of states cannot be prosecuted. This result would have made 
the “wild west” much wilder, but was obviously untenable and 
required an interpretative fix.175 The Supreme Court thus held, 
without explanation, that the Vicinage Clause “applies only to 
the case of offences committed within the limits of a State.”176 
The holding makes sense only as a matter of expediency be-
cause it ignores the fact that the Vicinage Clause expressly ap-
plies to “all criminal prosecutions” and that the rest of the 
Sixth Amendment can apply to crimes committed outside of 
states.177 This act of interpretative desperation would have 
been unnecessary if the drafters had focused more carefully on 
 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. amend. VI. 
 175. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment 
and Its Alternatives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1, 31 (1989) (“Giving meaning to each 
word of a statute or the Constitution also requires not interpreting the statute 
or Constitution to mandate absurd results.”). 
 176. United States v. Dawson, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 467, 487 (1853); see also 
Cook v. United States, 138 U.S. 157, 181–83 (1891); Jones v. United States, 137 
U.S. 202, 211 (1890). The district-vicinage requirement presumably must fall 
along with the state-vicinage requirement in cases involving crimes committed 
outside states. First, many such crimes do not occur in federal districts. For 
example, “piracy” on the “high seas” is a federal crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1651 
(2006), but there is no district physically encompassing international waters. 
Cf. id. § 3238 (establishing venue, but not vicinage, rules for criminal trials 
involving crimes on the high seas). Second, even if Congress defined a district 
that included nonstate outlying areas, those places often would lack a popula-
tion who could be compelled to appear as jurors, or the population would reside 
sufficiently far from the event to defeat the point of a vicinage requirement. 
 177. There is no indication that federal “criminal prosecutions” in Article 
III courts against defendants who acted outside of states need not be “speedy 
and public,” or that defendants can be deprived of the right to counsel and to 
confront witnesses. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5–10 (1956) (plurality opin-
ion). However, conduct outside of states (as well as within states) can raise a 
separate issue about what constitutes a federal “criminal prosecution” to 
which the Sixth Amendment applies. See Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 42 
(1976) (holding that the amendment does not apply to summary court mar-
tials); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40 (1942) (stating that there is no “right to 
demand a jury” in “trials by military commission”). 
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the existence of different types of spaces within the constitu-
tional order.178 
Second, the requirement that “district” boundaries “shall 
have been previously ascertained by law” creates another in-
terpretative oddity.179 If “previously” refers to creating a dis-
trict prior to the trial rather than the crime, then Congress can 
create ad hoc districts tailored to individual cases, which seems 
to defeat the point of requiring fixed district boundaries. Yet if 
“previously” refers to the crime, then changes to district bound-
aries between the time of the crime and the time of an arrest 
could eliminate the ability to empanel a jury: the crime would 
have been committed in a district that no longer exists, and the 
district that does exist was not “previously” defined. Congress 
has generally avoided this problem by preserving the bounda-
ries of modified districts to account for crimes that may have 
already been committed but have not yet been prosecuted.180 
The same physical space can thus simultaneously be within 
both the old and new district. This is one of only two examples 
of a point in space arguably being able to exist within two units 
of the same category of constitutionally defined place (the other 
is interstate boundary waters under the “concurrent jurisdic-
tion” of two states).181 However, Congress has not always pre-
 
 178. Article III required a similar interpretative fix. Criminal conduct often 
spans multiple states, and thus the reference to “the State” (singular) “where-
in” the crime was “committed” cannot mean what it literally says (unless one 
gives “committed” a very formal meaning that requires arbitrarily assigning a 
single locus to every crime). Congress finessed this geographic oversight by 
providing that “any offense . . . committed in more than one district, may be 
. . . prosecuted in any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or 
completed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (2006). The Supreme Court upheld this ap-
proach, holding that the word “district” in the Sixth Amendment really means 
“district or districts,” such that a single crime can be “committed” in multiple 
places. United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 704–05 (1946). 
 179. The meaning of this clause is “shrouded in obscurity.” Zicarelli v. Dietz, 
633 F.2d 312, 321 (3d Cir. 1980) (“[D]iligent research into the leading sources 
of Sixth Amendment analysis has disclosed no discussion or reference to the 
‘previously ascertained’ clause.”). The ratifiers presumably had an initial set of 
districts in mind given that Congress had already defined several. See Drew L. 
Kershen, Vicinage, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 801, 858–60 (1976). 
 180. 18 U.S.C. § 3240 (2006) (“Whenever any . . . territory is transferred 
from one district . . . to another . . . prosecutions for offenses committed within 
such . . . territory prior to such transfer, shall be commenced and proceeded 
with the same as if such . . . territory had not been transferred . . . .”). 
 181. See infra Part II.B. Overlaps between constitutional spaces typically 
involve different categories of places, such as water that is within both the 
federal admiralty jurisdiction and a state, or land that is within both a state 
and the United States.  
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served prior districts, and thus there has been at least one case 
where a court was forced to decide whether the transfer of ter-
ritory from one district to another precluded prosecution of 
crimes committed in the defunct district. The court allowed the 
prosecution to proceed in the new district despite the fact that 
the new district was not defined prior to the crime.182 This hold-
ing is an affront to plain meaning interpretation, but sensibly 
avoided creating zones of U.S. territory beyond the scope of fed-
eral criminal law. Such interpretative gymnastics were neces-
sary because the Constitution’s text (and Congress’s legislation 
pursuant to that text) did not think through the implications of 
a district’s evolving physical contours. 
Third, the permissible size of a district is also ambiguous. 
Districts need not be coextensive with states because otherwise 
the phrase “State and district” would be redundant. But how 
much smaller or larger can they be? Small districts probably do 
not raise concerns unless they are so small that they lack a suf-
ficient population to fill a neutral jury.183 Indeed, some mem-
bers of the first Congress (which voted on the Bill of Rights) 
apparently hoped that statutes would define small districts 
that minimized travelling by jurors.184 In contrast, districts 
should not be larger than states, although the issue is debata-
ble. First, making districts larger than states would be point-
less because the requirement that jurors come from both the 
“State and district” would render the out-of-state portions of a 
district superfluous. Second, there is no administrative reason 
for districts to be larger than states because such districts exist 
only for the purpose of vicinage and therefore need not be coex-
tensive with other kinds of federal regions, such as judicial dis-
tricts.185 Finally, permitting districts to extend beyond states 
would make them functionally illimitable. One could imagine a 
“district of the United States” that avoided the need for Con-
 
 182. See United States v. Louwsma, 970 F.2d 797, 800–02 (11th Cir. 1992); 
Brian C. Kalt, The Perfect Crime, 93 GEO. L.J. 675, 681 (2005) (critiquing 
Louwsma). 
 183. Cf. Kalt, supra note 182, at 678 (explaining how a venire might be un-
available in the District of Wyoming, which includes sparsely populated sec-
tions of Montana and Idaho). 
 184. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 784 (1789) (statement of Rep. Livermore) 
(“We have heard cases spoken of, to arise under the mountains of Carolina, and 
be dragged down to the sea-shore; but the inconvenience of three or four hun-
dred miles is nothing compared with what may take place under this system.”). 
 185. Federal vicinage districts are in fact coextensive with the jurisdiction-
al “districts” that Congress defined while creating “inferior” federal courts, but 
this syllogism was not constitutionally required. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. 
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gress to carefully define district boundaries. Alternatively, if 
the text’s reference to “the” relevant district implies the exis-
tence of more than one, we can instead imagine a “district of 
the East” and “district of the West.” Such an expansive scope 
would presumably defeat the point of having distinct vicinage 
districts, yet there is no discernable principle limiting Con-
gress’s discretion to define district borders once such borders 
span state lines. Two districts have in fact crossed state 
lines.186 Courts have never considered whether such districts 
violate the Vicinage Clause, nor is it clear that a defendant 
could challenge the district if jurors were drawn only from the 
portion in the appropriate state.187 The permissible geographic 
scope of districts therefore remains unknown, despite the fact 
that size is the only meaningful feature that districts possess. 
Finally, the reference to districts complicates the question 
of whether the Vicinage Clause binds state courts. Unlike most 
other components of the Sixth Amendment, the vicinage re-
quirement currently applies only to federal prosecutions.188 
However, some commentators believe that the clause should be 
incorporated against the states.189 That prospect raises a puzzle 
 
 186. See 28 U.S.C. § 131 (2006) (creating a district encompassing “Wyom-
ing and those portions of Yellowstone National Park situated in Montana and 
Idaho”); Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, § 21, 2 Stat. 89, 96 (creating the “district 
of Potomac,” which consisted of portions of Maryland, Virginia, and the “terri-
tory of Columbia”). 
 187. A postconviction challenge would likely fail because the error would be 
harmless. See Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 218–19 (2006) (stating 
that “harmless” constitutional violations require reversal only “in rare cases” 
where a “structural” error makes the “trial fundamentally unfair” or “unrelia-
ble” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). A pretrial challenge 
would also likely fail because the remedy for potential error associated with an 
overly broad district would be to call jurors from the district’s constitutional 
portion, rather than to suspend all criminal trials pending congressional ac-
tion. Overbroad laws prohibiting conduct can have undesirable chilling effects 
that may justify invalidating them entirely even if portions are permissible, 
see Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118–19 (2003), but there is no equivalent 
adverse effect from the mere existence of an overbroad vicinage district. 
 188. See 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 22.2(e) (3d 
ed. 2007) (noting that the Supreme Court has not decided whether the Vici-
nage Clause binds states, but that the “weight” of lower court authority is 
against incorporation); 1 id. § 2.6(b) (noting that the Court has incorporated 
most of the Sixth Amendment against states); see also Johnson v. Louisiana, 
406 U.S. 356, 371, 376 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (providing fifth vote for 
the proposition that the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous jury verdict 
in federal prosecutions but not in state prosecutions). 
 189. See, e.g., Steven A. Engel, The Public’s Vicinage Right: A Constitu-
tional Argument, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1658, 1707–08 (2000) (“There is no reason 
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because incorporation would require one of three unsatisfying 
conclusions. First, states might be obligated to respect the 
boundaries of federal districts, which would give Congress an 
unusually invasive and dubious role in state criminal proce-
dure.190 Second, states might be required to define their own 
districts. This rule would make districts the only constitution-
ally defined spaces whose boundaries are a function of both 
state and federal law.191 That odd result merits considering 
whether “districts” might have a uniquely federal character 
that state law cannot alter.192 Third, perhaps only the state-
vicinage and not the district-vicinage requirement would apply 
to the states. But this interpretation is dubious because it: (1) 
requires driving a wedge between the seemingly integrated 
“State and district” language; (2) would likely serve little or no 
purpose because the Constitution already limits states’ ability 
to draw jurors from out-of-state;193 and (3) would entail the 
questionable conclusion that the Constitution requires the fed-
eral legislature to consider drawing sub-state districts without 
 
to think that the Fourteenth Amendment should not respect some understand-
ing of the Vicinage Clause.”). 
 190. Cf. Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 564 (1990) 
(noting that the Court generally tries not to “conclude lightly that Congress 
intended to interfere with States’ administration of their criminal justice sys-
tems”); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971) (“Since the beginning of this 
country’s history Congress has, subject to few exceptions, manifested a desire 
to permit state courts to try state cases free from interference by federal 
courts.”). 
 191. The location of state boundaries generally presents a federal question, 
although state property law can apply to disputes regarding access to water at 
the state’s borders. See Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel 
Co., 429 U.S. 363, 370–71 (1977); Cissna v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 289, 291, 296 
(1918) (discussing “the law of interstate boundaries”); Mark D. Rosen, Why the 
Defense of Marriage Act Is Not (Yet?) Unconstitutional: Lawrence, Full Faith 
and Credit, and the Many Societal Actors That Determine What the Constitu-
tion Requires, 90 MINN. L. REV. 915, 972 (2006) (noting the “well-established 
body of federal common law” governing border disputes). 
 192. But see 1 LAFAVE, supra note 188, § 2.6(b) (assuming implicitly that 
states would have discretion to define their own districts). 
 193. The Due Process Clause requires states to have at least some connec-
tion with potential jurors sufficient to create personal jurisdiction; otherwise, 
the summons for jury duty would be unenforceable. See, e.g., Phillips Petro-
leum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 806–07 (1985) (noting that a state cannot 
“make a binding judgment against a person with whom the State had no con-
tacts, ties, or relations”). Incorporating a state-vicinage rule against the states 
would be meaningful only if the Sixth Amendment’s vague requirement that 
jurors be “of the State” imposes a tighter nexus requirement than current due 
process limits on the summons power. 
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imposing the same obligation on state legislatures.194 If none of 
these conclusions are plausible, then thinking about vicinage 
districts as spaces can clarify an unsettled question of incorpo-
ration doctrine. Once again, “the Land” shapes the “Law.”195 
The uncertain parameters of districts is another example of 
how imprecise usage of spatial terms can complicate constitu-
tional interpretation. Paying attention to geography in the con-
text of words like “district” illuminates questions not only about 
the location, size, and significance of particular places, but also 
about which entities (states or the United States) must create 
and respect those definitions.  
F. “PLACES” AND “TERRITORIES” 
The Constitution’s use of the words “place” and “territory” 
is an example of nomenclature run amuck and highlights the 
document’s lack of a comprehensive and precise geographic vo-
cabulary. These words again illustrate how physical spaces can 
have indeterminate scope that depends on their relationship to 
a governing entity. 
The word “place” (with a lowercase p)196 appears in the 
Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibits slavery “within the 
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”197 We 
 
 194. For example, Congress may allow defendants from southern Maine to 
be judged by jurors from northern Maine, but it must do so through the politi-
cal process of enacting vicinage legislation. That process presumably ensures 
consideration (or at least airing) of all relevant perspectives and forces legisla-
tors into making a choice. If the “district” and attendant “previously ascer-
tained by law” requirements did not apply to states, then Maine would not need 
to specify any limits on vicinage. Statewide vicinage could thus arise by default 
without legislators having to engage the issue through the political process. 
 195. See supra Part I.A. 
 196. See infra Part I.I (discussing “Places”). 
 197. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. The word also appears in the Fourth 
Amendment, which requires warrants to describe the “place to be searched.” 
Id. amend. IV. This use of “place” seems to refer generically to any type of 
space and does not have the same territorial connotation as “place” in the 
Thirteenth Amendment. This generic ambit is consistent with the principle 
that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,” such that courts will 
not decide whether “a given ‘area,’ viewed in the abstract, is ‘constitutionally 
protected.’” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Instead, the pro-
tection that the Fourth Amendment accords to activity within a space is a 
function of the relation between that space and the affected person. See Min-
nesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998) (“[T]he extent to which the Fourth 
Amendment protects people may depend upon where those people are.”); Rak-
as v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (“[C]apacity to claim the protection of 
the Fourth Amendment depends . . . upon whether the [claimant] has a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.”). 
  
1222 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:1168 
 
know from the “or” that wherever “places” are, they are not in 
the “United States.” We can also infer that “place” has the 
broadest possible scope both because of the preceding “any” and 
the fact that the abolitionists who drafted the Amendment did 
not intend to preserve enclaves of slavery in particular spac-
es.198 But that inference does not tell us anything about the 
geographic boundaries of “places” because of the caveat that 
“places” must be subject to U.S. “jurisdiction,” which is an un-
defined and amorphous term.199 The physical contours of a 
“place” are thus a function of the legal reach of the entity “the 
United States.” This linkage confirms the point above about 
how the “Law” and “the Land” often cannot be defined inde-
pendently.200 
The imprecision of “place” takes on a new importance when 
we consider the word “territory” (with a lowercase t),201 which 
appears only in the Eighteenth Amendment’s clause prohibit-
ing “the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating 
liquors within . . . the United States, and all territory subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof.”202 As with “place,” we know from con-
text that “territory” is not “within” the “United States.” But a 
puzzle arises from the use of the new word “territory” rather 
than the previously established “place”: Is “all territory” coex-
tensive with “any place,” or narrower?203 Neither answer is sat-
isfying. If “all territory” and “any place” are coextensive, then 
there was no reason to use different words. Yet if “all territory” 
and “any place” are not coextensive, there is no apparent crite-
ria for distinguishing between them. For example, courts have 
ruled that a vessel flying a U.S. flag in international waters is 
not a “territory” in which the Eighteenth Amendment ap-
plies,204 but is a “place” in which the Thirteenth Amendment 
 
 198. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 69 (1872) (describing the Thir-
teenth Amendment as “this grand yet simple declaration of the personal free-
dom of all the human race within the jurisdiction of this government”); Tobias 
Barrington Wolff, The Thirteenth Amendment and Slavery in the Global Econ-
omy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 1039–46 (2002) (contending that the Amend-
ment should have a broad extraterritorial application). 
 199. See sources cited supra notes 33–34 (discussing the concept of “juris-
diction”). 
 200. See supra Part I.A. 
 201. See infra Part I.G (discussing “Territory”). 
 202. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend XXI. 
 203. Territory is not broader because we already surmised that “any place” 
has the broadest possible meaning. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
 204. See Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 123 (1923). 
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applies.205 Yet the use of ships to circumvent U.S. law is a con-
cern in each context, and both locations are subject to U.S. ju-
risdiction, so it is not clear why the scope of federal power var-
ies.206 
Moreover, the imprecision of “jurisdiction” as a modifier for 
“territory” could have created problems if prohibition had sur-
vived through World War II. After the war, the United States 
occupied and exercised substantial civil authority over areas of 
Germany (to the point where the President created a “United 
States Court for Berlin”).207 The Supreme Court has suggested 
in an analogous context that such occupation likely confers a 
form of U.S. jurisdiction.208 If U.S. jurisdiction in fact existed 
within occupied areas of Germany, then the United States pre-
sumably would have had to close local bars, which would have 
created practical enforcement and morale problems in the 
midst of a recovering war zone. One could respond that military 
occupation zones are beyond U.S. “jurisdiction,” but that con-
clusion takes us back to the Thirteenth Amendment, which also 
applies only where the United States has “jurisdiction.” It 
seems untenable that the United States could tolerate slavery 
and involuntary servitude in zones that it occupies, and thus 
such zones would be “places” within its jurisdiction,209 forcing 
 
 205. See In re Chung Fat, 96 F. 202, 203–04 (D. Wash. 1899) (“[I]f . . . the 
petitioners are being coerced to labor on board an American vessel against 
their will . . . they are being subjected to involuntary servitude within the 
United States, in violation of the thirteenth amendment . . . .”). The practical 
scope of this protection is limited because the Supreme Court has held that sail-
ors who sign maritime employment contracts can be forcibly returned to their 
ships if they desert. See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 282–83 (1897).  
 206. One could argue that “territory” implies a nexus with land that a ship 
lacks, while “places” can be anywhere. If so, one wonders what was so important 
about land that made the drafters not want to extend prohibition beyond it. 
 207. See United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227, 229–35 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979) 
(discussing history of the court and the rules applicable in a criminal prosecu-
tion of a German defendant who hijacked a Polish airplane in German airspace). 
 208. See Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (8 How.) 603, 615 (1850) (stating that 
when land in Mexico “was in the exclusive and firm possession of the United 
States, and governed by its military authorities, acting under the orders of the 
President,” it was “subject to the sovereignty and dominion of the United 
States,” although not a “part” of the United States); cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 
553 U.S. 723, 754–55 (2008) (noting that the United States exercises “complete 
jurisdiction” over its naval base in Guantánamo Bay even though the base is 
subject to Cuba’s “de jure sovereignty”). 
 209. Cf. Wolff, supra note 198 (contending that the Thirteenth Amendment 
has a broad extraterritorial scope, but not considering its application in a mili-
tary occupation zone). The Emancipation Proclamation that preceded the 
Thirteenth Amendment explicitly relied for enforcement on the federal “mili-
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us to consider again whether they are also “territories” where 
prohibition would have applied. The Eighteenth Amendment’s 
imprecision and use of a novel vocabulary thus suggests its 
drafters did not think carefully about the Constitution’s exist-
ing typology of spaces and about the role of geography as a lim-
it on government power.210 
The contours of “places” and “territories” remain a mys-
tery, albeit one that would become relevant only if U.S. officials 
encounter involuntary servitude in areas under their control. 
Unfortunately, such encounters are not impossible given the 
prevalence of human trafficking and other forms of enslave-
ment that could test the definition of “places” within federal ju-
risdiction.211 
G. “TERRITORY” AND “PROPERTY” 
Article IV provides that “Congress shall have Power to dis-
pose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting 
the Territory or other Property belonging to the United 
States.”212 The word “Territory” reappears in the Constitution 
once (as a space in which the Twenty-First Amendment ap-
plies),213 while Property (with a capital P) never reappears.214 
Both Territory and Property present interpretative puzzles 
because the Constitution does not explain how these spaces dif-
fer from each other, whether these spaces have a uniform legal 
status or instead fragment into different subtypes with distinct 
regulatory implications, and what rights people have within 
these spaces. The Constitution’s imprecision makes Territory 
 
tary” in the occupied South. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, A PROCLAMATION (Jan. 1, 
1863), reprinted in 12 Stat. 1268, 1269. This occupied territory obviously had a 
closer nexus with the United States than does occupied territory in foreign na-
tions, but the Proclamation at least established that the military’s status as 
an occupying force is compatible with being a liberating force.  
 210. It is possible that the drafters deliberately used the word “territory” 
because it was narrower than “place” and would therefore avoid the unforesee-
able inconveniences that might arise from extending prohibition too far afield. If 
so, the drafters’ choice of terminology did not make their intentions clear. 
 211. See DAVID WEISSBRODT & ANTI-SLAVERY INT’L, OFFICE OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ABOLISHING SLAVERY 
AND ITS CONTEMPORARY FORMS 11–40, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/02/4 (2002) (dis-
cussing myriad forms of persisting slavery). 
 212. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
 213. See id. amend. XXI, § 2. 
 214. The Due Process and Takings Clauses mention “property” in a concep-
tual sense, rather than as the label for a particular region. See id. amends. V, 
XIV, § 1. 
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and Property gray areas in which Congress has ostensibly plen-
ary power that is subject to undefined limits. Efforts to identify 
these limits have generated a convoluted and controversial ju-
risprudence based on tenuous distinctions between different 
categories of spaces invented by judicial fiat. 
The first puzzle is how Territory differs from Property. If 
the two words encompassed entirely distinct ideas, we would 
expect the Constitution to reference “Territory or Property.” 
The fact that it instead references “Territory or other Property” 
suggests that Territory is a subtype of Property: all Territory is 
Property, but some Property is not Territory.215 In normal Eng-
lish usage, the reason to distinguish a subtype of a thing from 
the thing itself is because the subtype has some special signi-
ficance worth highlighting.216 So categorizing a space as a Ter-
ritory rather than mere Property could be legally meaningful. 
Yet the text grants Congress identical powers over both Terri-
tory and Property and never mentions either space in another 
context that suggests a difference between them.217 Creative in-
terpreters can try to fill the void by manufacturing possible dis-
tinctions. For example, some commentators have argued that 
the United States governs “Territory” as a sovereign and “other 
Property” as a proprietor.218 But these kinds of atextual dicho-
 
 215. The word “Property” is sufficiently broad to encompass even intangi-
ble federal assets. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 
330 (1936) (holding that the Property Clause covered the federal government’s 
interest in “electrical energy” generated by a dam). 
 216. The conclusion might be different if the list were longer. For example, 
the Enclave Clause applies to “Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and 
other needful Buildings.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. The listed subtypes of 
buildings, which all relate to the military, do not individually appear to have 
special significance and may serve merely to illustrate and clarify “needful 
Buildings.” Interestingly, these illustrations have not had any limiting effect 
on judicial analysis; the Supreme Court has interpreted the Enclave Clause to 
authorize more than just military buildings, and even to encompass vast ex-
panses of unimproved land. See Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 29–30 (1939) 
(holding that the Enclave Clause applied to a national park); James v. Dravo 
Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 142 (1937) (rejecting a “narrow construction” of 
the Enclave Clause that would permit only “structures for military purposes”). 
 217. The Twenty-First Amendment appears to apply equally to Territory, 
which it mentions explicitly, and Property, which it mentions implicitly as a 
subset of “possession.” See infra Part I.H. 
 218. Compare Albert W. Brodie, A Question of Enumerated Powers: Consti-
tutional Issues Surrounding Federal Ownership of the Public Lands, 12 PAC. 
L.J. 693, 708–11 (1981) (relying on the sovereign/proprietor distinction to cri-
tique current doctrine giving Congress broad authority under the Property 
Clause), with Eugene R. Gaetke, Refuting the ‘Classic’ Property Clause Theory, 
63 N.C. L. REV. 617 (1985) (arguing that the United States is not a mere proprie-
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tomies are not illuminating because their formalism overlooks 
the fact that the status of the United States as a sovereign in-
fluences its powers and immunities as a proprietor.219 The Con-
stitution thus frustrates efforts to interpret Article IV because 
it simultaneously equates Territory with Property while imply-
ing that a distinction exists.220 
 
tor of public lands within states). For a discussion of the Property Clause’s ori-
gins, see Robert G. Natelson, Federal Land Retention and the Constitution’s 
Property Clause: The Original Understanding, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 327 (2005). 
 219. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976) (“Congress 
exercises the powers both of a proprietor and of a legislature over the public 
domain.”); Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151, 174–75 (1886) (holding that 
federal property is immune from state taxation without Congress’s consent). 
 220. The Supreme Court suggested in dicta that “territory” was a synonym 
for “colony” or “province,” but has not developed this idea or considered its im-
plications. O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 537 (1933). Contempo-
rary public usage of the term territory could help explain how it differed from 
property, but the historical record is unclear and would not easily translate to 
the modern era. For example, the Continental Congress had established fed-
eral “Territory” before the Constitution was written. Northwest Ordinance of 
1787, reprinted in Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 51. The Framers often 
used the word “Territory” in a context suggesting that they envisioned space 
similar to what the Ordinance covered—i.e., land located adjacent to or near 
existing states that would eventually be formed into new states. See THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 2, supra note 43, at 38 (John Jay) (“It has often given me 
pleasure to observe that independent America was not composed of detached 
and distant territories, but that one connected, fertile, wide-spreading country 
was the portion of our western sons of liberty.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, su-
pra note 43, at 274 (James Madison) (discussing the Territory Clause in the 
context of “the Western territory”). But this may not have been the exclusive 
Founding era vision of Territory; the record is too ambiguous to permit a defin-
itive conclusion. See generally PETER S. ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL 
REPUBLIC: JURISDICTIONAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE UNITED STATES 1775–
1787 (discussing Founding era attitudes regarding various disputed territo-
ries). Moreover, the Framers apparently did not envision that the United 
States would replicate Britain’s role as an imperial power and thereby acquire 
distant lands that bore little resemblance to the Northwest Territory. See Zeph-
yr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 356 n.66 
(2009) (“The Framers saw America as a small country, akin to Holland and 
other small states—a country facing constant threat from the power and 
wealth of larger, imperial countries such as England, France, and Spain.”); 
Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Founders’ Foreign Affairs Constitution: Improvising 
Among Empires, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 209, 209 (2008) (“For a generation after 
the Revolution, the United States remained a provisional and peripheral actor 
in the Atlantic world.”). The Founding era perception of Territory, even if 
clear, therefore would not easily translate into subsequent eras when the 
United States acquired the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and various “Guano Is-
lands” scattered throughout the ocean. See Act of Aug. 16, 1856, ch. 164, § 1, 
11 Stat. 119, 119 (empowering private citizens, subject to presidential approv-
al, to claim on behalf of the United States “any island, rock, or key” containing 
guano and not under foreign jurisdiction); Christina Duffy Burnett, The Edges 
of Empire and the Limits of Sovereignty: American Guano Islands, in LEGAL 
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The Supreme Court has responded to textual imprecision 
with doctrinal imprecision. Opinions confirm that both Territo-
ry and Property encompass “land” but do not explain what dis-
tinguishes the lands that fall under each heading.221 The Court 
often either does not attempt to characterize spaces as Territo-
ry or Property or uses “property,” “territory,” and “possession” 
indiscriminately and interchangeably.222 Beyond blurring tex-
tual distinctions, the Court has implied that the Territory 
Clause is superfluous because Congress’s “right to govern” ter-
ritory is an “inevitable consequence” of its “right to acquire ter-
ritory” and inherent in its “general right of sovereignty” over 
possessions.223 Any subtle distinctions that the use of Territory 
and Property may have conveyed have thus been lost in a haze 
of atextual rhetoric. 
 
BORDERLANDS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN BORDERS 187, 192 
(Mary Dudziak & Leti Volpp eds., 2006) (noting that Congress sought to side-
step questions about how the Constitution would apply to the Guano Islands 
by characterizing such islands as “appertaining” to the United States rather 
than becoming federal “territory” subject to United States “sovereignty”). 
The Court once held that the word “the” before “Territory” in Article IV 
implied a reference to only the specific lands that the United States held at 
the time the Constitution was ratified. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 
How.) 393, 436 (1856). This thinly reasoned analysis was part of a convoluted 
attempt to deny Congress’s power to regulate slavery on the eve of the Civil 
War, see id. at 442, and has since been abandoned, see Nguyen v. United 
States, 539 U.S. 69, 71 (2003) (noting that Congress established Guam as a 
new “Territory” in 1950). 
 221. See United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526, 537 (1840) (“The 
term territory [in Article IV] is merely descriptive of one kind of property; and 
is equivalent to the word lands.”); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536 
(1911) (holding that the Property Clause conferred broad federal power over 
“land” within a national forest).  
 222. See, e.g., Domenech v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 294 U.S. 199, 204 
(1935) (referring to Puerto Rico as “an island possession” that is “like a territo-
ry”); Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 224 (1890) (concluding that the 
United States had “exclusive jurisdiction” over a Caribbean island claimed 
under the Guano Islands Act without considering whether the island was Ter-
ritory or Property); Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 42–43 (1890) (noting that various “territo-
ries” acquired by the United States were “property” within its “domain”). The 
Court has been more precise when interpreting statutes. For example, when 
interpreting a federal criminal statute that applied within federal “jurisdic-
tion” but excluded “territories,” the Court held that “territories” encompassed 
places where Congress had “organized” a “civil government[ ]” with “an execu-
tive, a legislative, and a judicial system.” In re Lane, 135 U.S. 443, 447 (1890). 
 223. Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 543, 546 
(1828); see also De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 174, 196 (1901) (holding that “au-
thority” over territories does “not necessarily” stem from “the territorial 
clause,” but may arise “from the necessities of the case”). 
  
1228 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:1168 
 
A second puzzle arises because the Constitution imposes a 
uniform terminology on a diverse landscape. Lands that fall 
within the Territory and Property labels are dissimilar and yet 
have the same formal status. That mismatch raises a question 
about whether these express terms have implied components 
that may merit distinct treatment. We already know that Prop-
erty fragments into two meaningful subtypes (“Territory” and 
“other”), but this list is not necessarily exhaustive. Additional 
subtypes of Property may exist within the “other” category, and 
one subtype (Territory) may have its own sub-subtypes. Article 
IV may therefore encompass many different kinds of places in 
which Congress has varying power, state or territorial govern-
ments have varying residual authority, and people have vary-
ing rights.224 One can imagine several factors that could help-
fully differentiate types of federal land, including: 
 
• Location in the Federal System (within a state v. outside the 
states) 
• Future Prospects (eventual statehood v. perpetual possession) 
• Manner of Acquisition (treaty, cession, or purchase v. occupation) 
 
 224. A broad reading of the word “respecting” in the Property Clause could 
mean that one subtype of affected land is not even federally owned. Conduct 
outside of federal land can cause effects within it, just as conduct in one state 
can cause effects in other states. See supra note 136. We already saw that 
these spillover effects justify extraterritorial regulation by states. See id. The 
power to regulate “respecting” federal property suggests that Congress has 
similar extraterritorial authority, although federalism concerns may limit its 
scope. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 538 (1976) (“[T]he power 
granted by the Property Clause is broad enough to reach beyond territorial 
limits.”); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 525–26 (1897) (noting that 
federal land cannot be “completely at the mercy of state legislation” and that 
Congress therefore has limited “police power” on state land adjacent to federal 
land); Peter A. Appel, The Power of Congress “Without Limitation”: The Prop-
erty Clause and Federal Regulation of Private Property, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1, 
124–25 (2001) (contending that Congress can regulate land use in the vicinity 
of national parks). The potentially broad scope of “respecting” raises a ques-
tion about why Article I gives Congress power “over” the District and federal 
enclaves. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. There is no policy rationale for giving 
Congress less extraterritorial authority to protect critical lands covered by Ar-
ticle I (such as the seat of government and “forts”) than to protect lands cov-
ered by Article IV (such as parks and forests). Id. The distinction between 
“respecting” and “over” is therefore either: (1) meaningless (which ignores the 
subtle geographic distinction between the two words); (2) poorly considered; or 
(3) moot because the District and federal enclaves are subtypes of Article IV 
“Property” and therefore covered by the “respecting” clause (and thus also cov-
ered by the “disposal” clause, which further suggests that the Constitution 
does not make the District permanent, see supra note 146). 
  
2011] CONSTITUTIONAL SPACES 1229 
 
• Legitimate Expectations (promised some autonomy v. not promised 
anything) 
• Location (contiguous with states v. isolated) 
• Self-Sustainability (many resources v. few resources) 
• Nature of Use (narrow specified purpose v. general community) 
• Permanence of Population (long term v. transient) 
• Prior Status (autonomous v. controlled from abroad) 
 
The problem is that the Constitution offers no guidance 
about whether these descriptively useful factors have any nor-
mative significance. Instead, the text creates a one-size-fits-all 
regulatory solution. As far as the text reveals, Puerto Rico has 
the same legal status as Howland Island: both are subject to 
Congress’s broad power under Article IV. Yet Puerto Rico hous-
es a vibrant community with nearly four million people and a 
$60 billion GDP,225 while Howland Island is an uninhabited 
rock.226 
The fact that federal power applies equally to residents of 
Puerto Rico and transient visitors to Howland Island is a symp-
tom of the Constitution’s imprecision in creating a typology of 
spaces and corresponding regulatory architecture. That symp-
tom might not be disturbing if people on both islands had a ro-
bust set of individual rights that limited federal power. After 
all, the Constitution does not distinguish between Las Vegas 
and the uninhabited Nevada desert, so there is nothing inher-
ently wrong with treating two dissimilar places equally. Yet a 
concern arises because courts often treat two similar places un-
equally. Population centers in states exist under one legal re-
gime, while population centers in federal possessions exist 
within an alternative regime that is less protective. 
The concern about unequal treatment of similar spaces 
leads to a third puzzle. The fact that Territory and Property ex-
ist outside the states means that the people in these spaces are 
outsiders to the normal relationship that the Constitution 
creates between the government and the governed. A recurring 
and vexing question is what this outsider status means in prac-
 
 225. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: 2010 tbls.1277, 1287, available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/ 
statab/2010/2010edition.html. 
 226. The United States acquired Howland Island in 1857 under the Guano 
Islands Act and continues to claim sovereignty over it. See 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1802(35) (2006). The island is so isolated that federal officials visit it only 
“about every 2 years.” Howland Island National Refuge, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE 
SERVICE, http://www.fws.gov/howlandisland (last visited Feb. 20, 2011). 
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tice. The Constitution does not expressly answer this question. 
It defines “Citizens” of states and the United States, explains 
the rights of these citizens, and distinguishes them from “for-
eign” citizens.227 But the Constitution does not create a unique 
status for people in federal territories (e.g., there are no “terri-
torians”). This omission might not pose a problem if residents of 
U.S. territories were automatically U.S. citizens at birth (and 
thus had a constitutionally recognized status), yet current ju-
risprudence does not extend birthright citizenship under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to unincorporated territories.228 Con-
gress therefore has a choice about whether to extend the bene-
fits of citizenship to people under its control, and sometimes 
chooses not to do so.229 Moreover, as discussed above with re-
spect to the District, the Constitution defines many rights in 
reference to the states and therefore creates doubt about 
whether these rights apply elsewhere.230 This textual uncer-
tainty has created room for the Supreme Court to hold that 
people living under federal control outside states lack many 
rights that they would possess if they lived within states. For 
example, the Insular Cases and subsequent decisions based on 
them held that people in Territories that Congress chose not to 
“incorporate” into the United States lack a Fifth Amendment 
right to a grand jury,231 a Sixth Amendment right to a jury tri-
al,232 the right to a “one man, one vote” electoral system,233 and 
 
 227. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; id. art. IV, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 228. See supra text accompanying notes 83–103 (discussing phrase “born in 
the United States” in the Citizenship Clause); supra note 102 (citing cases 
which held that birth in the Philippines, while it was a United States territo-
ry, did not create citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 229. For example, Congress never extended statutory birthright citizenship 
to the Philippines. See Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 416, § 2, 39 Stat. 545, 546. In 
contrast, people born in Puerto Rico are United States citizens, although some 
born between 1899 and 1941 were granted citizenship retroactively. See 8 
U.S.C. § 1402 (2006). People born in American Samoa are United States “na-
tionals,” but not United States citizens. Id. § 1408(1) (2006). 
 230. See supra Part I.D. 
 231. See Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 98 (1914) (Philippines); 
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 217–18 (1903) (Hawaii). 
 232. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 309 (1922) (Puerto Rico); Dorr 
v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 148 (1904) (Philippines). 
 233. Rayphand v. Sablan, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1139–40 (D.N. Mar. I. 1999) 
(“Since it is clear that the ‘one man, one vote’ principle is not a right that is the 
‘basis of all free government,’ it need not be applied in and to an unincorpo-
rated territory such as the Commonwealth [of the Northern Mariana Is-
lands].”), aff’d mem., Torres v. Sablan, 528 U.S. 1110 (2000). 
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the right to avoid non-uniform taxes on exports.234 In contrast, 
people in “incorporated” territories possess a broader set of 
rights commensurate with residents of states.235 The rationale 
for the incorporated/unincorporated distinction was opaque be-
cause neither term appears in the Constitution.236 Language in 
the opinions suggests that the Court’s categorical reasoning 
may have reflected discomfort with inhabitants of island terri-
tories, who the Court described as “alien races” with “modes of 
thought” that departed from “Anglo Saxon principles.”237 
The jurisprudence according second-class status to people 
in outlying territories has attracted substantial criticism.238 
 
 234. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901) (holding that Con-
gress could lawfully impose a duty upon imports from Puerto Rico, despite the 
Revenue Clauses in the Constitution providing that all duties, imposts, and 
excises shall be uniform throughout the United States). 
 235. See Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 525 (1905) (holding 
that the Sixth Amendment applied in Alaska before it became a state). 
 236. See Levinson, supra note 62, at 249 (“The doctrine of ‘unincorporated 
territories,’ one may confidently assert, was the product . . . of the perceived 
exigencies of the moment, which made Puerto Rico and the Philippines at once 
highly desirable as possessions of the United States yet, it was thought, un-
suitable for genuine membership in the American Union.”); Rogers M. Smith, 
The Bitter Roots of Puerto Rican Citizenship, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC 
SENSE, 373, 376–80 (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001) 
(outlining the incorporated/unincorporated distinction’s evolution and noting 
its foundation in turn-of-the-century debates about colonialism and race). 
Whether a territory is incorporated can depend on the Court’s subjective as-
sessment of congressional intent, rather than explicit use of the word “incorpo-
rated” in a statute or treaty. See Rassmussen, 197 U.S. at 522–23. 
 237. Downes, 182 U.S. at 287 (discussing Puerto Rico); see also id. at 278 
(expressing “serious” concerns about extending United States citizenship to 
“savages”). 
 238. An astute contemporary observer noted that, “‘[A]s near as I can make 
out the Constitution follows the flag—but doesn’t quite catch up with it.’” 
STUART CREIGHTON MILLER, ‘BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION’: THE AMERICAN 
CONQUEST OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1899–1903, at 157 (1982) (quoting Secretary 
of War Elihu Root). See generally Levinson, supra note 62, at 246–47 (“The 
importance of the Cases did not lie in the particular resolution of tariff policy, 
but, rather, in deciding whether the United States could emulate the Euro-
pean nations and conquer and possess colonial territories.”); sources cited su-
pra note 80 (critiquing the Insular Cases). For a general discussion of how the 
Constitution structures governance in the Territories, see ARNOLD H. 
LEIBOWITZ, DEFINING STATUS: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES 
TERRITORIAL RELATIONS (1989); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/OGC-
98-5, U.S. INSULAR AREAS: APPLICATION OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (1997). 
In addition to criticizing the status of residents of territories under U.S. 
law relative to the status of state residents, scholars have noted other consti-
tutional problems with how the United States structures territorial govern-
ance. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE 
ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 54–56 (2d ed. 1990) (criticizing doctrine 
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This criticism resonates with the point discussed above that the 
Constitution’s typology of spaces is so physically and legally in-
determinate that a jurisprudence of labels keyed to formal cat-
egories of spaces is likely to be unsatisfying. Determining how 
the existence of a power intersects with the boundaries of a 
place and the rights of a person requires analyzing the ration-
ale for the power, the reason for defining the place, and the na-
ture of the right. This is a subtle exercise that the Supreme 
Court’s categorical approach could not accommodate. The need 
for this subtlety might have been more apparent if the Consti-
tution was more precise in explaining how the Constitution ap-
plies in different spaces. Instead, the text creates labels that 
overly formalist courts239 often cannot resist imbuing with dis-
positive meaning despite the imprecise contours and signifi-
cance of the underlying spaces. 
H. “POSSESSIONS” 
The Twenty-First Amendment adds “possession” as a new 
category of space in the constitutional typology. The undefined 
term again highlights the imprecision with which the Amend-
ment’s drafters approached the “where” question of federalism. 
Section 2 of the Amendment provides that: “The transportation 
or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the 
United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, 
in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”240 The 
 
permitting Congress to create territorial courts that do not comply with Article 
III); Gary Lawson & Robert D. Sloane, The Constitutionality of Decolonization 
by Associated Statehood: Puerto Rico’s Legal Status Reconsidered, 50 B.C. L. 
REV. 1123, 1166–84 (2009) (considering whether Puerto Rico’s self-governance 
complies with the Appointments Clause and with elements of international 
law incorporated into U.S. law under the Supremacy Clause). 
 239. The judiciary’s penchant for attaching legal implications to distinc-
tions between spatial categories can fairly be described as formalist in the 
sense that it denies the existence of available normative choices. The catego-
ries exist as a matter of literal constitutional language, but the language does 
not directly communicate information about which constitutional norms do 
and do not permeate spatial boundaries. Opinions deeming legal conclusions 
to follow inexorably from the status of a particular place as a “Territory” (or a 
“State” or “District”) therefore mask the broad range of choices that judges 
have when considering which norms define the significance of spatial borders 
and which norms transcend those borders. See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 
97 YALE L.J. 509, 511–20 (1988); see also Efrén Rivera Ramos, The Legal Con-
struction of American Colonialism: The Insular Cases (1901–1922), 65 REV. 
JUR. U.P.R. 225, 272–79 (1996) (noting “formalist” and “instrumentalist” 
strands of reasoning in the Insular Cases). 
 240. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. 
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“or” tells us that possessions are neither states nor Territories, 
while the “thereof” indicates that possessions are regions of 
space with their own “laws.”241 Beyond that, we know very lit-
tle. The Supreme Court has never defined “possession” and the 
legislative history is unilluminating.242 
The puzzle is whether “State, Territory, or possession” is 
collectively different than “territory” (with a lowercase t), which 
was the undefined word referencing the space in which the 
Eighteenth Amendment applied until repealed by the Twenty-
First Amendment. States and Territories seem to fall clearly 
within “territory,”243 so the only issue is whether “possession” 
and the remainder of “territory” are coextensive. Neither word 
appears in the original Constitution, and thus both were novel 
appendages to the constitutional typology that lacked an estab-
lished meaning. We can isolate the interpretative issue by con-
sidering whether the Twenty-First Amendment would have a 
different scope if it mimicked the Eighteenth Amendment by 
providing that: “The transportation or importation into any ter-
ritory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States for de-
livery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the 
laws of such territory, is hereby prohibited.” The revised lan-
guage would arguably be broader than the current language 
because it would more clearly encompass the District of Colum-
bia. The District’s status under the “possession” language is 
unclear because it may be an internal component of the United 
States—like states and territories—rather than an external 
 
 241. “Thereof” apparently refers to each word in the phrase “State, Territo-
ry, or possession” and not just to the “United States,” such that each listed 
place can have specific “laws” governing it that are distinct from generally ap-
plicable federal law. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 484 (2005) (holding 
that the Twenty-First Amendment empowers states to enact laws that might 
otherwise be unconstitutional). The Amendment’s application to Territories is 
complicated by the fact that Territories do not have plenary legislative power. 
They therefore might be unable to regulate liquor, even despite the Amend-
ment, due to the limited scope of Congress’s grant of authority under the rele-
vant organic act. See Norman’s on the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d 
1011, 1018–19 (3d Cir. 1971) (discussing the Amendment’s effect in the Virgin 
Islands); Sancho v. Corona Brewing Corp., 89 F.2d 479, 481 (1st Cir. 1937) 
(discussing the Amendment’s effect in Puerto Rico). 
 242. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 274–75 (1984) (“[W]e 
have recognized the obscurity of the legislative history of § 2. No clear consen-
sus concerning the meaning of the provision is apparent.” (citation omitted)). 
The statute implementing the Amendment uses a distinct set of spatial refer-
ences, applying in any “State, Territory, or District of the United States, or place 
noncontiguous to but subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” 27 U.S.C. § 122 (2006). 
 243. See supra Part I.F. 
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space that the United States possesses.244 However, beyond 
this possible difference, “possessions” and the portion of “terri-
tory” outside states and Territory appear coextensive. Indeed, 
courts often use the two terms interchangeably.245 
The potential overlap between “territory” and “possessions” 
raises a question about why the Twenty-First Amendment in-
troduced a new spatial designator when there was already a 
catch-all available that the Eighteenth Amendment used in the 
same context of liquor regulation. There are three possibilities. 
First, the drafters may not have intended any difference in 
meaning, and thus their use of a different word would highlight 
the Constitution’s haphazard approach to defining the spaces 
where it operates. Second, the drafters may have deliberately 
used “possession” as a narrower word that avoided some of the 
complexities that arise when regulating at the outer edge of 
federal “territory.”246 If so, they seem not to have considered the 
possible effect their linguistic shift would have on the District, 
which would again illustrate an inattention to spatial issues. 
Finally, the drafters may have intended a broader scope than 
what “territory” would have provided. If so, they seem to have 
failed because it is difficult to imagine any space with its own 
“laws” that is a “possession” of the United States but not part of 
its “territory.”247 The word “possession” thus joins “territory” 
and “place” as broad references to spaces that amendments to 
the Constitution introduce without defining and without any 
apparent comparative assessment. 
I. “PLACES” 
Article I’s Enclave Clause introducing the unimaginatively 
named category of “Places” neatly illustrates how the Constitu-
tion fails to establish a systemic and meaningful typology of 
spaces.248 The word is so imprecise that it verges on pointless-
 
 244. See supra note 154. 
 245. See supra note 222. 
 246. See supra Part I.F. 
 247. If such nonterritorial possessions exist, they presumably are “places” 
under the Thirteenth Amendment, suggesting that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment has a broader reach than the Eighteenth Amendment. See supra text 
accompanying notes 201–12. 
 248. The Constitution also mentions “Places” that are not federal enclaves. 
These references are not to regions or fixed points in space, but rather address 
temporary locations linked to specific events. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 
(“Places . . . of holding Elections”); id. § 5 (“Place” where Congress may “ad-
journ”); id. § 6 (“Place” where Senators and Representatives may “not be ques-
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ness and so ambiguous that it simultaneously has inconsistent 
meanings. The clause provides that Congress may “exercise 
like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the 
Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the 
Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other 
needful Buildings.”249 The phrase “like Authority” references 
adjacent text granting Congress power to “exercise exclusive 
Legislation in all cases whatsoever” over the District constitut-
ing the seat of government.250 
The Enclave Clause appears to serve four purposes: (1) 
permitting the United States to own buildings, (2) specifying 
Congress’s power to regulate these buildings, (3) establishing 
the manner of acquiring these buildings, and (4) explaining 
how these buildings’ status as federal enclaves affects their sta-
tus as parts of States. Closer scrutiny reveals that the clause is 
either unnecessary or insufficient to fulfill any of these goals. 
First, there was no need for the Enclave Clause to author-
ize ownership of the specified structures because the Necessary 
and Proper Clause coupled with other Article I powers already 
established such proprietary authority.251 The power to “sup-
port Armies”252 presumably included the power to build “Forts, 
Magazines, [and] Arsenals,” and the power to “maintain a 
Navy”253 presumably included the power to build “dock-
Yards.”254 More generally, the power to construct unspecified 
“needful Buildings” was inherent in the existence of three 
branches of government. Even without the Enclave Clause, the 
Constitution surely would not have contemplated courts with-
out courthouses, a Congress without a capitol, and an executive 
branch whose officials would wander nomadically for want of 
 
tioned” under the Speech and Debate Clause); id. art. III, § 2 (“Places” for 
holding criminal trials). 
 249. Id. art I, § 8, cl. 17. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. § 8, cl. 18. 
 252. Id. cl. 12. 
 253. Id. cl. 13. 
 254. A contrary interpretation would lead to untenable results because the 
Enclave Clause applies only on land that is or was “in” a State, id. cl. 17, and 
thus could not authorize buildings in other kinds of federal spaces. Disallow-
ing such buildings would bar Congress from protecting federal territory by 
constructing forts, which the Framers must have realized would be reckless 
given the proximity of potentially hostile powers. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 25, 
supra note 43, at 163 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The territories of Britain, Spain, 
and of the Indian nations in our neighborhood encircle the Union from Maine 
to Georgia. The danger, though in different degrees, is therefore common.”). 
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offices to house them.255 Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court 
has interpreted the Necessary and Proper Clause to authorize 
construction and use of federal buildings,256 rendering this as-
pect of the Enclave Clause superfluous. 
Second, the Enclave Clause was unnecessary if its goal was 
to authorize Congress to regulate federal buildings. The Prop-
erty Clause in Article IV served the same purpose by permit-
ting Congress to “make all needful Rules and Regulations re-
specting . . . Property belonging to the United States.”257 The 
Property and Supremacy Clauses thus collectively make federal 
law the supreme law governing federal buildings, such that this 
aspect of the Enclave Clause is redundant. 
Third, the Enclave Clause seems to be pointless if its goal 
was merely to specify a mechanism (“purchase[]” from a “Con-
sent[ing]” State) for acquiring Places from states because that 
mechanism is both obvious and not exclusive. The power of 
Congress and the states to bargain with each other over land is 
likely inherent in the nature of their authority and did not re-
quire enumeration.258 Moreover, the Supreme Court has held 
 
 255. In theory, one can imagine a regime in which federal agents must rely 
on state hospitality, especially if states withhold “consent” to the transfer of 
land under the Enclaves Clause. Federal judges would thus work in state 
courthouses, the federal army would sleep in state barracks, and so on. In 
practice, however, there is no evidence that the Framers anticipated this sort 
of federal dependence on state beneficence. 
 256. See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371–72 (1876) (noting that the 
federal government’s authority to acquire land for “forts” and other buildings 
by eminent domain is “necessary for the exercise of [its enumerated] powers”); 
see also David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Second Congress, 
1791–1793, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 606, 636 n.174 (1996) (noting Founding era be-
lief that “the purchase of land and the construction of buildings [for a mint] were 
necessary and proper to the coining of money, which of course they were”). 
 257. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. The word “Property” could in theory ap-
ply only to federal land and not to the structures on top of it. But that would 
be a strained reading that the Court has never endorsed. See Ashwander v. 
Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 330 (1936) (holding that the Property 
Clause created a federal property interest in a dam, the “water power” it pro-
duced, and the resulting “electrical energy”). 
 258. See Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 541 (1885) (not-
ing in the context of a voluntary cession of land by Kansas to the United 
States that “the State and general government, may deal with each other in 
any way they may deem best to carry out the purposes of the Constitution”). 
The Articles of Confederation had contained a clause providing that “no State 
shall be deprived of territory for the benefit of the United States.” ARTICLES OF 
CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX. This obstacle to the acquisition of state land 
seems limited to the context in which it appeared: a conflict of interest rule 
preventing federally appointed “commissioners” from using their status as ar-
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that the Enclave Clause does not bar Congress from taking 
land from an unconsenting state by eminent domain.259 The 
combined effect of these two observations is that the Enclave 
Clause allows Congress to acquire land from states through a 
procedure that would have existed even without the clause, yet 
does not prevent Congress from acquiring land from states 
through other procedures despite the clause. The Enclave 
Clause therefore does not actually structure the relationship 
between Congress and the states with respect to transfers of 
land. 
Finally, the only remaining role that the Enclave Clause 
could serve is to explain whether states have any residual con-
trol over the Places that Congress acquires through the speci-
fied mechanism (consent by a state) for the specified purpose 
(constructing buildings). This question of state authority was 
important for the Framers, who wanted to ensure that Con-
gress could prevent state interference with federal operations 
on federal land.260 This ambiguity is important in practice be-
cause it determines, for example, whether states can tax activi-
ty within Places and whether people who live within Places are 
residents of states, and thus whether they can vote in state 
elections, attend state schools, get driver’s licenses, obtain di-
vorces, and be a state citizen for purposes of diversity jurisdic-
tion.261 
Ambiguity about states’ residual control over spaces arises 
because the Enclave Clause authorizes purchasing Places from 
the state “in which the same shall be.” The temporal reference 
for this phrase is unclear: “be” could refer to the time either be-
 
biters in state boundary disputes to aggrandize the federal government at 
state expense. Id. 
 259. See supra note 125 (discussing limits on federal eminent domain pow-
er over state lands). 
 260. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 43, at 273 (James Madison) 
(“The public money expended on [federal enclaves], and the public property 
deposited in them, require that they should be exempt from the authority of 
the particular State. Nor would it be proper for the places on which the securi-
ty of the entire Union may depend to be in any degree dependent on a particu-
lar member of it.”). A countervailing concern motivating the state consent re-
quirement was that Congress might “enslave any particular State by buying 
up its territory, and that the strongholds proposed would be a means of awing 
the State into an undue obedience.” 2 FARRAND, supra note 64, at 510 (report-
ing statement of Elbridge Gerry). 
 261. For a discussion of the practical problems that the exclusion of en-
claves from state territory created, see REPORT OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL 
COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF JURISDICTION OVER FEDERAL AREAS WITHIN 
THE STATES: PART I, at 23–27 (1956). 
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fore or after purchase. The clause therefore could encompass 
places that were in states until Congress acquired them or that 
still are in states even after Congress acquired them. Both in-
terpretations are plausible. On the one hand, the proximity of 
the Enclave Clause to the District Clause and their shared use 
of language granting “exclusive” federal jurisdiction suggests 
that Places have the same status as Districts: both encompass 
land that is no longer within the states from which they were 
acquired. Places can thus revert to state control only by retro-
cession (just as portions of the District reverted to Virginia in 
1846).262 On the other hand, Congress acquires the District by 
“cession” but acquires Places by “purchase,” suggesting that its 
title over Places may not displace state authority as fully as its 
title over the District.263 Places also are inherently more 
ephemeral than the District: the seat of government has re-
mained in the District of Columbia for more than two centuries 
while forts and other federal buildings have come and gone. 
This impermanence suggests that the Enclave Clause may 
have envisioned a relatively fluid reassertion of state control 
over Places when Congress no longer required exclusive juris-
diction. 
 
 262. See supra note 146. 
 263. Chief Justice Marshall overlooked this linguistic distinction when he 
characterized (in dicta) the District and Enclave Clauses as both involving 
“cession of territory.” United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336, 388 
(1818). The precise significance of Article I’s distinction between “cession” and 
“purchase” is unclear, especially given that Congress has “like Authority” over 
lands obtained through both mechanisms. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17; see 
also THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 43, at 272–73 (James Madison) (dis-
cussing the District and Enclave Clauses without highlighting the ces-
sion/purchase distinction, and noting that enclaves should be “exempt” from 
state “authority”). However, the use of different words in close proximity to 
describe the manner of acquiring land presumably was not a drafting accident. 
Indeed, two different words in the Constitution addressing “the same subject” 
generally “cannot be construed as synonymous with one another” because 
“every word must have its due force, and appropriate meaning.” Holmes v. 
Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 570–71 (1840). “Cession” therefore may have 
been a contemporary term of art implying a more complete transfer of sover-
eignty than a mere purchase. Cf. De la Croix v. Chamberlain, 25 U.S. (25 
Wheat.) 599, 600 (1827) (describing the acquisition of Florida from Spain as a 
“purchase and cession”); Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 388–89 (stating that 
“cession of territory” is “essentially the same” as surrendering “general juris-
diction”; in contrast, when the federal government acquires “jurisdiction” over 
state territory that has not been ceded—as in this case of admiralty jurisdic-
tion over state waters—the state retains “residuary powers of legislation”); 
WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 571–72 (5th ed. 
1904) (discussing the consequences of cession). 
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Congress has often—but not always—avoided the need for 
resolving questions about residual state jurisdiction by dis-
claiming the full extent of its Enclave power. Federal statutes 
permit states to retain some concurrent jurisdiction over the 
Places that they sell264 and expressly authorize some state reg-
ulations to apply on federal land.265 Yet Congress can still as-
sert exclusive jurisdiction when states consent, which has 
forced the Supreme Court to consider whether states that grant 
such consent possess any residual jurisdiction over federal 
Places. Sometimes states demand such jurisdiction (such as 
when they try to tax enclave residents),266 and sometimes they 
disclaim it (such as when they try to avoid providing social ser-
vices to enclave residents).267 
The Court’s decisions addressing whether Places remain in 
states have been inconsistent and highlight the text’s ambigui-
ty on a fundamental question about which entities control 
which places in the United States. In S.R.A., Inc. v. Minnesota, 
the Court held that if Congress purchases a Place under the 
Enclave Clause with a state’s unconditional consent, then the 
United States acquires “complete sovereignty,” the Place is no 
longer within the state’s “territorial jurisdiction,” and the Place 
is thus beyond the state’s taxing power.268 But when Congress 
ceases using the land as an enclave and resells it to a private 
purchaser, the land magically reverts to state control even if 
Congress never retroceded it, and thus the state regains power 
 
 264. See 40 U.S.C. § 3112(a) (2006) (disclaiming “exclusive jurisdiction” as 
a prerequisite for acquiring enclaves); Adam S. Grace, Federal-State “Negotia-
tions” over Federal Enclaves in the Early Republic: Finding Solutions to Con-
stitutional Problems at the Birth of the Lighthouse System, 75 MISS. L.J. 545, 
559–69 (2006) (discussing reservations on states’ cession of land for use as fed-
eral lighthouses). The Supreme Court has held that the Enclave Clause per-
mits such conditional transfers. See James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 
134, 148–49 (1937). 
 265. See 4 U.S.C. §§ 105–106 (2006) (state sales and use taxes apply in 
“Federal area[s]”); 16 U.S.C. § 457 (2006) (state wrongful death and personal 
injury laws apply “within a national park or other place subject to the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the United States”); 40 U.S.C. § 3172(a) (2006) (state work-
ers’ compensation laws apply to federal “land and premises”). 
 266. See infra text accompanying note 268. 
 267. See Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. McCorkle, 237 A.2d 640, 643–45 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1968) (rejecting county’s effort to deny child guard-
ianship and adult mental health care to residents of a military base). 
 268. S.R.A., Inc., v. Minn., 327 U.S. 558, 562–63 (1946); see also Pac. Coast 
Dairy v. Dep’t of Agric., 318 U.S. 285, 294 (1943) (characterizing enclaves as 
“federal territory” in which state law is “without force”). 
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to tax the land.269 This arrangement challenges our ordinary 
understanding of words. It is difficult to see how Congress has 
“complete sovereignty” over property it cannot sell without los-
ing its authority over the underlying territory, and how a place 
is not in a state’s territory and yet can become subject to the 
state’s territorial power without any formal retrocession. Yet 
the reversion rule is sensible because otherwise resale of en-
claves would create “isolated islands of federal jurisdiction” 
that are beyond the reach of state law and yet do not involve 
any federal activity.270 An implied reversion interest neatly 
avoids the inconvenience and mischief that these pockets of 
quasi-private, semi-federal land could create. However, the 
Court took a different approach nine years after S.R.A. in 
Howard v. Commissioners of the Sinking Fund.271 In Howard, 
the Court held without any analysis that federal enclaves re-
main within the “geographic structure” of the state that sold 
them.272 The reversion fiction was therefore unnecessary (and 
unmentioned by the Court) because states retained residual 
authority to tax “the federal area within its boundaries, so long 
as there is no interference with the jurisdiction asserted by the 
Federal Government.”273 Howard never cited S.R.A. and never 
attempted to explain how a Place could be outside a state’s 
“territorial jurisdiction” yet within its “geographic structure.” 
Subsequent opinions have echoed aspects of both S.R.A. 
and Howard without reconciling them or contributing addition-
al analysis. Thus, liquor transactions in federal enclaves are 
beyond a state’s “territorial jurisdiction,”274 yet people who live 
in enclaves are treated as state residents for purposes of voting 
in state elections.275 The Court has also held that aspects of 
 
 269. See S.R.A. Inc., 327 U.S. at 563–64 (holding that the federal sale “re-
vest[s] sovereignty in the states”). 
 270. Id. at 563. 
 271. 344 U.S. 624 (1953).  
 272. Id. at 626. 
 273. Id. at 627. 
 274. United States v. State Tax Comm’n, 412 U.S. 363, 378 (1973). 
 275. See Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 421–22 (1970) (holding that res-
idents of the National Institute of Health campus could vote in Maryland). The 
Evans holding treats enclave residents as state residents, which was not nec-
essarily the Founding era view. The evidence from this era is scant, but Jus-
tice Story’s review of the record led him to believe that “the inhabitants of 
[ceded enclaves] cease to be inhabitants of the State, and can no longer exer-
cise any civil or political rights under the laws of the State.” 3 JOSEPH STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1227 (1833); 
see also Opinion of Justices, 42 Mass. (1 Met.) 580, 583 (1841) (“[P]ersons re-
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state law operate as federal common law in enclaves, enabling 
a form of state regulation over land that might not technically 
be in the state.276 Enclaves thus are functionally in states when 
 
siding within [enclaves] do not acquire the civil and political privileges, nor do 
they become subject to the civil duties and obligations of inhabitants of the 
towns within which such territory is situated.”). 
The pragmatism in Evans may foreshadow how the Court would approach 
another awkward question related to residual state authority: How can en-
clave residents get divorced if neither spouse wants to leave the enclave? If 
they are not state residents then state family law may not directly apply. 
Compare Chaney v. Chaney, 201 P.2d 782, 784 (N.M. 1949) (holding that resi-
dents of Los Alamos enclave could not obtain divorce in New Mexico), with 
Hansford v. District of Columbia, 617 A.2d 1057, 1067 (Md. 1993) (citing 
Evans and overruling a prior decision that had barred enclave residents from 
obtaining a divorce in Maryland). Yet there is no generally applicable federal 
law governing marital dissolution. Divorces are therefore available to enclave 
residents only if state law binds residents or if federal common law governing 
the enclave borrows state family law. The Court presumably would be just as 
unwilling to hold that enclave residents cannot divorce as it was to hold that 
they cannot vote, and thus would find a way to apply state law. Cf. Evans, 398 
U.S. at 424 (observing that enclave residents could obtain divorces in Mary-
land, but not considering whether the Constitution required this result).  
 276. This rule is not entirely clear and not fully thought through. In James 
Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, the Court explained that: 
The Constitution does not command that every vestige of the laws of 
the former [state] sovereignty must vanish [when Congress purchases 
land for use as an enclave]. On the contrary its language has long 
been interpreted so as to permit the continuance until abrogated of 
those rules existing at the time of the surrender of sovereignty which 
govern the rights of the occupants of the territory transferred. This 
assures that no area however small will be left without a developed 
legal system for private rights. . . .  
  . . . [O]nly the law in effect at the time of the transfer of jurisdic-
tion continues in force, future statutes of the state are not a part of 
the body of laws in the ceded area. 
309 U.S. 94, 99–100 (1940) (footnote omitted). The Court did not identify the 
mechanism by which state law applied. Given that state law did not apply of 
its own force and that Congress did not enact a statute expressly adopting 
state law, the only plausible explanation is that state law constitutes federal 
common law that courts may apply until Congress adopts a statutory replace-
ment. Cf. Mater v. Holley, 200 F.2d 123, 124–25 (5th Cir. 1953) (holding that 
civil actions invoking the residual state law that applies in enclaves “arise un-
der” federal law). The Court has needlessly limited the effectiveness of this 
common law by stifling its evolution through a rule that adopts post-cession 
changes in state law only if they do not alter the “basic scheme” of pre-cession 
law. Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 269 (1963). Federal common law 
thus remains frozen at an increasingly archaic point. A more sensible rule 
would permit courts to apply contemporary state law in enclaves as federal 
common law to the extent that state law is consistent with federal interests. 
This rule would capture the benefits of state innovation while avoiding state 
overreaching. For a general discussion of when and why federal common law 
borrows from state law, see Radha Pathak, Incorporated State Law (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with author); cf. Michael C. Dorf, Dynamic Incorpo-
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there is a good reason to adopt that fiction (i.e., to avoid disen-
franchising people and to allow states to impose taxes to which 
Congress would be unlikely to object), but are functionally out-
side states when treating enclaves as state land would under-
mine federal interests. 
In a practical sense, the Court’s periodic fixation on and 
vacillation about whether states have “territorial” jurisdiction 
over enclaves is pointless. Even if enclaves are state territory, 
Congress has plenary power over them that preempts state 
law. Accordingly, the only practical effect of deeming enclaves 
to lie outside states is to consign enclave residents to a grey 
area of nonstate citizenship without access to many state ser-
vices. A more sensible regime would posit that: (1) enclaves are 
physically within states, but (2) most state law is preempted. 
This arrangement is essentially what Howard suggested, albeit 
without a clear explanation that would definitively settle the 
question. 
The imprecise constitutional text and jurisprudence gov-
erning Article I “Places” illustrate the quantum indeterminacy 
of federalism: Places exist both as federal space and state space 
depending on the observer and context. The jurisprudence that 
produces this duality is a byproduct of the Constitution’s inat-
tention to the legal significance of the typology of spaces that it 
created. Justice Story inadvertently highlighted this impreci-
sion when he opined that a state’s consent to federal jurisdic-
tion over enclaves is a “virtual surrender and cession of its sov-
ereignty over the place.”277 The word “virtual” is rhetorical 
sleight of hand that masks ambiguity behind a veneer of cer-
tainty and perfectly describes the fragmented transfer of state 
power over enclaves. Virtual cession is apparently not quite the 
same as actual cession, leaving room for interpretative creativi-
ty when reviewing specific regulations affecting specific people 
in specific ways. The legal significance of deeming a space to be 
a Place is thus yet another question of constitutional geography 
that resists formulaic resolution linked to labels and lines on a 
map. 
 
ration of Foreign Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 126 (2008) (noting that federal 
law can incorporate “future” developments in state law). 
 277. United States v. Cornell, 25 F. Cas. 646, 648 (C.C.R.I. 1819) (No. 
14,867) (Story, Circuit Justice). 
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J. THE “HIGH SEAS” 
The Constitution identifies two regions consisting of wa-
ter,278 mentioning each only once. Congress may “define and 
punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas,”279 
and the “judicial Power” extends to “all Cases of admiralty and 
maritime Jurisdiction.”280 This section analyzes the high seas, 
while the next section analyzes admiralty jurisdiction. 
The high Seas are a region that illustrates the complex in-
teractions between powers, places, and people that pervade 
constitutional space, as well as the physical and legal indeter-
minacy endemic to sparsely defined spaces. First, the Constitu-
tion does not define the “high Seas.”281 This imprecision raises 
a tricky interpretative question that courts seem not to have 
noticed: is the “high Seas” a uniquely constitutional space, or 
does the Constitution incorporate international law’s definition 
of a place with the same name?282 And if the Constitution does 
look elsewhere for guidance, to when does it look: the definition 
in 1789 or today?283 These questions hinge in part on the extent 
 
 278. Congress may also regulate “Captures on Land and Water,” but the 
text does not define any particular region or subtype of water. U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 8, cl. 11. Courts have not identified any water to which the clause does not 
apply. Cf. Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 126 (1814) (noting 
that the clause applies to both “exterritorial” and domestic captures).  
 279. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 280. Id. art. III, § 2. 
 281. The term could potentially encompass or exclude a wide array of 
areas, such as different types of tidal and non-tidal inland waters (rivers, in-
lets, harbors, bays, etc.), and coastal waters extending various distances from 
land. See generally 1 THOMAS SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY & MARITIME LAW 
§§ 2-13 to 2-17 (4th ed. 2008) (noting the existence of several formal categories 
of waters, including “internal waters,” “the territorial sea,” “the contiguous 
zone,” “the exclusive economic zone,” and “the continental shelf ”). 
 282. In practice, domestic and international law may differ. For example, 
piracy in territorial waters is generally not within the “high seas” under inter-
national law, but might be within the “high Seas” under U.S. law (based on old 
precedent that has not been overruled). Compare United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, supra note 93, art. 101, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 436 (piracy 
occurs either “on the high seas” or “outside the jurisdiction of any State”), and 
id. art. 86, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 432 (high seas excludes “territorial sea[s]”), with 
United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. 184, 200 (1820) (“Nor can it be objected that 
[the piracy] was within the jurisdictional limits of a foreign State” and thus 
beyond the “high seas”). See also discussion infra at note 287. 
 283. The analytical approach that courts have taken in the related context 
of admiralty suggests that definitions of spaces can evolve over time. See The 
Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 457 (1851) (reject-
ing earlier decisions limiting the scope of admiralty jurisdiction); N.J. Steam 
Navigation Co. v. Merchants’ Bank of Boston, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344, 386 (1848) 
(holding that the constitutional definition of admiralty jurisdiction is broader 
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to which evolving international standards can inform constitu-
tional interpretation.284 The Framers’ indeterminacy with re-
spect to the definition of a space that already existed in an in-
ternational context thus presents uncertainty about both 
semantic meaning and interpretative method. Second, the high 
Seas is a place over which Congress has power, yet most of that 
place is not “in” the United States.285 This disconnect highlights 
the distinction discussed above between an entity (here, the 
United States), the space of which it consists, and the broader 
space where it operates.286 Third, the “high Seas” arguably can 
 
than the Founding era English definition); Sarah H. Cleveland, Our Interna-
tional Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 27–28 (2006) (“The admiralty cases 
. . . explicitly reject the proposition that constitutional admiralty jurisdiction 
should be tied to English law at the time the Constitution was adopted, in favor 
of asserting the role of the U.S. courts . . . as participants in the recognition and 
development of an evolving general transnational jurisprudence of admiralty.”). 
Some theories of interpretation contend that words in the Constitution 
should have a fixed semantic meaning defined by usage at the time of ratifica-
tion. A fixed meaning would not necessarily imply that the scope of the high 
Seas remains static because the semantic meaning of a phrase can include the 
possibility of evolution within the category that the phrase creates. The “high 
Seas” thus could refer either to specific waters that in 1789 were encompassed 
in the international law definition of high seas, or generically to the interna-
tional law category of high seas such that the domestic category evolves along 
with the international category. Choosing between these interpretations would 
require analysis of context and contemporary usage. See generally Jack Bal-
kin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
549, 552–54 (2009); Randy E. Barnett, Is The Constitution Libertarian?, 2009 
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 9, 19 (“[T]he meaning of a written constitution is the se-
mantic meaning of its words in context.”). 
 284. International law can intersect with constitutional law in three ways 
that have generated controversy. International law can have: (1) persuasive 
force if it informs judicial understanding of the Constitution’s text, (2) preemp-
tive force if the Supremacy Clause requires federal courts to apply it and 
states to obey it unless and until Congress displaces it, and (3) preeminent 
force if the Constitution incorporates international standards. See generally 
Agora: The United States Constitution and International Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 42 (2004); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International 
Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. 
REV. 815 (1997); Cleveland, supra note 283; Harold Hongju Koh, Is International 
Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998); Symposium, The De-
bate over Foreign Law in Roper v. Simmons, 119 HARV. L. REV. 103 (2005). 
 285. There is no plausible definition of the United States as a physical loca-
tion that would encompass, for example, a Somali pirate in a skiff on the Gulf 
of Aden. Cf. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 
428, 440–41 (1989) (stating that “high Seas” are generally not within the 
United States’ “territorial jurisdiction”). 
 286. See supra Parts I.A–B. 
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extend into the sovereign waters of other nations.287 Yet Article 
I elsewhere refers to certain legal entities as “foreign.”288 A con-
stitutionally defined space (the high Seas) can thus exist within 
the territory of a different constitutionally defined entity (for-
eign nations), much like a federal “Place” can exist within a 
“State.”289 Fourth, federal authority over the “high Seas” ex-
tends further than merely regulating felonies and piracy. For 
example, Congress’s powers under the Foreign Commerce 
Clause extend to vessels at sea,290 and the President is the 
“Commander in Chief” of the “Navy” while it is deployed.291 
The text’s delineation of a place in the context of a specific pow-
er thus does not preclude the exercise of different powers over 
the place by the same or another federal actor. Fifth, Congress 
has power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to define fel-
onies on land (otherwise there would be virtually no federal 
criminal law).292 This additional authority confirms that the 
enumeration of power over one place (the high Seas) does not 
preclude the exercise of that power over a different place. Sixth, 
 
 287. See 3 STORY, supra note 275, § 1163 (“The phrase [high Seas] embrac-
es . . . waters on the sea-coast . . . whether within the territorial boundaries of 
a [foreign] nation, or of a domestic state.”). But see Eugene Kontorovich, 
Beyond the Article I Horizon: Congress’s Enumerated Powers and Universal 
Jurisdiction over Drug Crimes, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1191, 1237 (2009) (contend-
ing that “the Define and Punish Clause has no application in foreign waters”). 
Even if U.S. law follows the high Seas into foreign territory, the United States 
might be unwilling to enforce federal law in that territory absent authoriza-
tion under international law. See Milena Sterio, The Somali Piracy Problem: A 
Global Puzzle Necessitating a Global Solution, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1449, 1474 
(2010) (discussing the limited scope of U.N. Security Council resolutions au-
thorizing foreign warships to pursue pirates in Somali waters). 
 288. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“foreign Nations”), § 9 (“foreign State”), 
§ 10 (“foreign Power”). 
 289. See supra Part I.I. 
 290. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3; Lord v. Steamship Co., 102 U.S. 541, 
544 (1880) (“[W]hile on the ocean, [a vessel is] engaged in commerce with for-
eign nations, and as such she and the business in which she was engaged were 
subject to the regulating power of Congress.”). 
 291. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 292. The only specific references to non-aquatic federal crimes in the Con-
stitution address counterfeiting, treason, the “Law of Nations,” and conduct 
underlying impeachment. Id. art. I, §§ 3, 8; id. art. III, § 3. For a discussion of 
Congress’s power to define crimes under the Necessary and Proper Clause, see 
John S. Baker, Jr., State Police Powers and the Federalization of Local Crime, 
72 TEMP. L. REV. 673, 700–01 (1999); Kathleen F. Brickey, The Commerce 
Clause and Federalized Crime: A Tale of Two Thieves, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 27, 28 (1996) (“In contrast with the 17 crimes that formed the 
entire body of federal criminal law two centuries ago, there are now more than 
3000 federal crimes on the books today.”). 
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states have some power to apply their criminal law on the high 
Seas.293 This overlapping authority suggests that the Constitu-
tion’s allocation of power over a place to one entity does not au-
tomatically preclude similar regulation by another entity. Fi-
nally, the fact that the United States exercises power on the 
high Seas raises a question about what limits apply to that 
power and what rights belong to various targets of that power, 
such as U.S. citizens being searched or Haitian migrants being 
interdicted. Courts therefore must consider how the Constitu-
tion applies at the intersection of a government power, a de-
fined place, and an affected people.294 Similar analysis also op-
erates in other kinds of spaces, such as unincorporated 
territories and military bases abroad.295 
The foregoing observations are interesting in their own 
right, and they also collectively highlight the limits of the can-
on of interpretation known as expressio unius est exclusio alte-
rius—to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of 
the other.296 The observations show that the High Seas Clause: 
(1) creates federal power that states may partially exercise, (2) 
 
 293. See Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 77 (1941) (“If the United States 
may control the conduct of its citizens upon the high seas, we see no reason 
why the State of Florida may not likewise govern the conduct of its citizens 
upon the high seas with respect to matters in which the State has a legitimate 
interest and where there is no conflict with acts of Congress.”). The Framers 
may not have envisioned the application of state criminal law on the high Seas 
because of contemporary beliefs about the territorial limits of state power. See 
Adam H. Kurland, First Principles of American Federalism and the Nature of 
Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 45 EMORY L.J. 1, 27 (1996). 
 294. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 267 (1990) (dis-
cussing application of the Constitution outside the United States and noting 
that there is “no indication that the Fourth Amendment was understood by 
contemporaries of the Framers to apply to activities of the United States di-
rected against aliens . . . in international waters”). Sometimes the conclusion 
is that noncitizens lack any rights. See Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 953 
F.2d 1498, 1513 (11th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he interdicted Haitians have no recog-
nized substantive rights under the laws or Constitution of the United 
States.”); Louis Henkin, Immigration and the Constitution: A Clean Slate, 35 
VA. J. INT’L L. 333, 334–35 (1994) (“Given the Court’s opinion in the Chinese 
Exclusion Case (an embarrassing title), the Constitution does not apply to the 
admission of persons to the United States. Congress may establish any criteria 
for admission or non-admission, however irrational or invidious, including bla-
tant racial, ethnic, and religious distinctions. Because the Constitution does 
not apply, the United States can seize individuals outside its territory and 
forcibly return them to another country in order to keep them from entering 
the United States: Witness the Haitian interdiction program and the recent 
policy toward Cubans.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 295. See supra Parts I.B, I.G. 
 296. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 793 n.9 (1995). 
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gives Congress power over a place without barring exercise of 
the same power in other places, (3) creates a power over a place 
that is not exclusive of other powers over the same place, (4) 
empowers Congress to act in a place without disempowering 
the President, and (5) defines a place under federal control that 
is concurrently under foreign control. This non-exclusive inter-
action between different constitutional clauses reminds us that 
canons of interpretation that presume systemic consistency are 
often inadequate when the underlying typology is haphazard.297 
The Constitution’s typology of spaces is extremely haphazard, 
which should make interpreters wary of placing excessive 
weight on its categorical distinctions. 
K. “ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME JURISDICTION” 
Analyzing “admiralty” as a space sheds new light on con-
temporary debates about the Admiralty Clause’s meaning by 
highlighting how the Framers created a place that they did not 
assign to a regulator. The only reference to admiralty in the 
Constitution is the extension of the “judicial Power” to “all Cas-
es of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.”298 This “Jurisdic-
tion” at first seems more like a concept than a place. Yet one 
reason that cases can fall within admiralty jurisdiction is that 
the underlying conduct occurs in a physical space to which that 
jurisdiction extends.299 Indeed, the Supreme Court often de-
termines the extent of federal and state regulatory power over 
events connected to water by reference to whether challenged 
activity was within or beyond the spatial limits of admiralty ju-
risdiction.300 It is thus coherent to ask both “what is federal 
 
 297. See David M. Golove, Against Free-Form Textualism, 73 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1791, 1815–16 (1998) (critiquing the expressio unius canon and noting its 
limited applicability). 
 298. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 299. The “locality” of an event is neither necessary nor sufficient to confer 
admiralty jurisdiction. Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 
249, 268 (1972). In tort cases, the event must “bear a significant relationship 
to traditional maritime activity.” Id. In contract cases, an agreement reached 
on land falls within the jurisdiction if it addresses maritime issues (colloquial-
ly, such agreements have a “salty flavor”). Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 
U.S. 731, 742 (1961). 
 300. For example, in United States v. Flores, the defendant argued that the 
enumeration of Congress’s power to regulate crimes on the “high Seas” pre-
cluded Congress from regulating crimes on extraterritorial waters that were 
beyond the high seas. 289 U.S. 137, 146–47 (1933). The Court rejected this ar-
gument and held that the Admiralty Clause “conferr[ed] on Congress” regula-
tory power over various categories of waters, including a port in the Belgian 
Congo. Id. at 148. For other examples of the Court treating admiralty as a 
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admiralty jurisdiction?” and “where is federal admiralty juris-
diction?” The two questions overlap because Congress can enact 
statutes that convert admiralty claims into ordinary common 
law claims.301 An event that physically occurs in admiralty ju-
risdiction therefore does not necessarily arise under admiralty 
jurisdiction. 
Deciphering admiralty’s content and location is difficult 
because admiralty jurisdiction is the only space that the Con-
stitution mentions without any express indication of who con-
trols it or what should happen within it. The Constitution’s im-
precision helps to explain why three puzzles about admiralty 
have intrigued commentators while resisting a satisfying reso-
lution. First, the Supreme Court has held that Congress can 
regulate the “entire subject” of admiralty.302 This conclusion 
raises a question about why federal legislative power exists 
over a place that the Constitution mentions only in Article III 
in the context of judicial power.303 Second, the Court has held 
that the judiciary may create common law governing admiralty 
cases even absent statutory authorization.304 This raises a 
question about why a clause expressly granting courts adjudi-
cative jurisdiction somehow silently grants them regulatory ju-
 
constitutionally defined place, see Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 
205 (1971) (identifying the “locality of the accident” rule that shapes admiralty 
jurisdiction in tort cases); The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. 
(12 How.) 443, 453 (1851) (holding that the scope of Article III admiralty juris-
diction “depends upon the place” where activity occurred). The physical scope 
of admiralty jurisdiction has expanded over time. See id. at 457 (rejecting ear-
lier decisions that limited admiralty jurisdiction to tidal waters).  
 301. See Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 388 (1924). 
 302. Id. at 386 (“Although containing no express grant of legislative power 
over the substantive law, the [Admiralty Clause] was regarded from the be-
ginning as implicitly investing such power in the United States. . . . [T]here is 
no room to doubt that the power of Congress extends to the entire subject.”); 
see also Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 55 n.18 (1932) (“This power [to amend 
and revise the maritime law] is distinct from the authority to regulate interstate 
or foreign commerce and is not limited to cases arising in that commerce.”). 
 303. See Ernest A. Young, The Last Brooding Omnipresence: Erie Railroad 
Co. v. Tompkins and the Unconstitutionality of Preemptive Federal Maritime 
Law, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1349, 1364 (1999) (discussing “bootstrapping theory 
that bases Congress’ ‘admiralty’ power on judicial jurisdiction”); Note, From 
Judicial Grant to Legislative Power: The Admiralty Clause in the Nineteenth 
Century, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1230–37 (1954) (discussing the history of 
Congress’s role in admiralty law). 
 304. See Nw. Airlines v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95–96 (1981) 
(“We consistently have interpreted the grant of general admiralty jurisdiction 
to the federal courts as a proper basis for the development of judge-made rules 
of maritime law.”). 
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risdiction.305 Finally, the Court has held that federal power 
over admiralty can displace state law even absent congression-
al action. In effect, the states are powerless to regulate certain 
admiralty matters.306 This raises a question of why states lack 
concurrent authority over waters within their borders absent 
express legislative preemption307 or dormant constitutional 
preemption in cases implicating foreign affairs.308 All these 
questions arise because the Constitution omits critical informa-
tion about admiralty jurisdiction. The Constitution recognizes 
that admiralty is a place where events happen that might gen-
 
 305. See REDISH, supra note 238, at 140–41 (critiquing the existence of fed-
eral common law regarding maritime commerce in light of the absence of such 
common law governing commerce on land); Bradford R. Clark, Federal Com-
mon Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1334 (1996) 
(challenging the legitimacy of judge-made admiralty rules that “govern mat-
ters within the traditional legislative competence of the states,” but defending 
judge-made law in prize cases and cases implicating foreign relations where 
state law may be inapplicable or preempted); Jonathan M. Gutoff, Federal 
Common Law and Congressional Delegation: A Reconceptualization of Admir-
alty, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 367 (2000) (contending that Congress delegated com-
mon lawmaking authority to courts in admiralty cases); Jay Tidmarsh & Brian 
J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 585, 620–26, 
633–38 (2006) (suggesting that the need for uniformity in foreign policy and an 
implied delegation of authority from Congress may justify judicial creation of 
common law in admiralty cases); Louise Weinberg, Back to the Future: The 
New General Common Law, 35 J. MAR. L. & COM., 523, 554–57 (2004) (ar-
guing that courts can create common law in admiralty cases to protect nation-
al policy interests); Ernest A. Young, It’s Just Water: Toward the Normaliza-
tion of Admiralty, 35 J. MAR. L. & COM. 469, 521 (2004) (critiquing 
exceptionalism that pervades admiralty law and noting that “admiralty must 
be normalized and subjected to normal constitutional rules like Erie”). 
 306. See Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 210 (1996) (“[I]n 
several contexts, we have recognized that vindication of maritime policies de-
manded uniform adherence to a federal rule of decision, with no leeway for 
variation or supplementation by state law.”); Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 
U.S. 443, 452 (1994) (“It would be idle to pretend that the line separating 
permissible from impermissible state regulation is readily discernible in our 
admiralty jurisprudence, or indeed is even entirely consistent within our ad-
miralty jurisprudence.”). 
 307. See Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 
274–75 (1999) (noting that admiralty is “the only area in which ‘general’ com-
mon law is routinely held to preempt contrary state law without any action by 
Congress. This problem of maritime preemption—the relationship of the gen-
eral maritime law to state law governing marine events—has given rise to 
over fifty Supreme Court decisions since 1917 and a set of doctrines that Pro-
fessor David Currie aptly called ‘the Devil’s Own Mess.’”). 
 308. See Clark, supra note 305, at 1357 (noting that the application of 
judge-made admiralty law in state territorial waters may fill a void left by 
constitutional preemption of state laws that “interfere with the conduct of for-
eign relations”). 
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erate litigation, but it does not identify the source of substan-
tive rules that should apply in such litigation. 
A seemingly easy answer to vexing questions about federal 
admiralty power could be that they are red herrings. In con-
trast to Territories and enclaves, admiralty arguably is not a 
special place requiring a specific regulator and therefore justi-
fying federal legislative power in spaces traditionally subject to 
state control. Instead, the Constitution makes admiralty a 
place only insofar as relevant to determining whether federal 
courts can adjudicate cases about activities within it. The scope 
of federal regulatory power over that place is an entirely differ-
ent issue. Article I addresses this issue in the Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce Clauses by giving Congress broad power 
over water forming “channels of commerce” within and beyond 
the United States.309 Congress can thus regulate “maritime 
commerce” to the same extent that it can regulate “commerce 
by plane or truck.”310 Article III may also provide further guid-
ance about who regulates within admiralty’s space by linking 
jurisdiction to the existence of general “maritime” law and 
thereby authorizing federal courts to apply that law unless and 
until Congress modifies it by statute.311 On this view, modern 
 
 309. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995); see supra note 
290. Reframing Congress’s control over admiralty as a subset of its commerce 
power would not create new limits on federal authority over purely intrastate 
waters because those are already exempt from admiralty jurisdiction. See 
THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 1-3, at 14–15 (4th 
ed. 2004) (explaining that admiralty jurisdiction extends only to “navigable 
waters,” which are defined as waters connecting to a “continuous highway” be-
tween states, or beyond the United States). 
 310. Young, supra note 305, at 480. Of course, planes and trucks did not 
exist in 1789. The modern regime giving special status to admiralty thus 
merges an ambiguous text with an uncritical acceptance of tradition.  
 311. Admiralty courts during the post-Founding era applied established 
principles of maritime law, which they perceived as a form of general law that 
was enforceable despite not being rooted in the authority of any particular sov-
ereign. See Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 545–46 
(1828) (“A case in admiralty does not, in fact, arise under the Constitution or 
laws of the United States. . . . [T]he law, admiralty and maritime, as it has ex-
isted for ages, is applied by our Courts to the cases as they arise.”); William A. 
Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 
1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1551–53 
(1984). The idea that this general law is a species of federal common law that 
binds the states is a modern innovation. See John Harrison, The Power of 
Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Text of Article III, 
64 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 252 (1997). General maritime law might have a legiti-
mate modern role, even after Erie Railroad. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 
(1938), if it fills a regulatory void that would otherwise exist due to the inap-
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constitutional law governing admiralty is misguided because it 
removes admiralty from the standard Article I framework for 
thinking about the allocation of regulatory power between the 
state and federal governments. Yet this view has not gained 
traction in case law.312 Some early decisions invoked the Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce Clauses, without mentioning ad-
miralty jurisdiction, to uphold federal statutes governing activ-
ity on navigable waters.313 But the Court subsequently treated 
Congress’s power over admiralty as distinct from Congress’s 
power over commerce314 and has not reconsidered whether 
Congress’s enumerated powers over channels of commerce pre-
clude assertion of unenumerated power over admiralty.315 
 
plicability or preemption of state law and the absence of a federal statute sup-
plying a rule of decision. See Young, supra note 305, at 508–09. 
 312. For discussion of how the commerce power may justify congressional 
regulation of admiralty and maritime law, see REDISH, supra note 238, at 141 
n.167; George W. Healy, III, Remedies for Maritime Personal Injury and 
Wrongful Death in American Law: Sources and Development, 68 TUL. L. REV. 
311, 312 (1994); Young, supra note 303, at 1364. 
 313. See, e.g., The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 564 (1870) (uphold-
ing a federal statute that required licensing of ships in navigable waters); 
Moore v. Am. Transp. Co., 65 U.S. (24 How.) 1, 39 (1861) (commenting in dicta 
that the federal statute governing liability of ship owners “can apply to vessels 
only which are engaged in foreign commerce, and commerce between the 
States”); N.J. Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants’ Bank of Bos., 47 U.S. (6 How.) 
344, 392 (1848) (noting briefly that admiralty jurisdiction might not extend to 
waters beyond the scope of federal “commercial” power); cf. 3 STORY, supra note 
275, § 1672 (noting the need for federal oversight of admiralty matters because 
of their nexus with “commerce and navigation” “abroad” and “at home”). 
 314. See In re Garnett, 141 U.S. 1, 12 (1891) (“It is unnecessary to invoke 
the power given to Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and 
among the several states, in order to find authority to pass the [maritime] law 
in question.”). The Court’s treatment of admiralty and commerce as two dis-
tinct objects of legislative power may have arisen in part because of admiralty 
doctrine’s pedigree in English common law, which was unconstrained by any 
requirement for a nexus with interjurisdictional commerce. Cf. United States 
v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 106 n.a (1820) (discussing the pre-
constitutional history of criminal jurisdiction over admiralty matters due to its 
potential relevance to U.S. law). The Court may also have been concerned that 
linking admiralty to the Commerce Clause might create complications due to 
the potentially limited reach of federal commerce power in the nineteenth cen-
tury. Cf. The Thomas Swan, 23 F. Cas. 1011, 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1872) (No. 
13,931) (holding that the Commerce Clause did not permit Congress to impose 
fire safety rules for a barge on an interstate river because the passengers were 
travelling between points within a single state). 
 315. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 173–74 (1979) (dis-
cussing Congress’s broad commerce power over waters, but not considering 
whether this power obviated scrutiny of Congress’s authority under the Admir-
alty Clause); The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 
451–52 (1851) (raising the possibility that the Commerce Clause might substi-
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The foregoing confusion arises because Admiralty is an or-
phan space that the Constitution references but does not assign 
to a regulatory parent. Greater attention to admiralty’s spatial 
dimension by the Framers would have revealed the need to 
specify who regulates admiralty and what regulations they can 
adopt. Likewise, greater attention to spatial issues by the Su-
preme Court might have avoided admiralty’s exceptionalism by 
fitting admiralty law into the framework for dealing with other 
kinds of spaces, such as enclaves, that are governed by a mix of 
federal legislation, federal common law, and state law.  
II.  THE LAW OF THE LANDLESS: UNENUMERATED 
SPACES   
Part I explored how the Constitution defines fourteen dis-
crete spaces that influence the allocation of government power 
and the scope of individual rights. These spaces often have im-
precise physical contours and ambiguous legal significance. But 
they at least have an express constitutional status that creates 
a foundation for thinking about their scope. In contrast, the 
Constitution never mentions many kinds of spaces that never-
theless have been or could be important in the development of 
constitutional law. Disputes over the boundaries and status of 
these spaces have forced courts to create a federal common law 
of national geography. These rules affect constitutional powers 
and rights without the benefit of explicit constitutional text de-
fining the relevant space.316 
The existence of unenumerated spaces sheds further light 
on the ad hoc nature of the Constitution’s typology of enumer-
ated spaces. The typology provides neither a comprehensive ac-
count of the spaces it defines nor an exhaustive list of the spac-
es that are constitutionally important. The typology is therefore 
 
tute for the Admiralty Clause in justifying congressional regulation of certain 
waters, but not reaching the question because Congress had not invoked its 
commercial authority and the case presented an issue of adjudicative jurisdic-
tion rather than legislative power).  
 316. All judicial decisions interpreting constitutional text are a form of 
common law. See Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common 
Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14, 17 (1975). The cases discussed in Part I are 
therefore part of the same overall body of geographic common law as the cases 
discussed in Part II. The difference lies in the extent to which the two bodies 
of law can plausibly claim to be rooted in an explicit grant of constitutional au-
thority to make rules governing the boundaries of spaces and the nature of 
government authority within them. 
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a helpful starting point for thinking about the “where” question 
in constitutional law, but cannot provide the ending point. 
This Part briefly introduces two types of unenumerated 
physical317 spaces that present vexing constitutional questions 
in part because they are unenumerated: Indian lands and “Ad-
jacent Spaces” along the borders of enumerated spaces.318 The 
goal is to create a foundation for future scholarship by illustrat-
ing how recurring issues in constitutional law are a symptom of 
a broader problem of indeterminacy in the Constitution’s 
treatment of spaces. 
A. INDIAN TERRITORY 
The law governing jurisdiction over Indian territory is a 
convoluted mess. Confusion arises because tribes retain vestig-
es of their prior sovereignty, yet operate within a constitutional 
regime that does not explicitly recognize that sovereignty.319 
 
 317. This Article focuses on physical spaces that existed at the time of the 
Founding and subsequent amendments, and therefore does not discuss “cyber-
space.” For analysis of how constitutional provisions written for a tangible 
world translate into cyberspace, see Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth 
Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1007 
(2010) (seeking “to map the protections of the Fourth Amendment from physi-
cal space to cyberspace”); Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyber-
space, 45 EMORY L.J. 869 (1996); cf. Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace As/And Space, 
107 COLUM. L. REV. 210, 213 (2007) (“The important question is not what kind 
of space cyberspace is, but what kind of space a world that includes cyberspace 
is and will become.”). 
 318. Other examples of unenumerated physical spaces that raise interest-
ing questions about the extent and relative scope of state and federal power 
are local government units (such as cities and counties) and foreign embassies 
and property within the United States. See generally MYRON ORFIELD, 
AMERICAN METROPOLITICS: THE NEW SUBURBAN REALITY (2002) (discussing 
legal and policy issues arising from transboundary interactions in metropoli-
tan regions); Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in 
Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1122 (1996) (suggesting a need for 
“more permeable local boundaries and regionally bounded local governments”); 
Anderson, supra note 32 (discussing legal regimes governing counties and 
multijurisdictional regions); Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations arts. 
22–23, 30, 41, 45, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S 95 (enumerating 
a receiving nation’s obligations with respect to the “premises” of a foreign mis-
sion); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609–1611 (2006) (defining foreign property’s immunity 
from attachment and execution); The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 
U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 135 (1812) (conducting “the very delicate and important 
inquiry, whether an American citizen can assert, in an American court, a title 
to an armed national vessel [belonging to the French Navy], found within the 
waters of the United States”). 
 319. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 
U.S. 316, 326–29 (2008) (noting tribes’ “residual sovereignty”). The convoluted 
character of rules and explanations for the allocation of authority over tribes 
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Land that is nominally under tribal control is therefore not ex-
clusively under tribal control. Wherever there is nonexclusivity 
there is concurrence, and wherever there is concurrence there 
are questions about how to allocate shared authority.320 Courts 
and commentators have for centuries noted the vexing prob-
lems arising from concurrent jurisdiction between the United 
States, individual states, and tribes over Indian lands.321 But 
they have not linked the issue to the broader question of how 
the Constitution treats physical spaces. Thinking about Indian 
lands in this broader context highlights the consequences of 
having a federal system in which the Constitution makes geog-
raphy important, but only partially defines the legal landscape. 
The Constitution mentions “Indians” only three times. All 
three references contemplate a special status for Indians, but 
none indicates how that status might affect the land that In-
dians occupy. The two Apportionment Clauses treat Indians as 
people who might live “in” states but enjoy an exemption from 
taxation that would partially remove them from the state’s po-
litical community.322 This outsider status reappears in the In-
dian Commerce Clause, which recognizes that “Indian[s]” col-
 
also stems in part from the fact that tribes’ current status traces back to fed-
eral conquest of tribal lands. Building jurisprudence on a foundation of conquest 
is an awkward enterprise because “the rule of law cannot be easily harmonized 
across the colonial-constitutional divide.” Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American 
Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 431, 436 (2005). 
 320. See Rosen, supra note 2, at 1135–40 (discussing mechanisms for re-
solving conflicts within regimes authorizing concurrent authority). 
 321. See Barbara Ann Atwood, Fighting over Indian Children: The Uses 
and Abuses of Jurisdictional Ambiguity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 1051 (1989); Vanes-
sa J. Jiménez & Soo C. Song, Concurrent Tribal and State Jurisdiction Under 
Public Law 280, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1627 (1998); Judith Resnik, Tribes, Wars, 
and the Federal Courts: Applying the Myths and the Methods of Marbury v. 
Madison to Tribal Courts’ Criminal Jurisdiction, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 77 (2004); 
Laurie Reynolds, Adjudication in Indian Country: The Confusing Parameters 
of State, Federal, and Tribal Jurisdiction, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 539 (1997); 
Mark D. Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional 
Federal Law: Of Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 479 (2000). 
 322. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (“Indians not taxed” do not count as 
members of the state’s population for purposes of apportionment). This lan-
guage amended Article I, which had similarly excluded “Indians not taxed” 
from state populations without explicitly saying that such Indians lived “in” 
states. Id. art I, § 2; see also Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Suprema-
cy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 125 (2002) (“[The exclusion 
from apportionment] constituted a recognition that Indians, while geographi-
cally located within territory claimed by the United States, were not in any 
political sense part of the nation and should not be counted for representa-
tional purposes.”). 
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lectively form “Tribes” and that commerce “with” these tribes is 
distinct from commerce “with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States.”323 Indians thus exist within a constitutional 
gray area—not quite foreign, but not quite domestic. This gray 
area is tangible because Indians and Tribes occupy physical 
space.324 The existence of such space raises questions about 
who controls it (the Tribes, the states, or the United States) 
and what can, cannot, or must happen within it.325 The Consti-
tution does not explicitly answer these questions because it 
does not include tribal land within its typology of spaces. There 
is no equivalent of the Territory, Property, or Enclave Clauses 
explaining how tribal lands might become annexed to the Unit-
ed States and discussing how tribes, states, and the United 
States would exercise jurisdiction over such lands. Indian lands 
are thus squeezed into a legal regime that does not expressly 
preserve a role for tribal self-government. 
The absence of any constitutional provision addressing In-
dian lands arose from the Framers’ belief that Congress would 
define the status of such lands when the need arose using its 
powers over federal territory, commerce, and foreign affairs.326 
The problem with this approach is that, as we saw in Part I, 
none of Congress’s enumerated powers definitively resolve the 
federalism concerns that arise in a system of divided sovereign-
 
 323. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 324. For a demographic and geographic breakdown of the Indian popula-
tion in the United States, see Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible To Re-
ceive Services From the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 75 Fed. Reg. 60,810 
(Oct. 1, 2010); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WE THE PEOPLE: AMERICAN INDIANS AND 
ALASKA NATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES (2006); U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, AMERICAN INDIAN POPULATION AND LABOR 
FORCE REPORT (2005). For a history of how tribes acquired their current legal 
status, see COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW §§ 1.03–.07 (2005). 
 325. For example, can tribes regulate nonmembers on tribal land, or mem-
bers outside tribal land? Can states tax activities on tribal land, or tax extra-
territorial activities by tribal businesses? Who regulates crimes on tribal land: 
the tribes, the states, the United States, or some combination? 
 326. The Framers anticipated that tribes “would soon either move West, 
assimilate, or become extinct,” which made them an external force to be nego-
tiated with rather than a core internal component of the Union. Nell Jessup 
Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 
U. PA. L. REV. 195, 200 (1984); see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Preconstitu-
tional Federal Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 509, 562 (2007). Congress barred future 
treatymaking with tribes in 1871, leaving development of Indian law to other 
regulatory devices. See 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2006) (“No Indian nation or tribe with-
in the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an 
independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may con-
tract by treaty . . . .”). 
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ty over shared spaces. Adding a third sovereign (tribes) to the 
mix further complicates the problem. It was thus inevitable 
that conflicts would arise between federal, state, and tribal ef-
forts to regulate activity on tribal land, and that courts would 
need to develop doctrines for resolving competing claims of ju-
risdiction under a web of statutes and treaties. The rules (in-
cluding federal common law)327 that have evolved to address 
these jurisdictional issues have constitutional overtones be-
cause they implicate the allocation of power between the na-
tional and state governments. State regulation of tribal affairs 
affect federal interests,328 while tribal autonomy is the mirror 
image of state disempowerment. 
The result of this predictable complexity is that tribal 
lands have a bizarre status. Tribes are treated as “domestic de-
pendant nations,”329 which is a double oxymoron: nations gen-
erally are neither domestic nor dependant. Congress has codi-
fied this unusual terminology in statutes referring to “Indian 
country.”330 The practical meaning of this nation-within-a-
nation and country-within-a-country status is uncertain be-
cause the land that tribes occupy bears little resemblance to 
anything in the Constitution’s typology of spaces. Formally, 
tribal lands lie within states’ territory,331 although until recent-
ly this was unclear and courts often characterized tribal lands 
as if they were outside the states.332 In addition to being in 
 
 327. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 324, § 4.02[1]; Frank Pommer-
sheim, Tribal Courts and the Federal Judiciary: Opportunities and Challenges 
for a Constitutional Democracy, 58 MONT. L. REV. 313, 328 (1997) (“[T]he 
Court now recognizes a judicial plenary power to parse the limits of tribal 
court authority based on federal common law.”). 
 328. The “trust relationship” between the United States and tribes creates 
a federal interest in tribal affairs. United States v. White Mountain Apache 
Tribe, 537 U.S. 464, 476 n.3 (2003). 
 329. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). 
 330. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006) (defining the term).  
 331. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001) (“State sovereignty does 
not end at a reservation’s border.”). 
 332. See McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 168–69 
(1973) (reviewing history of the Court’s treatment of tribal lands as beyond 
state control); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832) (“The 
treaties and laws of the United States contemplate the Indian territory as 
completely separated from that of the states . . . .”). The Court went so far as 
to deem tribes beyond federal jurisdiction for purposes of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s provision granting citizenship to “[a]ll persons born . . . in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 
94, 101–03 (1884) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1) (denying citizenship 
to an Indian born in the United States). The Court has never overruled Elk. 
Congress has mooted the issue by granting citizenship to Indians born in the 
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states, tribal lands are also within the tribe’s “territorial juris-
diction”333—sort of. Tribal jurisdiction is incomplete because it 
often does not extend to nonmembers.334 The upshot is a form 
of concurrent jurisdiction in which the states and tribes each 
have partially overlapping and partially exclusive authority 
subject to broad federal power to preempt state and tribal 
law.335 
Indian lands thus raise many of the same issues as the 
spaces discussed in Part I, but in a more complicated context 
with less explicit textual guidance. The Constitution does not 
expressly anticipate the acquisition of tribal lands and there-
fore does not integrate these lands into the national regime of 
divided sovereignty.336 Including tribal lands within the typolo-
gy of spaces would not have eliminated the need to make diffi-
cult choices in particular cases involving competing claims of 
power and autonomy, but at least would have structured con-
gressional and judicial discretion. Absent such a formal struc-
 
United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2006); cf. Levinson, supra note 62, at 
262 (“[T]o this day the Constitution does not truly follow the flag in regard to 
Indian nations within the territorial United States. The Bill of Rights has 
never been formally ‘incorporated’ against Indian nations, and even the Indian 
Civil Rights Act, which extends most of the protections of the Bill of Rights to 
members of Indian tribes, nonetheless omits the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment.”). 
 333. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 126 (1993). 
 334. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997) (“[A]bsent ex-
press authorization by federal statute or treaty, tribal jurisdiction over the 
conduct of nonmembers exists only in limited circumstances.”); Katherine J. 
Florey, Indian Country’s Borders: Territoriality, Immunity, and the Construc-
tion of Tribal Sovereignty, 51 B.C. L. REV. 595, 602 (2010) (“[T]he U.S. Su-
preme Court’s Indian law jurisprudence of the last fifty years . . . has made 
identity of parties, rather than location, the basis for tribal jurisdiction in both 
its adjudicative and regulatory aspects.”). 
 335. Further complexity arises because a statutory regime known as Public 
Law 280 allows the relative scope of state and federal power over tribes to vary 
from state to state. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. § 1321, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 
(delegating federal regulatory authority to several, but not all, states with tribal 
populations). For a comprehensive discussion of how concurrent jurisdiction 
operates in practice, see COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 324, §§ 5–6. 
 336. Some national constitutions do attempt to account for semi-
autonomous enclaves housing indigenous populations, although these efforts 
post-date the U.S. Founding era. See, e.g., Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Does Con-
stitutional Change Matter? Canada’s Recognition of Aboriginal Title, 22 ARIZ. 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 449, 450 (2005) (discussing section 35 of Canada’s Consti-
tution); Gonzalo Aguilar et al., The Constitutional Recognition of Indigenous 
Peoples in Latin America, 2 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION 44, 75–81 
(2010), http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context= 
pilronline (comparing constitutional treatment of indigenous land claims in 
fifteen countries in Central and South America). 
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ture, future scholarship should consider whether analogizing 
Indian lands to other kinds of constitutional spaces can suggest 
helpful ways of conceptualizing particular doctrinal problems, 
such as the role of state law on tribal land and tribal law on 
state land, the preemptive force of federal law, and the content 
and legitimacy of federal common law. The goal would be to sit-
uate Indian law within a broader constitutional landscape rath-
er than to view it solely as an idiosyncratic silo of doctrine. 
B. ADJACENT SPACES: ABOVE (THE AIR), BELOW 
(UNDERGROUND RESOURCES), BESIDE (COASTAL WATERS AND 
SUBMERGED LANDS), AND BETWEEN (BOUNDARY RIVERS) 
The Constitution’s typology of spaces envisions interjuris-
dictional boundaries as two-dimensional. Imaginary lines on a 
map mark the limits of each space. This approach to spatial 
definition creates two problems. First, the Constitution con-
templates spaces with breadth, but does not necessarily consid-
er their depth or height. Second, the boundaries between spac-
es often run along natural landmarks without an obvious 
beginning and end. A border line can thus mutate into a border 
zone that straddles two distinct spaces, creating confusion 
about the legal significance of events that occur within that 
zone. Both problems implicate what I call Adjacent Spaces: the 
unmentioned spaces that are above, below, beside, and between 
the spaces that the Constitution explicitly references. One can 
imagine an argument that Adjacent Spaces do not really exist; 
they may simply be part of the places they touch. References to 
a “state” and “the air above the state” accordingly might both 
encompass the same constitutional place.337 But in practice Ad-
jacent Spaces often have a special status, such that events oc-
curring within them do not merit the same treatment as simi-
lar events occurring in their attached counterparts. Thinking 
about Adjacent Spaces as distinct spaces, or at least as distinct 
subtypes of spaces, can therefore illuminate problems regard-
ing the extent of government power and individual rights with-
in these spaces. 
The Constitution has little to say about Adjacent Spaces, 
once again requiring courts to create common law with minimal 
textual guidance. Likewise, scholars have never systematically 
analyzed Adjacent Spaces. A comprehensive account of these 
 
 337. Cf. Ford, supra note 33, at 854 (“The modern world is divided into ju-
risdictions. Gaps or zones of unclaimed or ambiguously apportioned territory 
are anomalous.”). 
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spaces is beyond the scope of this Article, but a brief discussion 
can lay a foundation for future exploration. This section there-
fore briefly addresses three types of Adjacent Spaces: the air, 
underground resources, and rivers that run along state borders. 
These often-overlooked regions have an indeterminate constitu-
tional status that requires considering many of the same types 
of questions that Part I addressed about the contours of spaces, 
the content and source of rules governing spaces, and the allo-
cation of concurrent regulatory authority. More generally, the 
overlapping state and federal interests within each of these 
spaces further challenge the utility of relying on physical 
boundary lines and categorical labels to structure government 
power and individual rights.  
First, consider the air above the United States. The air is 
essentially a modern analogue to admiralty jurisdiction—a 
channel of transportation and commerce shared by actors mov-
ing between multiple jurisdictions under circumstances requir-
ing uniform rules. But unlike admiralty, the Constitution never 
mentions the air (which is unsurprising given that air travel 
was not viable in 1789). Thinking about air as a space within 
the constitutional framework raises at least three interesting 
questions about how air overlaps with other spaces. First, is the 
air above a state also within that state? Courts have uncritical-
ly assumed that states have territorial control over their air-
space in cases where states tried to exercise personal jurisdic-
tion over defendants served on airplanes.338 Yet state 
jurisdiction must end somewhere. For example, it does not ex-
tend to orbiting satellites.339 So there may be an altitude 
beyond which the fiction of territorial jurisdiction evaporates.340 
 
 338. See Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 444 (E.D. Ark. 1959). A 
similar issue of legislative jurisdiction would arise if a person committed a tort 
on an aircraft. 
 339. See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Ex-
ploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bod-
ies art. II, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 605 (establishing that 
outer space is beyond national “sovereignty”). If states lack power over space, 
there is a question of how much power they possess over “spaceports” on 
Earth. See Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, One Half Century and Counting: The 
Evolution of U.S. National Space Law & Three Long-Term Emerging Issues, 4 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 405, 421 (2010). 
 340. That altitude cannot be so low as to prevent property owners from 
building upon and using their land. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 
264 (1946) (“We have said that the airspace is a public highway. Yet it is ob-
vious that if the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have 
exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere.”); id. 
at 266 (“Flights over private land are not a taking, unless they are so low and 
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Second, even if state territory extends vertically, there is a 
question about whether Congress and the federal judiciary 
have the same legislative and common law authority over the 
air that they have over admiralty. The air is a channel of com-
merce in which Congress can preempt state law,341 and over 
which Congress has claimed “exclusive” national “sovereign-
ty.”342 However, it is not clear that dormant federal preemption 
over navigable airspace is as strong as dormant preemption 
over navigable waters, and thus the role of federal common law 
is uncertain.343 Third, the mirror image of the question about 
whether state power over land encompasses some of the appur-
tenant air is whether federal power over air encompasses some 
 
so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment 
and use of the land.”). A similar problem arose at the dawn of air travel when 
nations were forced to consider whether air was an extension of national terri-
tory or was instead analogous to oceans that all nations could access. See 
STUART BANNER, WHO OWNS THE SKY? 42–68 (2008) (discussing how lawyers 
structured early legal regimes governing air travel).  
 341. See Chi. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 107 
(1948) (“[Air] travel which quickly escapes the bounds of local regulative com-
petence called for a more penetrating, uniform and exclusive regulation by the 
nation than had been thought appropriate for the more easily controlled com-
merce of the past.”). 
 342. 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1) (2006). “Federal Acts regulating air commerce 
are bottomed on the commerce power of Congress, not on national ownership 
of the navigable air space, as distinguished from sovereignty.” Braniff Airways, 
Inc. v. Neb. State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 347 U.S. 590, 596 (1954). 
 343. Cf. Nancy Lee Firak & Kimberly A. Schmaltz, Air Rage: Choice of Law 
for Intentional Torts Occurring in Flight Over International Waters, 63 ALB. L. 
REV. 1, 120 n.893 (1999) (“Even though Congress has not acted to make avia-
tion tort law uniform, the federal common law is evolving in that direction.”); 
Justin T. Barkowski, Comment, Managing Air Traffic Congestion Through the 
Next Generation Air Transportation System: Satellite-Based Technology, Tra-
jectories, and—Privatization?, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 247, 254 n.28 (2010) (discuss-
ing history of concurrent state and federal regulation of airspace); Note, Third 
Party Liability of the Private Space Industry: To Pay What No One Has Paid 
Before, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 503, 533–35 (1991) (comparing space common 
law and admiralty common law, and its relation to laws surrounding air-
space). The Framers obviously did not devote the same attention to air com-
merce that they did to maritime commerce, which raises a question about how 
to translate their fixation with navigable waters to the advent of navigable 
airspace. A similar issue arises in the context of discussions about whether 
Congress’s authority to raise “Armies” and a “Navy” and regulate “land and 
naval” forces, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12, 14, renders the Air Force uncon-
stitutional even though it was not foreseen and therefore could not have been 
intentionally precluded. See Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal 
Realism, and the Interpretation of “This Constitution,” 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 
1232–33 (1987); Samuel Issacharoff, The Elusive Search for Constitutional In-
tegrity: A Memorial For John Hart Ely, 57 STAN. L. REV. 727, 727 (2004); Law-
rence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1203 (1993). 
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of the appurtenant land. This question arises because air travel 
requires airports, and thus federal power over airspace may ex-
tend to the lands that planes use to access this space.344 The ex-
tent of federal power over land as an incident to its power over 
the air remains an open question.345 The air thus hovers above 
us as an unenumerated space in the “public domain” lacking 
“precise limits” and a clear legal status.346 
Second, the land beneath states also presents fascinating 
federalism questions because state law currently determines 
property rights in oil and gas resources extracted from under-
ground deposits.347 State primacy makes sense from the per-
spective of someone looking down on a two-dimensional map: 
the resources emerge from underneath the place marked on the 
map as a state, and so the state’s government decides how to 
allocate them. But if we think about federal space from a three-
dimensional perspective and imagine a lateral view of the 
United States, we would see the air on top, the ground in the 
middle, and a large area below. The middle area is generally 
under state control. But if the air is possibly a unique space 
subject to federal control despite being appurtenant to the 
state, then subterranean space might have a quasi-federal sta-
tus as well. While this underground space is not navigable, like 
the air, another aspect implicates federal interests. When liq-
uid or gaseous resource deposits span state lines, extraction in 
one state depletes supplies available to the others.348 Whether 
 
 344. In an analogous context, Congress has recognized the nexus between 
land and maritime commerce by regulating seaports. See Longshore and Har-
bor Workers Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (2006); Ports and Wa-
terways Safety Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1221 et seq. (2006). 
 345. Cf. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Local Airport Regulation: The Constitu-
tional Tension Between Police Power, Preemption & Takings, 11 PENN ST. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 17–20 (2002) (discussing federal preemption of state author-
ity to regulate airports); Jeffrey A. Berger, Comment, Phoenix Grounded: The 
Impact of the Supreme Court’s Changing Preemption Doctrine on State and 
Local Impediments to Airport Expansion, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 941, 963–71 (2003) 
(discussing federal statutes governing airports). 
 346. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946). 
 347. See generally 1 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MYERS, OIL & 
GAS LAW § 201 (2005) (providing an overview of how states conceptualize 
property rights in oil and gas); Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The 
Rule of Capture–An Oil and Gas Perspective, 35 ENVTL. L. 899, 900–05 (2005) 
(discussing history of oil and gas regulation in U.S. states). 
 348. To see why, imagine two people sharing the same milkshake through 
two straws. Even if each person keeps their straw on “their half ” of the glass, 
each is capable of fully consuming the milkshake (thus denying the other their 
just desert). 
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this zero-sum situation is sufficient to convert subterranean 
transborder resource deposits into a distinct space meriting a 
special regulatory regime is debatable.349 On the one hand, a 
race between states or their citizens to capture scarce shared 
resources could create interstate conflict meriting preemptive 
federal intervention.350 Technological innovations that open 
subterranean spaces to new uses likewise might generate in-
terstate friction requiring a federal solution. For example, car-
bon sequestration—which involves diverting atmospheric car-
bon dioxide into underground containment mechanisms—raises 
numerous questions to which appurtenant states may have dif-
 
 349. Even if such deposits are not a novel form of federal space, Congress 
presumably still could play a role in their management given the commercial 
nature of extraction operations and the interstate character of the harvested 
resources. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 953–54 
(1982) (holding that groundwater pumped from an interstate aquifer is an “ar-
ticle of commerce” that Congress can regulate); Blake Hudson, Commerce in 
the Commons: A New Conception of Environmental and Natural Resource 
Regulation Under the Commerce Clause, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2011) (“Since the ‘object of regulation’ of privatized commons resources is the act 
of appropriation, which is an economic transaction, these acts can be aggre-
gated for the purpose of finding a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”); 
Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory 
State, 92 IOWA L. REV. 545, 579 (2007) (noting that the Supreme Court’s re-
cent skepticism about federal commerce power in cases involving natural re-
sources has focused on Congress’s efforts to regulate “seemingly local activities”). 
 350. For example, in Oklahoma v. Texas, the Supreme Court noted that 
Texas and Oklahoma had each granted conflicting rights to the same land 
along their disputed border, creating a “danger of armed conflict between rival 
claimants” seeking to drill for oil beneath that land. 256 U.S. 70, 84 (1921). 
The Court resolved the conflict over drilling rights by determining the location 
of the interstate border. See id. at 92. In theory, the conflict could have fes-
tered if the field spanned both states but was accessible only from wells on one 
side of the border, but that apparently was not an issue in the litigation. Many 
states have rules governing “unitization” and “pooling” which give landowners 
rights to prevent adjacent owners from capturing all the resources from a sub-
terranean field spanning multiple parcels. Jacqueline Lang Weaver & David 
F. Asmus, Unitizing Oil and Gas Fields Around the World: A Comparative 
Analysis of National Laws and Private Contracts, 28 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 3, 6 n.2 
(2006). But these regimes are creatures of state law, raising a question about 
whether federal law should mandate some form of unitization when resources 
span state lines and are at risk of capture from a single aggressive driller in 
one of the states. 
A different federalism problem could arise from slant drilling—i.e., the 
drilling of a well in state A that spans diagonally into a field located entirely 
beneath state B. States have developed responses to slant drilling when it oc-
curs entirely within the state; for example, when one landowner siphons re-
sources from beneath an adjacent parcel. See generally Owen L. Anderson, 
Subsurface ‘Trespass’: A Man’s Subsurface Is Not His Castle, 49 WASHBURN 
L.J. 247 (2010). However, scholars do not appear to have considered the choice 
of law and preemption issues that might arise if the well crosses a state line. 
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ferent answers.351 To resolve or prevent conflict over extraction 
or injection of transborder resources, one could imagine 
preempting state law with a federal common law or statutory 
regime, or creating a scheme of concurrent state jurisdiction 
analogous to the rules that govern surface-level boundary riv-
ers.352 Yet invasive federal oversight might be unnecessary be-
cause states have mutual incentives to prevent disputes by 
agreeing in advance about how to allocate resources. Indeed, 
states have acted proactively by adopting interstate compacts 
to address oil and gas drilling353 and the analogous problem of 
water allocation in river systems that span state lines (where 
upstream uses have downstream effects).354 An additional fac-
 
 351. See, e.g., Thomas R. Decesar, An Evaluation of Eminent Domain and a 
National Carbon Capture and Geologic Sequestration Program: Redefining the 
Space Below, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261, 275 (2010) (describing how carbon 
sequestration programs implicate state property law, but not addressing the 
issues of interstate conflict or choice of law); Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth 
J. Wilson, Climate Change, Carbon Sequestration, and Property Rights, 2010 
U. ILL. L. REV. 363 (considering the possible role of federal law in governing 
property rights in deep “pore space” where carbon could be stored beneath 
states). Another innovation involving insertion rather than extraction of re-
sources into transborder fields is hydraulic fracturing, which entails injecting 
fluids into coal or shale beds in the hope of improving their productivity. See 
Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil 
and Gas Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. 
L. REV. 115, 157–67 (2009) (discussing conflicting state regulatory regimes 
without considering how state law would apply to interstate fields). For a gen-
eral discussion of how new technologies may require expanding federal control 
over underground spaces, see John G. Sprankling, Owning the Center of the 
Earth, 55 UCLA L. REV. 979, 1032–33 (2008). 
 352. See infra text accompanying notes 356–63. 
 353. See Interstate Compact to Conserve Oil and Gas, Aug. 27, 1935, ch. 
781, 49 Stat. 939. For a description of the compact and the commission that it 
creates, see INTERSTATE OIL AND GAS COMPACT COMMISSION, http://www.iogcc 
.state.ok.us/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2011). 
 354. See, e.g., Jessica A. Bielecki, Managing Resources with Interstate 
Compacts: A Perspective from the Great Lakes, 14 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 173 
(2007); Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water 
Management in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405 (2006). If 
states cannot agree about the disposition of interjurisdictional water re-
sources, federal common law can fill the void. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 
47 (1907) (establishing the doctrine of equitable apportionment); J.B. Ruhl, 
Equitable Apportionment of Ecosystem Services: New Water Law for a New 
Water Age, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 47 (2003). For a general discussion of 
how surface and sub-surface water systems create federalism problems by in-
tersecting with each other and spanning state lines, see John D. Leshy, Inter-
state Groundwater Resources: The Federal Role, 14 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1475 (2008). For a summary of how state laws governing 
surface waters and groundwaters vary, see James H. Davenport, Less is More: 
A Limited Approach to Multi-State Management of Interstate Groundwater 
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tor complicating federalizing management of underground re-
sources is that the existence of state-created property interests 
means that a new federal regulatory regime for subterranean 
spaces would implicate the Takings Clause.355 Accordingly, 
mapping subterranean space into constitutional space presents 
interesting theoretical and policy questions meriting further 
study, especially if new technologies reveal deficiencies in the 
current model positing that states extend downward. 
Third, many states share borders along rivers. Sometimes 
the border follows the shoreline,356 and sometimes it follows the 
middle of the river’s channel.357 Either way, practical problems 
arise because activities on land spill into the river, and activi-
ties on one side of the river spill across its middle.358 Congress 
has often addressed these problems in statutes defining state 
borders by granting two states “concurrent jurisdiction” over 
rivers constituting a “common boundary.”359 These rivers there-
 
Basins, 12 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 139, 160 (2008) (presenting a table that 
summarizes each state’s water apportionment system). 
Bi- and multi-lateral agreements have likewise been a mechanism for re-
solving disputes in the analogous context of transnational resource deposits. 
See, e.g., Joseph W. Dellapenna, International Law’s Lessons for the Law of the 
Lakes, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 747, 750–61 (2007) (discussing the “unusually 
complicated amalgam of international, interstate and interprovincial, nation-
al, and state law” governing water rights in the Great Lakes along the 
U.S./Canada border); Paul Stanton Kibel, A Line Drawn in Water: Aquifers 
Beneath the Mexico-United States Border, 12 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 191 
(2008) (discussing the legal framework for addressing extraterritorial effects of 
U.S. water management decisions); Karla Urdaneta, Transboundary Petro-
leum Reservoirs: A Recommended Approach for the United States and Mexico 
in the Deepwaters of the Gulf of Mexico, 32 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 333 (2010) (dis-
cussing bilateral agreements governing oil and gas deposits spanning the 
U.S./Mexico border).  
 355. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. Merely modifying the scope of state com-
mon law or statutory property rights to address interstate externalities of pri-
vate conduct would not automatically constitute a taking, but could raise con-
stitutional questions depending on the nature and effect of the new federal 
rule. See generally Kramer & Anderson, supra note 347, at 915; Deborah 
Clarke Trejo, Identifying and Valuing Groundwater Withdrawal Rights in the 
Context of Takings Claims—A Texas Case Study, 23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 409 
(2010). For example, different analytical frameworks would apply depending on 
whether federal preemption of state law entirely eliminated a private property 
right or merely imposed conditions on the property’s use. See Tahoe-Sierra 
Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322–23 (2002). 
 356. See Act of June 15, 1836, ch. 100, § 1, 5 Stat. 50, 51 (Arkansas’ border 
with Texas extends to the “north bank” of the Red River). 
 357. See Act of Mar. 6, 1820, ch. 22, § 2, 3 Stat. 545, 545 (eastern border of 
Missouri runs to the “middle” of the Mississippi River). 
 358. See infra text accompanying notes 360–61. 
 359. Act of Feb. 14, 1859, ch. 33, § 2, 11 Stat. 383, 383 (Oregon); Act. of 
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fore have an oddly indeterminate status. They simultaneously 
are part of a state, subject to the power of a different state, and 
subject to broad federal power over commerce and admiralty. 
Overlapping authority covering a single space complicates 
analysis of state power to, for example, prosecute crimes, apply 
civil law, and exercise personal jurisdiction with respect to ac-
tivities on boundary rivers.360 The extension of state jurisdic-
tion to boundary rivers also raised theoretical questions before 
the Civil War about whether a free state could liberate slaves 
on passing boats.361 More generally, the prospect that one state 
can have federal statutory jurisdiction over the territory of 
another state raises a puzzle about where these rivers are and 
who is really regulating them. The rivers in a sense may be 
both federal and state territory, or they may be state territory 
where state law does not apply of its own force, but rather be-
cause Congress has incorporated it into federal law.362 Bound-
ary rivers thus illustrate that state borders are often zones 
rather than lines, and that the Constitution may tolerate flexi-
 
Feb. 26, 1857, ch. 60, § 2, 11 Stat. 166, 166 (Minnesota); Act of Aug. 6, 1846, 
ch. 89, § 3, 9 Stat. 56, 57 (Wisconsin); Act of Mar. 3, 1845, ch. 48, § 3, 5 Stat. 
742, 743 (Iowa); Act of Mar. 6, 1820, ch. 22, § 2, 3 Stat. 545, 546 (Missouri); 
Act of Apr. 18, 1818, ch. 67, § 2, 3 Stat. 428, 429 (Illinois); Act of Apr. 19, 1816, 
ch. 57, § 2, 3 Stat. 289, 289 (Indiana). 
 360. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 159 S.W. 1132 (Ark. 1913) (upholding Arkan-
sas’ authority to prosecute gambling that occurred on a houseboat on Missouri’s 
side of the St. Francis River); Phillips v. People, 55 Ill. 429 (1870) (affirming 
conviction in Illinois stemming from an assault on the Mississippi River de-
spite the fact that the defendant had already been convicted of the same crime 
in Iowa, which shared jurisdiction over the river); State v. Mullen, 35 Iowa 199 
(1872) (holding that Iowa could prosecute proprietors of a floating “house of ill-
fame” that had run aground on the opposite bank of the Mississippi River); 
Christian v. Birch, 763 N.W.2d 50, 60 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (upholding per-
sonal jurisdiction over a person within the state’s “concurrent jurisdiction” 
even if she was not within its territory); Sanders v. St. Louis & N.O. Anchor 
Line, 10 S.W. 595, 596–97 (Mo. 1889) (upholding application of Missouri law 
in an action for the wrongful death of a steamboat deck hand despite the fact 
that the accident occurred on Illinois’ side of the Mississippi River). 
 361. See, e.g., State v. Hoppess, 1845 WL 2675 (Ohio Feb. 1845) (declining 
to interfere with navigation of the Ohio River by freeing a slave on a boat tem-
porarily docked in Ohio). 
 362. The Supreme Court has never explored the constitutional basis for 
granting two states concurrent jurisdiction over the same place. Cf. Miller v. 
McLaughlin, 281 U.S. 261, 263 (1930) (“The grant of concurrent jurisdiction to 
Iowa does not deprive Nebraska of power to legislate with respect to its own 
residents within its own territorial limits.”); Wedding v. Meyler, 192 U.S. 573, 
585 (1904) (“The conveniences and inconveniences of concurrent jurisdiction 
[over rivers] both are obvious, and do not need to be stated. We have nothing 
to do with them when the law-making power has spoken.”). 
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ble approaches to unusual spaces that do not fit neatly within 
its formal typology.363 
  CONCLUSION   
Physical spaces are real—they have substance and dimen-
sion. But legal spaces are merely fictions that facilitate the 
public ordering of interactions in the physical world. These fic-
tions have no intrinsic content or value and convey only as 
much meaning as lawmakers provide and observers perceive. 
The Constitution’s drafters constructed many fictional spaces, 
but endowed the distinctions between them with less meaning 
than is commonly assumed. A systemic approach to constitu-
tional spaces reveals that categorical labels and lines on a map 
often cannot resolve dilemmas arising from the fragmentation 
and overlap of sovereignty over spaces containing a transient 
mix of insiders and outsiders. Many constitutional spaces lack 
precise boundaries, and even when boundaries are apparent 
the extent and allocation of government authority within par-
ticular spaces is unclear. Scholars have noticed this imprecision 
in numerous discrete contexts that they often treat as isolated 
phenomena. A broader survey of the constitutional landscape 
reveals that these phenomena share common features. 
The indeterminacy of spatial labels pervades the Constitu-
tion and complicates analysis of basic questions discussed 
above, such as: When do outsiders have rights within a space 
and when do insiders carry their rights outside a space? Which 
spaces are amenable to regulation by states, the United States, 
tribes, or some combination? When should a place that is not in 
a state (such as the District or a Territory) be treated as if it 
were in a state; and when should a place that is in a state (such 
as an enclave, tribal reservation, boundary river, or navigable 
 
 363. A similar border zone exists when state land abuts a coastline, al-
though in that context the issues are how far into the ocean (and how deep) 
state authority extends and the extent to which federal law preempts that au-
thority even within state territory. See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 
19, 38–40 (1947) (holding that the United States rather than California had 
“dominion” over submerged land beneath “marginal sea” extending three miles 
from the state’s coastline); Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1356 
(2006) (responding to California by extending state borders three miles beyond 
the coast, granting states property rights over submerged lands within that 
three-mile zone, and extending federal authority seaward from the outer edge 
of the three-mile zone to “outer Continental Shelf ”). For a discussion of the 
complex federalism issues that arise from attempts to exploit coastal re-
sources, see Rachael E. Salcido, Offshore Federalism and Ocean Industrializa-
tion, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1355 (2008). 
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water) be treated as if it were not? When is federal law’s control 
over a space so overwhelming that it preempts any state regu-
lation, to the point where courts may create federal common 
law to fill the void? When should spatial rules be functional and 
when should they be formal?364 Should the contours and signif-
icance of spatial boundaries change over time, and if so what 
factors influence intertemporal variations in constitutional 
meaning?365 When does authority over territory—whether it be 
a state, the United States, Property, Indian Country, or air-
space—include authority over extraterritorial events implicat-
ing that territory? And who decides the answers to the fore-
going questions with respect to particular spaces: courts, 
Congress, individual states, or the political process? 
Recognizing that these and other questions arise in many 
spatial contexts can promote clearer thinking about each indi-
vidual question and identify complexity, analogies, and recur-
ring themes that might otherwise evade critical scrutiny. The 
analysis in this Article can thus help generate insights about 
myriad doctrines implicating the geographic scope of govern-
ment power and individual rights. 
 
 364. For example, the Guantánamo Bay naval base is within the United 
States in the functional sense that the Suspension Clause applies, but not in 
the formal sense that people born in it are United States citizens. See supra 
notes 92, 101. 
 365. One can imagine a wide variety of demographic, technological, and 
conceptual innovations that arguably could affect constitutional law governing 
particular spaces. For example, extraterritorial regulation may be more ap-
propriate today than in the past given the relative ease with which conduct in 
one space can affect other spaces, individual rights may now require a broader 
ambit in light of greater individual mobility and the longer reach of govern-
ment actors, overlapping regulatory authority may be more pervasive and tol-
erable than originally anticipated, spaces may have evolved in scope (such as 
the high Seas and admiralty jurisdiction), and the functional character of par-
ticular spaces may have transformed to an extent requiring reconsideration of 
their formal status (such as the District, enclaves, and Indian lands). 
